Finance. The prospective statements of Indian finance have not always been realized; but every account I have received from Bombay leads me to think, that the above will be an exception; but even if there is a disappointment this year, I am sanguine in the expectation, that if the economical measures adopted are rigidly persevered in, the reduction of expenditure will be progressive. I shall not enter into details. These will be found in the papers laid before the Committee of the House of Commons, and are given also, as far as I had information, in the Appendix A, page 90. I have before stated the revision made in the different branches of the Bombay Government with a view to relieve the finance. This required a change of almost every department which included the consolidation of duties, the diminution of offices and establishments, the lessening of the number of agents, but the augmentation, in some cases, of salaries where individual charge and responsibility were increased. While all the actual reductions made were approved, and more directed, it was with real regret I learned that the Court of Directors have not thought as I did, that increased allowances to those to whom higher and more laborious duties were assigned were essential, but have directed that the pay of such officers should be reduced to a scale ordered for the stations they held-when these were on a very dif ferent footing from what they had been placed by a system, the success of which depended upon a selection of men who, independent of the ordinary routine of their duties, were employed as active aids in the check and supervision of public expenditure. In a letter which I wrote to the chairman of the Finance. Court of Directors, I observed, speaking of the individuals whose salaries were raised:-" The increase of 66 66 66 salary to these public officers was part, and a most "essential one, of a system which included great re"ductions. It was to them I looked for Government being enabled to maintain a system which, in all cases of contingent charge, established a prompt audit, and a check upon demand, not issue; and not only through such means lessened actual disburse"ment, but gave the best security that could be obtained, to guard against that greatest of all evils, the gradual growth of public expenditure." 66 66 I have understood that the Government of Bombay, after carrying into execution the orders of the Court of Directors, have urged, in the strongest manner, the necessity of their being reconsidered, which I trust they will, otherwise the reduction of a few salaries will be as a unit against the losses sustained. The local government must, to maintain the rigid system of economy that has been established, have the power of stimulating and rewarding the zeal and activity of the best talent in the service. Without such aids in every department, neither check nor supervision will be adequate to prevent the recurrence of those abuses which will invariably take place, when we expect in such governments to substitute routine duties of public officers, and multiplied vouchers and checks, for that individual energy and active integrity which detects by continued vigilance every approach to that neglect or indifference which is so baneful to every plan calculated to promote permanent economy. Political. CHAPTER III. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF BRITISH INDIA, AND I NOw proceed to offer some short observations on the general Government of India, and on those plans which have been suggested for its improvement. My sentiments on this subject are given very fully in my letter under date the 26th March, 1832, to the Secretary of the India Board, which, with its enclosure of a letter to Lord William Bentinck, on the Civil Government of India, forms a number of the Appendix *. One of the most important questions relating to the political administration of India is that of subsidiary alliances with native princes. These, which had been adopted on our first advance to political power in India, were extended and took a more systematical shape under the government of the Marquis Wellesley. It was at that period the paramount power of the British Government in India was, for the first time, openly avowed, and the necessity of its maintenance assumed, as a fundamental principle of our administration; and one which, beyond all others, was essential to the preservation of the peace and prosperity of the Indian empire. The past and probable future effects of these alliances have been the ground of much discussion. It * Vide Appendix D, p. 151. is a subject on which I was examined by the Com- Political. mittee of the House of Commons; and I cannot better convey my sentiments on the operation of this system, than by quoting my answer to a query which required my opinion on subsidiary treaties. 66 66 66 "I am aware,” I stated, "that a very different opinion " will be formed, connected with the policy and result of our subsidiary treaties, between persons who have judged them at a distance and from records, however full, and those who have personally had an opportunity, not only of being instrumental in their negotiation, but have seen them in all their results. The latter is my case. I consider, that, from our condition "in India, we have had in the political branch always an option of difficulties, and that our subsidiary alliances have been formed either for the purpose of defending ourselves through them against our enemies, or subsequently for maintaining that general tranquillity which we pledged ourselves to protect at "their original formation. In the war in which we "became engaged with Tippoo Sultan, we were 66 66 66 66 obliged to form subsidiary alliances with the Nizam " and the Peishwa; and without these alliances, we "could not have protected our own dominions in the "south of India from the invasion of that prince, much less have subdued so irreconcilable an enemy to the "British Government. After we had taken this first step, the fulfilment of our engagements with good "faith towards the Nizam led to the subsidiary alliance "with him being maintained and extended, for the purpose of protecting him against a combination of Political," the Mahrattas. That combination assuming a hostile 46 66 66 66 66 aspect towards our government, obliged the GovernorGeneral of India, at the period of which I am speaking (1802), to adopt the best measures he could for enabling the British Government to resist the attacks " with which it and its allies were threatened, from the policy and conduct of the Mahratta princes, Dowlut Row Sindia, Ragojee Bhonsela, and Jeswunt Row Holkar, rulers who continued to be influenced by the principles of predatory warfare which are inherent "in the constitution of Mahratta states. The Peishwa "Bajerow, who had long been solicited to enter into a subsidiary alliance, in order to protect himself, as well "as us and our allies, against the chiefs of his own "nation, was withheld by jealousy of the British power "from contracting such an engagement, until an actual "attack upon his capital forced him to fly to its terri"tories for protection, and led to the treaty of Bassein. "That treaty no doubt might have precipitated the hostilities that took place afterwards with the Mah"ratta chiefs in 1803; but I am quite confident that war could not have been ultimately avoided, and that the continual preparation which we had been for "several years obliged to make, in order to save us "from attack, would have been ruinous to the finances " of government. The result of our subsidiary alliance "with the Peishwa gave our troops military positions, "before the war of 1803 commenced, within his territories, that ensured a success which established for "a period the peace of India; and had our subsidiary system been then extended, we should have, I 66 |