of life, with the different bias and way of thinking they give to the mind, that he may so conduct himself in his behaviour and manner of speaking, as will render him most acceptable, and gain him the good esteem of those whom he addresses.

Of the Passions.

THE third and last part of rhetorical invention relates to the passions, of which I am now to discourse. And as it is often highly necessary for the orator, so it requires his greatest skill to engage these in his interest. Quintilian calls this, The soul and spirit of his art. And, doubtless, nothing more discovers its empire over the minds of men than this power to excite, appease, and sway their passions, agreeably to the design of the speaker. Hence we meet with the characters of admirable, divine, and other splendid titles, ascribed to eloquence by ancient writers. There is nothing great or noble to be performed in life, wherein the passions are not concerned. The stoics, therefore, who were for eradicating the passions, both maintained a thing in itself impossible; and which, if it was possible, would be of the greatest prejudice to mankind. For while they appeared such zealous asserters of the government of reason, they scarce left it any thing to govern; for the authority of reason is principally exercised in ruling and moderating the passions, which, when kept in a due regulation, are the springs and motives to virtue. Thus hope produces patience, and fear industry, and the like might be shown of the rest. The passions, therefore, are not to be extirpated, as the stoics asserted, but put under the direction

and conduct of reason. Indeed, where they are ungovernable, and, instead of obeying, command, they are, as some have fitly called them, diseases of the mind, and frequently hurry men into vice, and the greatest misfortunes of life. Just as the wind, when it blows moderately, carries on the ship; but if it be too boisterous and violent, may overset her. The charge, therefore, brought against this art, for giving rules to influence the passions, appears groundless and unjust; since the proper use of the passions is not to hinder the exercise of reason, but to engage men to act agreeably to reason and if an ill use be sometimes made of this, it is not the fault of the art but of the artist. So moralists explain the nature both of virtues and vices, that men may know better how to practise one, and avoid the other; but if their precepts happen to have a different effect, they are not answerable for that.

But that an orator may be enabled to manage this part of his province to the best advantage, it is necessary he should, in some measure, be acquainted with the nature, causes, and objects of the passions. Now the passions, as defined by Aristotle, are, Commotions of the mind, under the influence of which men think differently concerning the same things. Thus a thing appears good to him who desires it; though it may not appear so to another, or to the same person at a different time. Writers are not agreed as to the number of the passions. But I shall wave this dispute, as the more proper business of philosophy, and only consider them as they come under the cognizance of the orator. And that I may proceed in some order, I shall treat of them as they may be separately referred, either to demonstrative, deliberative, or judicial discourses;

though they are not wholly confined to any of them.

To the demonstrative kind we may refer joy and sorrow, love and hatred, emulation and contempt.

Joy is an elation of the mind, arising from a sense of some present good. Such a reflexion naturally creates a pleasant and agreeable sensation, which ends in a delightful calm and serenity. This is heightened by a description of former evils, and a comparison between them and the present felicity. Thus Cicero endeavours to excite in the minds of his fellow citizens the highest sense of joy and delight at Catiline's departure from Rome, by representing to them the imminent danger which threatened both them and the city, while he continued among them.

Sorrow, on the contrary, is an uneasiness of mind, arising from a sense of some present evil. This passion has generally a place in funereal discourses, and it may be heightened like the former by comparison, when any past happiness is set in opposition to a present calamity. Hence Cicero aggravates the sorrow at Rome, occasioned by the death of Metellus, from his character, and great services to the public while living.

Love excites us to esteem another for some excellency, and to do him all the good in our power. It is distinguished from friendship, which is mutual; and therefore love may continue where friendship is lost: that is, the affection may remain on one side. And when we assist a person from no other motive, but to do him a kindness, Aristotle calls this good will. Love takes its rise from a variety of causes. Generosity, benevolence, integrity, gratitude, courtesy,

and other social virtues, are great incitements to love any one endued with such qualities. And persons generally love those who are of a like disposition with themselves, and pursue the same views. It is therefore the chief art of a flatterer, to suit himself in every thing to the inclination of the person whose good graces he courts. When the orator would excite this affection towards any person, it is proper to show that he is possessed of some at least, if not all these agreeable qualities. When the conspirators with Catiline were to be brought to justice, Cicero was very sensible of the envy he should contract on that account, and how necessary it was for him to secure the love of the Roman senate for his support and protection in that critical juncture. And this he endeavours to do in his fourth oration against Catiline, by representing to them, in the most pathetic manner, that all the labours he underwent, the difficulties he conflicted with, and the dangers to which he was exposed on that account, were not for his own sake, but for their safety, quiet, and happiness.

Hatred is opposed to love, and produced by the contrary dispositions. And therefore persons hate those who never did them any injury, from the ill opinion they have of their base and vicious inclinations. So that the way to excite this passion is, by showing that any one has committed some heinous fact with an ill intent. And the more nearly affected persons are by such actions, in what they account of the greatest concern, the higher in proportion their hatred rises. Since life therefore is esteemed the most valuable good, Cicero endeavours to render Mark Antony odious to the citizens of Rome, by describing his cruelty.

Emulation is a disquiet, occasioned by the fe

licity of another, not because he enjoys it, but because we desire the like for ourselves. So that this passion is in itself good and laudable, as it engages men to pursue those things which are so. For the proper objects of emulation are any advantages of mind, body, or fortune, acquired by study or labour. And persons are generally excited to an emulation of those with whom they converse. So children are often ambitious of the like virtues or honours which they see in their relations or friends. And therefore it was a very proper question of Andromache to Eneas, concerning Ascanius, which we have in Virgil:

"What hopes are promised from his blooming years! How much of Hector's soul in him appears!" Emulation therefore is excited by a lively représentation of any desirable advantages, which appear to be attainable from the example of others who are, or have been, possessed of them. But where the felicity of another occasions an uneasiness, not from the want of it, but because he enjoys it, this passion is called envy; which the ancients describe as a hideous monster, feeding upon itself, and being its own tormentor. Aristotle observes, that it most usually affects such persons who were once upon a level with those they envy. For most men naturally think so well of themselves, that they are uneasy to see those who were formerly their equals advanced above them. But as this is a base and vicious passion, the orator is not to be informed how to excite it, but how to lesson or remove it. And the method prescribed by Cicero for this purpose is, to show that the things which occasioned it have not happened to the envied person undeservedly, but are the just reward of his industry or virtue; that he does not so much convert them to his own profit or pleasure, as to the be