ENUMERATION takes in all the parts of a thing. And from this we prove, that what agrees to all the parts agrees to the whole; and what does not agree to any one or more parts, does not agree to the whole. As when Cicero proves to Piso, that all the Roman state hated him; by enumerating the several ranks and orders of Roman Citizens, who all did so.

NOTATION or Etymology explains the meaning or signification of a word. From which we reason thus; If he cannot pay his debts, he is insolvent; for that is the meaning of the word insolvent.

GENUS is what contains under it two or more sorts of things, differing in nature. From this head logicians reason thus: because every animal is mortal, and man is an animal, therefore man is mortal. But orators make a further use of this argument, which they call ascending from the hypothesis to the thesis, that is, from a particular to a general. As should a person, when speaking in praise of justice, take occasion thence to commend and show the excellency of virtue in general, with a view to render that particular virtue more amiable. For since every species contains in it the whole nature of the genus to which it relates, besides what is peculiar to itself, whereby it is distinguished from it,-what is affirmed of the genus must of necessity be applicable to the species.

SPECIES is that which comprehends under it all the individuals of the same nature. From hence we may argue: He is a man, therefore he has a rational soul. And orators sometimes take occasion from this head to descend from the thesis to the hypothesis; that is, in treating upon what is more general to introduce some particular contained under it, for the greater illustration of the general.

ANTECEDENTS are such things, as being once allowed, others necessarily, or very probably follow. From this head an inseparable property is proved from its subject: as, it is material, and therefore corruptible.

CONSEQUENTS are such things, as being allowed, necessarily, or very probably, infer their antecedents. Hence the subject is proved from an inseparable property in this manner; it is corruptible, and therefore material.

ADJUNCTS are separable properties of things, or circumstances that attend them. These are very numerous, and afford a great variety of arguments, some of which usually occur in every discourse. They do not necessarily infer their subject, but, if fitly chosen, render a thing credible, and are a sufficient ground for assent. The way of reasoning from them we shall show presently.

CONJUGATES are words deduced from the same origin with that of our subject. By these the habit is proved from its acts; as, he who does justly is just. He does not act wisely, therefore he is not wise. But this inference will not hold, unless the actions appear continued and constant.

A CAUSE is that, by the force of which a thing does exist. There are four kinds of causes,matter, form, efficient, and end, which afford a great variety of arguments. The way of reasoning from them is to infer the effect from the cause: as, Man is endued with reason, therefore he is capable of knowledge.

AN EFFECT is that which arises from a cause, therefore the cause is proved by it; as, He is endued with knowledge, therefore with rea

son.

CONTRARIES are things which, under the same genus, are at the utmost distance from each

other. So that what we grant to the one we utterly deny the other: as, Virtue ought to be embraced, therefore vice should be avoided.

OPPOSITES are such things, which, though repugnant to each other, yet are not directly contradictory as, to love and to injure; to hate and to commend. They differ from contraries in this, that they do not absolutely exclude one another. An argument is drawn from things repugnant thus: He will do a man a mischief, therefore he does not love him. He loves a man, therefore he will not reproach him.

SIMILITUDE is an agreement of things in quality. Thus Cicero proves, that pernicious citizens ought to be taken out of the state; by the likeness they bear to corrupted members, which are cut off to prevent further damage to the body.

DISSIMILITUDE is a disagreement of things in quality. From this head Cicero shows the preference of his own exile to Piso's Government of Macedonia: by the difference between their conduct, and the people's esteem of them.

COMPARISON is made three ways: for either a thing is compared with a greater, with a less, or with its equal. This place therefore differs from that of similitude on this account, that the quality was considered in that, but here the quantity. An argument from the greater is thus drawn: If five legions could not conquer the enemy, much less will two. And by this the manner of the rest may be easily conceived.

I shall just give one example somewhat larger than I have hitherto done of the manner of reasoning from these heads, whereby the uge of them may further appear. If any one therefore should have endeavoured to persuade Cicero not to accept of his life upon the condi

tion offered him by Antony,-that he would burn his Philippic orations, which had been spoken against him,—he might be supposed to use such arguments as these: partly taken from the adjuncts of Cicero, partly from those of Antony, and partly from the thing itself. And first with regard to Cicero it might be said: That so great a man ought not to purchase his life at so dear a price, as the loss of that immortal honour which, by so great pains and labour, he had acquired. And this might be confirmed by another argument: That now he was grown old and could not expect to live much longer. And from the character of Antony he might argue thus: That he was very crafty and deceitful, and only designed, by giving him hopes of life, to have the Philippics first burnt, which otherwise he knew would transmit to posterity an eternal brand of infamy upon him, and then he would take off the author. And this might be shown by comparison: For since he would not spare others, who had not so highly exasperated him, and from whom he had not so much to fear, certainly he would not forgive Cicero, since he knew well enough, that, so long as he lived, he himself could never be in safety. And lastly an argument might also be fetched from the nature of the thing itself in the following manner That Cicero by this action would shamefully betray the state, and the cause of liberty, which he had, through his whole life, most courageously defended, with so great honour to himself, and advantage to the public. Upon such an account a person might have used these, or the like arguments with Cicero, which arise from the forementioned heads.

From this account of Common Places it is easy to conceive what a large field of discourse they open to the mind upon every subject. These

different considerations furnish out a great number and variety of arguments, sufficient to supply the most barren invention. He can never be at a loss for matter who considers well the nature of his subject, the parts of which it consists, the circumstances which attend it, the causes whence it springs, the effects it produces, its agreement, disagreement, or repugnancy to other things,and in like manner carries it through all the remaining heads. But although But although this method will assist us very much to enlarge upon a subject, and place it in different views, yet a prudent man is not so desirous to say a great deal as to speak to the purpose, and therefore will make choice of proper arguments, and such only which have a direct tendency to confirm or illustrate his subject. And for this end it is necessary for him to gain first a thorough knowledge of his subject, and then arguments will naturally spring up in his mind proper to support it; and if he be still at a loss, and find occasion to have recourse to these heads, he will readily perceive whence to take those which are best suited to his purpose.

Of External Topics.

THE nature and design of Common Places have been shown already; and a particular account of those which, because they are taken from the subject matter of a discourse, are therefore called internal, has likewise been given. But the orator sometimes reasons from such topics as do not arise from his subject, but from things of a different nature, and for that reason, are called external. And because the former are more properly invented by him, and the effect of his art, Aristotle calls them artificial

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