1688. despatch, and all possible haste: the king had then but eighteen ships riding in the Downs: but a much greater fleet was almost ready to come out they only wanted seamen, who came in very slowly.

When these things were laid before the prince, he said, he could by no means resolve to come over with so small a force: he could not believe what they suggested, concerning the king's army's being disposed to come over to him: nor did he reckon, so much as they did, on the people of the country's coming in to him: he said, he could trust to neither of these he could not undertake so great a design, the miscarriage of which would be the ruin both of England and Holland, without such a force, as he had reason to believe would be superior to the king's own, though his whole army should stick to him. Some proposed, that the prince would divide his force, and land himself with the greatest part in the north, and send a detachment to the west under marshal Schomberg. They pressed the prince very earnestly to bring him over with him, both because of the great reputation he was in, and because they thought it was a security to the prince's person, and to the whole design, to have another general with him, to whom all would submit in case of any dismal accident: for it seemed too much to have all depend on a single life: and they thought that would be the safer, if their enemies saw another person capable of the command, in case they should have a design upon the prince's person. With this the prince complied easily, and obtained the elector's consent to carry him over with him. But he rejected the motion of dividing his fleet and army. He said, such a divided force might be fatal: for if

the king should send his chief strength against the 1688. detachment, and have the advantage, it might lose the whole business; since a misfortune in any one part might be the ruin of the whole.

When these advices were proposed to Herbert 778 and the other seamen, they opposed the landing in the north vehemently. They said, no seamen had been consulted in that: the north coast was not fit for a fleet to ride in, in an east wind, which it was to be expected in winter might blow so fresh that it would not be possible to preserve the fleet: and if the fleet was left there, the channel was open for such forces as might be sent from France: the channel was the safer sea for the fleet to ride in, as well as to cut off the assistance from France. the advices for this were so positive, and so often repeated from England, that the prince was resolved to have split the matter, and to have landed in the north, and then to have sent the fleet to lie in the channel.

Yet

cover the

The prince continued still to cover his design, Artifices to and to look towards Colen. He ordered a review design. of his army, and an encampment for two months at Nimeguen. A train of artillery was also ordered. By these orders the officers saw a necessity of furnishing themselves for so long a time. The main point remained, how money should be found for so chargeable an expedition. The French ambassador had his eye upon this; and reckoned that, whensoever any thing relating to it should be moved, it would be then easy to raise an opposition, or at least to create a delay. But Fagel's great foresight did prevent this. In the July before, it was represented to the States, that now by reason of the

1688. neighbourhood of Colen, and the war that was like

to arise there, it was necessary to repair their places, both on the Rhine and the Issel, which were in a very bad condition. This was agreed to: and the charge was estimated at four millions of guilders. So the States created a fund for the interest of that money, and ordered it to be taken up by a loan. It was all brought in in four days. About the end of September a message was delivered to the States from the elector of Brandenburgh, by which he undertook to send an army into his country of Cleve, and to secure the States from all danger on that side for this winter.

Upon this, it was proposed to lend the prince the four millions. And this passed easily in the States, without any opposition, to the amazement of all that saw it for it had never been known, that so great and so dangerous an expedition in such a season had been so easily agreed to, without so much as one disagreeing vote, either at the Hague, or in any of the towns of Holland. All people went so cordially into it, that it was not necessary to employ much time in satisfying them, both of the lawfulness and of the necessity of the undertaking. Fagel had sent for all the eminent ministers of the chief towns 779 of Holland: and, as he had a vehemence as well as a tenderness in speaking, he convinced them evidently, that both their religion and their country were in such imminent danger, that nothing but this expedition could save them: they saw the persecution in France: and in that they might see what was to be expected from that religion: they saw the violence with which the king of England was driving matters in his country, which, if not stopped,

would soon prevail. He sent them thus full of zeal, 1688. to dispose the people to a hearty approbation and concurrence in this design. The ministers in Holland are so watched over by the States, that they have no more authority when they meet in a body, in a synod, or in a classis, than the States think fit to allow them. But I was never in any place, where I thought the clergy had generally so much credit with the people, as they have there: and they employed it all upon this occasion very diligently, and to good purpose. Those who had no regard to religion, yet saw a war begun in the empire by the French. And the publication of the alliance between France and England by the French ambassador, made them conclude that England would join with France. They reckoned they could not stand before such an united force, and that therefore it was necessary to take England out of the hands of a prince who was such a firm ally to France. All the English that lived in Holland, especially the merchants that were settled in Amsterdam, where the opposition was like to be strongest, had such positive advices of the disposition that the nation and even the army were in, that, as this undertaking was considered as the only probable means of their preservation, it seemed so well concerted, that little doubt was made of success, except what arose from the season; which was not only far spent, but the winds were both so contrary and so stormy for many weeks, that a forcible stop seemed put to it by the hand of Heaven.

Herbert went to sea with the Dutch fleet: and The Dutch put to sea. was ordered to stand over to the Downs, and to look on the English fleet, to try if any would come

1688. over, of which some hopes were given; or to engage them, while they were then not above eighteen or twenty ships strong. But the contrary winds made this not only impracticable, but gave great reason to fear that a great part of the fleet would be either lost or disabled. These continued for above a fortnight, and gave us at the Hague a melancholy prospect. Herbert also found, that the fleet was neither so strong nor so well manned as he had expected.

780

Some fac

tious mo

Hague.

All the English that were scattered about the Provinces, or in Germany, came to the Hague. tions at the Among these there was one Wildman, who, from being an agitator in Cromwell's army, had been a constant meddler on all occasions in every thing that looked like sedition, and seemed inclined to oppose every thing that was uppermost. He brought his usual ill humour along with him, having a peculiar talent in possessing others by a sort of contagion with jealousy and discontent. To these the prince ordered his declaration to be shewed. Wildman took great exceptions to it, with which he possessed many to such a degree, that they began to say, they would not engage upon those grounds. Wildman had drawn one, in which he had laid down a scheme of the government of England, and then had set forth many particulars in which it had been violated, carrying these a great way into king Charles's reign; all which he supported by many authorities from law books. He objected to the prince's insisting so much on the dispensing power, and on what had been done to the bishops. He said, there was certainly a dispensing power in the crown, practised for some ages: very few patents passed in which there was not a non obstante to one or more acts of