Held, that the covenant to pay land-tax, &c. was a common covenant in a lease reserving a net rent; and that the proviso for re-entry must, with reference to a lease of a public-house, also be considered usual and common. Bennett v. Womack, H. 8 & 9 G.4. Page 627 6. In construing acts of parliament, the Court must take into consideration, not only the language. of the preamble or of any particular clause, but of the whole act; and if in some of the enacting, clauses expressions are t found of more extensive inport than in others, or than in the preamble, the Court will give effect to those more extensive expressions, if upon a view of the whole act it appears to have been the intention of the legislature that they should have I effect.

J

1

Upon this ground, where a 1lease of certain waggon-ways was granted to A. B, under the authority of an act of parliament, in which, as well as in the lease, there was a proviso for re-entry, in case he neglected in any one year to bring a certain quantity of coals to C. for the use of the inhabitants of L., and sell them there at a certain price; and by a subsequent act, the preamble of which recited that the price was inadequate, and that the inhabitants of L. would sustain great inconvenience if A. B. ceased to supply them with coals; it was enacted, first, that the former act, confirming the lease, (except such parts as were thereby altered or repealed,) should continue; that A. B. might sell his coals brought to and deposited at C., or at any other place near thereto, to be used as a repository for coals,

instead thereof, at a certain increased price. Another section provided, that if A. B. neglected to bring the stipulated quantity of coals to C, or to such other place near thereto, to be used as a repository for coals instead thereof, and sell them there at the price fixed by that act, his interest in the waggon-ways should cease: Held, that although the preamble did not recite an intention to give A. B. liberty to change the place used as a repository for coals; and although it was not expressly enacted that he might do so, yet that the intention of the legislature to give him that privilege was clear, and that he might do so without forfeiting his interest in the waggon-ways. Doe dem. Bywater v. Brandling and Others, H. 8 & 9 G. 4.

LATITAT. See PRACTICE, 11.

Page 643

LEASE. See LANDLORD and Tenant, 2. 4, 5, 6. STAMP, 5.

LIBEL.

Declaration stated, that defendant contriving, &c., did print and publish of and concerning the plaintiff a libel, containing the false and scandalous matter following, without alleging that that matter was of and concerning the plaintiff, and then set out the libel, which on the face of it did not manifestly appear to relate to the plaintiff, and there was no inuendo to connect it with the plaintiff; Held, upon writ of error, that the count was bad. Clement -v. Fisher (in error), M. 8 G. 4.

459 LICENCE.

LICENCE.

See TROVER, 4.

LIEN.

1. A wharfinger at Hull claimed a general lien for wharfage, labourage, (comprising landing, weighing, and delivery), and warehouse rent. The claim for wharfage was admitted, but as to the residue, upon a case, stating that in Hull such claim had, in a great majority of instances, been acquiesced in, but in others had been rejected, and that the right had long been, and still was a disputed point there: Held, that the claim could not be supported, as the right of general lien arises out of an express or implied contract, of which the former had not been made, and the latter could not be inferred from the circumstances stated in the case. Holderness and Another, Assignees, v. Collinson, T. 8 G. 4.

Page 212

2. Where a broker having accepted bills for his principal, on the security of goods then in his hands, pledged the goods with a person who had notice of the agency, but did not inform the principal of this transaction: Held, that under the 6 G. 4. c. 94. s. 5. the broker could only transfer such right as he had, which was a right to be indemnified against the bills which he had accepted; and that the principal having satisfied those bills, was entitled to have back his goods from the pawnee, without paying the amount for which they were pledged. Fletcher v. Heath and Others, M. 8 G.4. 517

MANDAMUS.

Where an appeal against an order of removal was dismissed on the

ground that the appellant had not given the notice required by the rules of the justices, this Court, thinking it reasonable that the appeal should be heard, granted a mandamus to the justices to enter continuances and hear the appeal. The King v. The Justices of Lancashire, H. 8 & 9 G. 4. Page 691

MARKET.

The lord of an ancient market may, by law, have a right to prevent other persons from selling goods in their private houses situated within the limits of his franchise.

t

Where such a market had been from ancient times held in a public street, but in consequence of the increased population and traffic, persons frequenting the mar ket-place were subjected to inconvenience and danger, and the lord had permitted part of the market-place to be used for other purposes than for the sale of articles usually sold there. In an action, brought by the lord against the owner of a house adjoining to the market-place for there opening a shop and selling goods, but who, at the time when he sold the goods, had a stall in the market-place which he might have occupied; it was held, that it was properly submitted to the jury, to find whether, from the state of the market-place, the defendant had a reasonable cause for selling in his private house; and a verdict having been found for the plaintiff, the Court refused to grant a new trial. Mosley v. Walker, T. 8 G. 4.

MARSHAL.

See PRACTICE, 15.

40

MASTER

MASTER AND SERVANT. Where a person, employed by an attorney to keep possession of goods seized under a fieri facias, made complaint to a magistrate, that he could not obtain payment for his services, and the magistrate, having summoned the party and heard the complaint, proceeded under the 20 G. 2. c. 19., and made an order upon the attorney for payment of a certain sum, which was afterwards levied on his goods: Held, that the magistrate was liable to an action of trespass, for that the service 1. performed was not of such a nature as to give him jurisdiction under the 20 G. 2. c. 19. Branwell v. Penneck, M. 8 G. 4. .. Page 536

OVERSEER.

See APPEAL, 3. POOR RATE, 5. 1. An overseer has not, by virtue

of his office, any authority to borrow money; and in an action against a surety on a bond éonditioned for the overseer's faithfully accounting for all sums received by him by virtue of his office, the surety is not liable for a sum lent to the overseer, and applied by him to parochial purposes. Leigh and Another v. Taylor, M. 8 G. 4. Page 491

2. By statute 17 G. 2. c. 3. s. 2. it is enacted, "That overseers of the poor shall permit inhabitants of the parish to inspect rates at all seasonable times;" and by section 3. "if any overseer shall not permit an inhabitant to inspect the rate, such overseer for every such offence shall forfeit and pay to the party aggrieved the sum of 201.:" Held, first, that a demand to inspent a rate made on the overseer by a rated inhabitant in the presence of his attorney, was a lawful demand.

9.11

Secondly, that the refusal to produce the rate upon a lawful demand constitutes the inhabitant a party grieved within the meaning of the statute.

Thirdly, that a notice that a rate of so much in the pound would be collected forthwith, was a good publication of the rate, although it was not stated that it had been allowed by the justices. Fourthly, that a demand to see "the rate was sufficiently specific, there being only one rate in esse at that time.

"

Fifthly, that the overseer, by refusing to shew the rate, and referring the party to the select vestry as a place where he would be allowed to inspect it, incur3L

red

red the penalty imposed by the 17 G. 2. c. 3.

Sixthly, that an assistant overseer, appointed by a select vestry under the provisions of the 59 G.3. c. 12. s. 9., is not liable to the penalties imposed by the 17 G. 2. c. 3. s. 3. upon overseers not permitting inhabitants to inspect the rate, unless it be proved that the select vestry have imposed upon such assistant overseer the duty of producing the rate to the inhabitants. Bennett v. Edwards, M. 8 G. 4. Page 586

3. Where a demand to inspect a rate was made upon an overseer on his own premises, not far from his house, and he refused to allow the inspection, but not on the ground that it was inconvenient to go to his house for that purpose: : Held, in an action against him for the refusal, that this was a reasonable demand. Parker v. Edwards, M. 8 G. 4.

pany, and retained A. to defend the actions, and in the course of making that defence a bill of costs was incurred: Held, that A., as a member of the company, being jointly liable to contribute to the expense of defending those actions, could not maintain any action against B. and C. for his bill of costs. Milburn v. Codd, M. 8 G. 4. Page 419 3. Where A. and B. agreed to take a farm, and pay C., the former occupier, for certain articles, by bills at three months, and C. afterwards, without the knowledge or consent of A., took from B. bills for the amount, payable at six and twelve months, accepted by himself in his own name and A.'s: Held that the latter could not be sued on the bills. Greenslade v. Dower and Colman, H. 8 & 9 G. 4. 635

PAYMENT.

1. Where the seller of goods received from the purchaser an order upon his banker for the price, and the latter (with whom money had been deposited to meet that and certain other demands), offered to pay in cash, deducting discount for the period of credit, or by a bill upon a third person, which the seller elected to take: Held, that although the bill was afterwards dishonoured, he could not sue the purchaser for the price of the goods. Smith and Others v. Ferrand, T. 8 G. 4.