co-operation, obtained possession of the port of Kwang-chaufu, which is the best outlet to the sea of the southern province of Kwangsi. Some surprise was felt at the moderation of the French demand, as it was generally assumed that France had cast her eyes on Hainan, but perhaps her experience of island colonies was such as to deter her from embarking on a new venture like that of Madagascar. Of Hainan itself it may be said that, although its transfer from Chinese to European hands would not be difficult, its conquest from the aboriginal tribes might be attended with greater loss and trouble. At the same time that France obtained Kwang-chau-fu, she reiterated her claim, previously advanced by M. Gerard in 1895, to a prior right to control the future of the province of Yunnan. The claim in itself is neither more nor less natural than that put forward by Germany in Shantung, to which the British Government has so hastily expressed its compliance, but the legitimate development of British Burmah is incompatible with the pretensions that France has successfully advanced with the Tsungli Yamen.

When Germany, Russia, and France had made these successive moves, the British Government found itself compelled to take a corresponding step. It began by declaring that, whatever rights other Powers obtained in China, it should equally enjoy them by virtue of the most favoured nation clause in the Treaties with China. This was the principle of "the open door." Morally and theoretically it was perfectly sound and unassailable, but it could only have been vindicated on this occasion by the hazard and perhaps the certainty of war with Russia and France, and perhaps Germany as well. Perhaps the moment for taking that great risk in the Far East has not quite arrived, and it is only on that assumption that Lord Salisbury's policy will escape unanimous condemnation. It may at least be declared that at the moment of Russia's extreme action, Japan, our only probable ally, was not quite ready to embark on a great war. She had still to receive twelve millions of the war indemnity, and two years must elapse before she will obtain all the war vessels she has ordered to be constructed in foreign and principally British dockyards. If, then, we may assume that Japan desired the

struggle for mastery in the Far East to be postponed until she was ready to take a more prominent part in it, then an excuse is available for the more lenient judgment of British policy. There is at least something to be said in favour of a course which met the wishes of an ally.

Having found the policy of maintaining the strict letter of treaty rights in China impossible, the British Government turned its attention to obtaining some similar right to that acquired by Russia and by Germany. Sir Claude Macdonald, British Minister at Pekin, discovered that the Chinese were not averse to letting us have Wei Hai Wei, and although the idea was repelled when first made, Lord Salisbury decided that its occupation was the only available means we possessed of answering Russia's seizure of Port Arthur. Accordingly Wei Hai Wei, the port on the northern coast of Shantung, was assigned to Great Britain on precisely the same terms as Port Arthur had been to Russia, and the date of occupation was fixed at the period when the Japanese should evacuate the place. Wei Hai Wei might undoubtedly be made a naval station of the first importance if a large sum were expended on its defences, but it would also require a large garrison, because the harbour and docks and island forts are completely commanded from the hills on the mainland. It will be remembered that during the siege Admiral Ting would have been compelled to make an immediate surrender if he had not landed and spiked the guns in the shore batteries. The occupation of Wei Hai Wei in itself is valueless, except as a demonstration that in the last resort a British Government may be driven to do something. At present it forms no part of the Government plan to spend two or three millions on a place which has no commercial value, and the British army cannot spare ten thousand men, or half that number, for a permanent garrison on the Gulf of Pechihli. The only possible use of Wei Hai Wei would be if we were to take in hand the training of a Chinese contingent, and to make Wei Hai Wei the base for such an interesting attempt. Then indeed might our occupation of Wei Hai Wei be made the starting-point of a serious and systematic attempt to save China,

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There remains to describe briefly the part Japan has taken in the whole question. It has been marked by great reticence, reserve, and dignity. Japan has received the assurances of Russia without comment and with a brief declaration that she took note of them and believed them. She has secured the remainder of her money from China, and she will be able to complete her purchases in foreign dockyards. Her military reforms are also in progress, and the time is not remote when she will be able to place her half-million of trained soldiers on the continent of Asia. Japan has something to wait for. Every year sees her stronger and better able to assert her claims on the mainland. In the mean time she has obtained increased freedom of action in Corea. Russia, as far as she ever takes such a course, has waived her claims in that state. At the least Japan can count on being unfettered while she builds the railway from the port of Chemulpo to the capital of Seoul, and that may count for much in the future. While the European Powers have been very active in securing what they wanted and in defining their spheres of action, Japan has not, from a practical point of view, been indifferent. She is preparing for eventualities, not by useless protest or idle bluster, but by keeping her own counsel and developing her power.

Such is the existing position in the Far East. Russia, Germany, and France, acting on identical lines, have appropriated certain places and ports of China. They have each defined their positions without any reference to any outside authority, except perhaps to one another. Each has wrested from the helpless Government at Pekin privileges or monopolies for specific tasks. Russia has secured the outlet for her railway across Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria, and the naval station free of ice for her Pacific squadron. Germany has appropriated the mineral-bearing province of Shantung, and Great Britain has gone out of her way to say she will not interfere with her projects. France is laying the basis of an Imperial sway in Southern China, and threatening to bar the road of Anglo-India to the Yang-tse-kiang. Japan has momentarily. retired from the scene, but only, it cannot be doubted, to husband and collect her energies for a fresh and greater effort.

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2 N

Great Britain has secured an isolated position valueless without a large expenditure and an active policy. There is too little reason to suppose that either one or the other will be sanctioned or displayed. She has, on the other hand, obtained a promise that the post of Inspector-General of Customs, so long occupied with remarkable ability and address by Sir Robert Hart, shall always be held by an Englishman. The value of that promise depends on the life of the Pekin Government. It will obviously not possess much value when Pekin holds a Russian garrison, and when the occupant of the Dragon Throne is the vassal of St. Petersburg. To give it tangible significance it is necessary with as little delay as possible to obtain the removal of the Imperial Customs Department from Pekin to Shanghai, where it would be secure against arbitrary interference or perhaps even complete supersession. The reservation of the Yangtse valley as a sphere in which England will not tolerate interference is a matter that depends not on the pledges of Pekin, but on the naval power of this country.

The division of the Chinese Empire into what practically amounts to spheres of influence implies that it is moribund, and that the Manchu dynasty which has been in existence for 250 years approaches the term of its power. The assumption may prove correct, for it is difficult to discover in any section of Chinese society the public spirit and the patriotism needed to deliver a country from great perils and a nation from being conquered. If the Chinese realized their position there would be ground for hope; but so far as can be judged, there is not a public man in China who perceives that the State is on the verge of dissolution, and that nothing short of the most strenuous exertion will avail to save not the dynasty but the country from death.

The question which the British people more than their Government have to decide is whether they will stand aside and leave China to its fate, securing as best they can in the international scramble their material interests. They have at the present moment the choice of two courses. They can throw themselves with all their power and energy into the task of developing the Yangtse region, and of assisting the

TWO COURSES.

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Chinese to form a new administration and a new army at Nankin. If this course is followed the new China created by our efforts in the populous and wealthy provinces of the Middle Kingdom will be equal to the task of expelling the Russians, if need be, from the northern provinces. The Manchu dynasty, unworthy of its position, will have passed away, but the germs of a worthier administration will have been discovered. To carry out this project requires men and an approving Government. The former we have, but to secure a start the goodwill of the Foreign Office and of the Consular authorities is essential. Will it be forthcoming? The timid will tell us that it is only beginning the conquest of China ourselves in disguise, but if we recoil from the enterprise from fear of its magnitude we shall do nothing until the season for wise and profitable action has been lost, and we shall be outstripped in the race.

The other course open to us is to continue indefinitely the idle and useless warfare of diplomatic fence that has been exhibited during the winter of 1897-8. This system is the one favoured by senility and cowardice. It is marked by three regular periods. In the first, we lay down the most admirable and noble principles; in the second, we protest when we see them broken in the most flagrant and brazen manner; in the third, we accept meaningless and fleeting assurances, and imitate the very action that we began by censuring. A continuance in that path must end in the loss of our power, the destruction of our reputation, and the passing of "the great name of England" into a by-word among the nations.

THE END.