China entered on the war with a great and what seemed a growing reputation. She had done enough in the struggle with France to justify the opinion that she possessed considerable military power and a great capacity of endurance. On paper her navy was formidable. In Port Arthur she possessed a superior naval station to Hongkong, and Wei Hai Wei was scarcely in any way inferior. Her policy in Corea, it is true, had not been very skilful. It was directed to the attainment of opposite and incompatible objects, and with inexcusable inaptitude she tied her own hands and then advanced extreme and unattainable pretensions. The reforms of the Japanese were known to be more real and radical than those that had given a tinge to China's public existence. Opinions differed as to whether the Japanese fleet could cope with the Chinese, but every one allowed the superiority of the Japanese army. The balance of opinion inclined, therefore, to the view that the superior numbers and resources of the Chinese would supply their deficiencies and that the result would be indecisive.

The course of the campaign refuted these assumptions and destroyed one after another the preconceptions favourable to China. It was not merely that the Japanese generals and admirals, soldiers and sailors, exhibited an indisputable superiority over the Chinese, for that would have happened in any decisive war between equals, but the incidents of the struggle revealed in vivid colours that China had learnt nothing, and that her public men were destitute of spirit and honesty, and her soldiers of even the primitive attributes of patriotism. There were isolated instances of courage, but after the ignominious surrender of Port Arthur no foreign observer attempted to discover them. Even Admiral Ting's heroism excited incredulity, and the antiquated views of warfare held by Chinese military men, whose text-books went back for 2000 years, formed the theme of ridicule.

There is no doubt that the Chinese Government gave a deplorable exhibition of itself, and after what occurred it would be impossible to put faith in any military or naval changes carried out under the auspices of the Government then and still existing at Pekin. No military and naval reforms

A GOVERNMENT WANTED.

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But

could command belief in their sincerity or efficacy until the ruling Government has been purged and has adopted new models. Of that no evidence has yet been afforded. if, on the one hand, the downfall of China was complete and crushing, it would be folly for us to go to the other extreme and regard the Chinese nation as beneath contempt for all time as a fighting Power. To do so would be to play the game of our numerous adversaries. The collapse of the Chinese was due to clearly defined and ascertainable causes— the incapacity and shortsightedness of the Pekin authorities. and the elaborate system of make-believe kept up by Li Hung Chang. When China has a different Government, inspired and directed, as it is now clear that it must be, by foreign influence and example, she will give a very different account of herself on the field of battle, and the Power that most successfully utilizes her toiling millions will possess the mastery of the world.

VOL. II.

2 M

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT.

THE Chinese having been brought, by the fall of Wei Hai Wei and the advance of the Japanese army into Manchuria, to admit the necessity of peace, it only remained to secure the most favourable terms that could be obtained. To do this it was necessary, in the first place, to appoint a Plenipotentiary who should not only have full powers, but whose name would suffice to satisfy the Japanese Government that the Chinese were really in earnest in their request for peace, and that they would fulfil the conditions to which their representatives agreed. This was the more necessary because two months earlier the Chinese had sent a so-called peace mission under Chang Yin Huan, with inadequate powers to negotiate at Tokio, and the Japanese, on discovering the flaws in their credentials, had firmly and indignantly refused to do business.

For the purposes of the moment China possessed only two men of adequate rank and reputation. These were Prince Kung and Li Hung Chang. The former, in experience as well as in rank, was entitled to be considered the foremost man in China. In 1860, when Li Hung Chang was still an unknown official of no importance, Prince Kung had signed the Pekin Convention with Lord Elgin, and for a great many years he had practically controlled the foreign policy of China. But for ten years preceding the outbreak of the war with Japan he had been in disgrace, and the all-powerful Empress Dowager had decreed that for his opposition to her plans he should cease to have any part

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in the active administration, The misfortunes of the Japanese war, by lowering the reputation of those in power, had brought him back to office, but he wielded no great influence. Still, his nomination as Plenipotentiary would have been satisfactory to the Japanese; but, on the other hand, it was necessary for the Chinese representative, as coming from the defeated country, to proceed to Japan and to sue for peace. To that depth of concession a prince of the Imperial family, the uncle of the reigning Emperor, could not be brought. There remained, therefore, only the choice, practically speaking, of Li Hung Chang. Prince Kung was a patriotic and able prince, whose career his countrymen must hope has not yet finished. But on this occasion he could not and would not incur the personal ignominy of gracing by his presence the triumph of his country's enemy, as would have been signified by his proceeding to Shimonoseki.

If

In consequence of these considerations, which were not devoid of weight, Li Hung Chang remained the only possible representative for China in any peace negotiations that were at all likely to succeed. He was accordingly appointed Plenipotentiary with full powers, and reached Shimonoseki in that capacity on the 20th of March, 1895. Whatever opinion may be formed of Li Hung Chang as an able administrator or as a patriot, there can be no doubt of his skill in the art of diplomacy or at the game of chicane. the Chinese could recover anything of all they had lost in war by skill of fence in the negotiations, no one was more qualified by character and experience than the ex-Viceroy to obtain it. The chances of the success of his mission, so far as success was possible, were greatly increased by an accidental occurrence which aroused a sentiment of pity for the aged statesman, and stirred the chivalrous ruler and people of Japan with an impulse to atone by some concession for a breach of the laws of hospitality.

Four days after his arrival, Li Hung Chang, while returning from the conference with Count Ito, the Japanese plenipotentiary, was shot in the cheek by a fanatic. The wound. was not very serious, but the outrage roused great sympathy

for Li Hung Chang, and China benefited by his suffering. The Emperor of Japan sent his own doctor to take care of the wounded minister, the Empress prepared the lint with her own hands. There was a general and unanimous chorus of sympathy and regret on the part of the Japanese people, and Li Hung Chang, a master of phrases, strengthened the feeling of sympathy by the happy phrase, "In truth the benevolence of Her Majesty the Empress of Japan is profound as the sea. When I return home and tell my Imperial mistress what has been done for me she will be very satisfied." In consequence of this occurrence, the Japanese at once granted an armistice, and the original terms they had put forward as the condition of peace were modified in several of their harshest conditions. On the 17th of April the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, and on the 8th of MayLi Hung Chang having returned to Pekin in the interimthe ratifications were exchanged at Chefoo.

The terms of the treaty come under three heads: the surrender of territory, the payment of an indemnity, and the concession of commercial facilities and rights, while the first article of all provided for the full and complete independence and autonomy of Corea. The surrender of territory was to comprise the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores and the southern part of the province of Shingking, including the Leaoutung or Regent's Sword Peninsula and the important naval harbour and fortress of Port Arthur. As indemnity, China was to pay 200 million Kuping taels in eight instalments with interest at the rate of 5 per cent. on the unpaid instalments. The commercial concessions included the admission of ships under the Japanese flag to the different rivers and lakes of China, and the appointment of consuls. The text of the treaty is given in the Appendix, and it is unnecessary to enlarge on its provisions.

The terms of peace imposed on China were certainly onerous, but considering the completeness of the Japanese triumph they could not be termed excessive. If they had not seriously disturbed the balance of power in the Far East they would no doubt have been allowed to stand, as no Government was disposed to take up the cause of China