it, this event was still the originating cause of the important occurrences that followed during the summer of 1894 in Corea. Evidence was soon forthcoming that the murderer had been put up to commit the deed by the Corean authorities. On his return to Corea honours and rewards were bestowed upon him, while the body of Kim-Ok-Kiun was quartered as that of a traitor. At this moment the Tong Haks, a body of religious not political reformers, began to agitate for various concessions, and failing to obtain them, broke into open rebellion. At the end of May the Tong Haks obtained a considerable success over the Corean forces, three hundred of whom were slain. This defeat caused such consternation at Seoul that a request was at once sent to China to send a force to save the capital.

There was no reason why China should not comply with that request, and there were many reasons why she should. By the 10th of June 2000 Chinese troops were encamped at Asan, a port some distance south of Seoul, and its recognized port Chemulpo. A few Chinese men-of-war were also sent to the coast. Notification was made to Japan of the despatch of these forces to Corea under the terms of the Convention. The Japanese Government, having equal rights with China, determined to do the same, and, acting with extraordinary vigour and promptitude, they possessed within forty-eight hours of the arrival of the Chinese at Asan a far superior force of troops at Seoul and of ships at Chemulpo. They were also in complete possession of the capital and of the Court, which was wholly in sympathy with China and opposed to Japan.

In these circumstances China revived her pretensions to regard Corea as a vassal state. Japan refused to tolerate the pretensions on the ground, first, that she had never at any time admitted them, and secondly, that the Li-Ito Convention was clear in its tenor as to the equality of the rights of the two states. The Japanese made another very astute move. They called attention to the obvious evil consequences of misgovernment in Corea, and they proposed to China that she should join them in executing the needful reforms. China, hampered by her alliance with the reactionary party at Seoul,

THE KOWSHING CASE.

519

held back, and Japan, with the extraordinary promptitude that characterized all her proceedings, threw herself into the task alone. To do this with any prospect of success, it was necessary to secure the person of the King of Corea, and his palace was accordingly attacked by the Japanese, his guard dispersed, and the ruler of the peninsula secured as the tool or ally of his captors. The first document to which he was required to put his seal was one ordering the Chinese troops who had come at his invitation to leave the country. The Japanese acted nominally in the name of liberty and progress, but in truth it was only the great game of ambition, which they played remarkably well.

The seizure of the king's person on 23rd of July, 1894, was followed by two signal events. On the 25th the Japanese squadron attacked the transport Kowshing and its escort bringing fresh troops to Asan. In the engagement that followed, one Chinese man-of-war was sunk, one disabled, and 1200 troops were destroyed with the Kowshing. Here, again, the energy and success of the Japanese redeemed their reputation. The torpedoing of the unarmed Kowshing was a brutal act, not in accordance with the spirit of the age, and under different circumstances the firing on the British flag might have entailed serious consequences. On the same day as this fight General Oshima left Seoul with a small force to attack the Chinese camp at Asan. This the Chinese had abandoned for a better position at Song-hwan, which they strongly fortified. So formidable did it appear that the Japanese resorted to a night surprise as the safest mode of attack, and on the 29th of July they carried the place with a loss to the Chinese of 500 killed and wounded. Half the Chinese force, under their General Yeh, made a timely retreat on hearing of the loss of the Kowshing, and succeeded in reaching Pingyang, north of Seoul, on the main road to China. These preliminary encounters were followed by a mutual declaration of war between China and Japan on the Ist August.

The exciting events of July were followed by a period of tranquillity. The declaration of war produced a lull in hostilities. The interval was taken up by the preparations for

the real fighting of the struggle. Japan poured her troops into Corea, while the Chinese fleet, missing its chances, hugged the harbours of Wei Hai Wei and Port Arthur in ignominious safety. It was not until the beginning of September that the Japanese army was in sufficient strength to detach a corps of 13,000 men in all to attack the Chinese position at Pingyang, a town of historic importance on the northern banks of the Taidong river. The chief command of the operations on the Japanese side was entrusted to General Nodzu. The Chinese were in considerable force, and held a naturally strong position, but the preliminary skirmishes indicated the radical ignorance of the Chinese in military knowledge.

The early morning of the 15th of September was the time fixed for the attack on Pingyang, and so well were the arrangements made, that all was in readiness to deliver the attack at the appointed signal, although one of the columns had marched across Corea from Gensan. The plan of the Japanese was simple. While their main force threatened Pingyang in front, the Gensan corps took up a position of attack on its east, and another corps a similar position on the west. Both these latter corps had crossed the Taidong river unknown to the Chinese. The passage of the river was difficult and slow, and the Chinese might easily have overwhelmed the Japanese; but instead of this result they allowed themselves to be lulled into a false sense of security, and to remain ignorant of even the fact that the river had been crossed by their enemy.

The battle began at sunrise on the 15th of September with an attack on the forts held by the Chinese on the left bank of the river commanding a bridge of boats across the Taidong. Here the Chinese fought well, and repulsed the Japanese with considerable loss; but this success had no influence on the result of the day, which was being decided on another part of the scene. The attack on the forts north of the river by the two flanking columns represented the serious part of the operation. Here five forts, more or less strong by nature, and by artifice, had to be captured, and for a time the Chinese made a most vigorous resistance. The Japanese were fortunately assisted by the artillery fire they were able to direct

BATTLE OF PINGYANG.

521 on the interior of the forts from a hill they had succeeded in capturing the night before. Aided by this advantage the Japanese succeeded in capturing the fort on Peony Hill, and the death of the Chinese general Tso-pao-kuei, who fought when wounded with a noble heroism to the last, shook the confidence of the whole Chinese army. It was then that the Japanese succeeded in capturing the Gemmu gate in the wall of Pingyang itself. When the day's struggle was over the Chinese had fully made up their mind to flee, and as soon as night set in the garrison began a disorderly retreat. As one of the Japanese divisions commanded the only line of retreat, the Chinese suffered heavily from the artillery and rifle-fire kept up on the disorderly crowd. Over 1500 Chinese were killed during this retreat, whereas in the battle itself they had only lost 500 killed in addition to wounded and prisoners.

The Japanese themselves lost 162 killed, 438 wounded, and 33 missing, who may fairly be added to the former total. At the moment when the Chinese began their flight from Pingyang they had made a respectable resistance, and if the other Chinese generals had been animated by anything like Tso's spirit, there is every reason to say that the first attack of the Japanese would have been repulsed, and that time would thus have been gained to make an orderly retreat. Much more than this would have been secured if the Chinese had shown the least knowledge of the military art. Then the Japanese would never have crossed the Taidong river, and the Gensan column would have been crushed before aid could have reached it. The battle of Pingyang was a great defeat for China, but some of the Chinese officers and men fought with great courage, and on the whole it was not the disgraceful military fiasco that has been alleged. It signified, however, the Chinese evacuation of Corea, for not a man paused until he had got the other side of the Yalu.

On the very day of the battle of Pingyang the Chinese fleet was engaged in the conveyance of troops to the mouth of the Yalu, where the Chinese were collecting a second army. The Chinese fleet, under the command of Admiral Ting, on its return from this task was encountered off the

island of Hai Yang by the Japanese squadron, under Admiral Ito, on the 17th of September. The two fleets were of very equal strength. They each numbered ten fighting vessels, and if two of the Chinese ships were superior in strength, the Japanese were superior in steam power. The Chinese began to fire at a distance of four miles, while the Japanese reserved their fire until only two miles separated the adversaries. It was to quickness and manoeuvring that the Japanese Admiral mainly trusted for victory, and his first attack consisted mainly in circling round the Chinese squadron. The weaker vessels on both sides were soon put out of action. The Chinese flagship, Ting-yuen, after a duel with the Japanese Matsushima, was severely damaged, and only saved from sinking by the intervention of her sister ship, the Chenyuen. These two fine ships, thanks to their armour, succeeded in making their way out of the action with the torpedo boats, but four of the Chinese boats were sunk, and a fifth was destroyed. In men the Chinese lost 700 killed or drowned and 300 wounded, while the Japanese lost 115 killed and 150 wounded-one-third of these were on the Japanese flagship alone. The honours of the day rested with the Japanese, whose skilful manœuvring won the admiration of all interested in naval warfare. The direct consequences of this victory were considerable, for the Chinese fleet never afterwards attempted to contest the seas, and water communication with the Yalu was as effectually cut off as it had been in the first week of the war with Asan.

The Japanese army halted for more than a fortnight after the battle of Pingyang. By that time Marshal Yamagata had arrived with a considerable body of fresh troops, and he assumed the personal command in the field. The Japanese began their forward movement from Pingyang early in October, and on the 10th of the month their advanced guard reached the Yalu. A considerable Chinese army, under the command of General Sung, held the northern bank of the river, which was broad and difficult of passage. The neglect and military ignorance of the Chinese had allowed of the easy crossing of the Taidong, the same causes enabled the Japanese to cross the river boundary of China. General Sung's