PRINCE KUNG'S MERIT.

423 as Chiseang there would be no possibility of excluding their names and their brief and feverish ambition from the national annals. After due deliberation, therefore, the name of Tungche was substituted for that of Chiseang, and, meaning as it does "the union of law and order," it will be allowed that the name was not selected without proper regard for the circumstances of the occasion. Prince Kung was rewarded with many high offices and sounding titles in addition to the post of Chief Minister under the Two Empresses. He was made president of the Imperial Clan Court in the room of Tsai, Prince of I, and the title of Iching Wang, or Prince Minister, was conferred upon him. His staunch friends and supporters Wansiang, Paukwen, and Kweiliang were appointed to the Supreme Council. Prince Chun, to whose skill and bravery in arresting Sushuen Prince Kung felt very much indebted, was also rewarded. With these incidents closed what might have proved a grave and perilous complication for the Chinese Government. Had Prince Kung prematurely revealed his plans there is every reason to suppose that he would have alarmed and forewarned his rivals, and that they, with the person of the Emperor in their possession, would have obtained the advantage, if their own incapacity might have prevented their long retaining it. His patience during the two months of doubt and anxiety while the Emperor remained at Jehol was matched by the vigour and promptitude that he displayed on the eventful 2nd of November. That his success was beneficial to his country will not be disputed by any one, and Prince Kung's name must be permanently remembered both for having commenced, and for having ensured the continuance of, diplomatic relations with England and the other foreign Powers.

The increased intercourse with Europeans not merely led to greater diplomatic confidence and to the extension of trade, but it also induced many foreigners to offer their services and assistance to the Pekin Government during the embarrassment arising from internal dissension. At first these persons were, as has been seen, encouraged and employed more in consequence of local opinion in the treaty-ports than as a matter of State policy. But already the suggestion had

been brought forward in more than one form for the employment of foreigners, with the view of increasing the resources of the Government by calling in the assistance of the very agency which had reduced them. A precedent had been established for this at an earlier period-before, in fact, the commencement of hostilities-by the appointment of Mr. Horatio N. Lay to direct and assist the local authorities in the collection of customs in the Shanghai district. Mr. Lay's experience had proved most useful in drawing up the tariff of the Treaty of Tientsin, and his assistance had been suitably acknowledged. In 1862, when the advantages to be derived from the military experience of foreigners had been practically recognized by the appointment of Europeans to command a portion of the army of China, it was thought desirable for many reasons that something should also be done to increase the naval resources of the Empire, and Mr. Lay, at Sir Robert Hart's suggestion, 'was entrusted with a commission for purchasing and collecting in Europe a fleet of gun-boats of small draught, which could be usefully employed for all the purposes of the Pekin Government on the rivers and shallow estuaries of the country. Mr. Lay said, "This force was intended for the protection of the treaty-ports, for the suppression of piracy then rife, and for the relief of this country from the burden of 'policing' the Chinese waters;" but its first use in the eyes of Prince Kung was to be employed against the rebels and their European allies.

Captain Sherard Osborn, a distinguished naval officer, was associated with Mr. Lay in the undertaking. An Order of Council was issued on the 30th of August, 1862, empowering both of these officers to act in the matter as delegates of the Chinese. Captain Osborn and Mr. Lay came to England to collect the vessels of this fleet, and the former afterwards returned with them to China in the capacity of their Commodore.

Difficulties arose on the threshold of the undertaking. Mr. Lay wrote in August, 1862, to say that he had chosen as the national ensign of the Chinese navy "a green flag, bearing a yellow diagonal cross," and he wrote again to

THE FLOTILLA.

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request that an official notification should appear in the Gazette. Mr. Lay was informed that no notice could appear in the London Gazette except after the approval of the Pekin authorities; and Prince Kung wrote on the 22nd of October to say that the Chinese ensign would be of "yellow ground, and on it will be designed a dragon with his head toward the upper part of the flag." Mr. Lay preceded the vessels -seven gun-boats and one store-ship-and arrived at Pekin in May, 1863. At the capital he found two opinions prevailing, which did not promise to contribute to the harmony of the new arrangement. In the first place he found Sir Frederick Bruce resolved not to take any active part in the affair at all, without instructions to do so from his Government.

But if the attitude of Sir Frederick Bruce was embarrassing, that of the Chinese themselves was far more discouraging. Their fears had been already aroused as to the possibly independent attitude these foreign commanders might assume when affairs had settled down. The views of Prince Kung and Mr. Lay were distinctly opposed on the point of the position of the new ships as part of the external defences of China. The former considered that the fleet purchased in Europe out of Chinese treasure should form an integral portion of the warlike resources of the Empire, and be as subservient to the orders of the local authorities as if it were one of the old fleets of war-junks. Mr. Lay could not bring himself to take the same view. The fleet was to be virtually independent. Captain Sherard Osborn would, by his personal arrangement with Mr. Lay, act only upon "orders of the Emperor which may be conveyed direct to Lay," and, moreover, he refused to act on any orders conveyed through any different channel. To the unprejudiced observer it would seem that the proper persons to decide by whom the orders should be given were the Chinese themselves, and not their foreign officers and servants. When it is realized how much the originators of this scheme took the whole arrangement out of the hands of Prince Kung and his colleagues, there will not be much surprise at the scheme coming to the abortive and unfortunate end that it did.

Prince Kung had been most anxious for the speedy

arrival of the flotilla; and the doubtful fortune of the campaign in Kiangsu, where the gun-boats would have been invaluable, rendered him extremely desirous that they should commence active operations immediately on arrival. But he found, in the first place, that Mr. Lay was not prepared to accept the appointment of a Chinese official as jointcommander, and in the second place that he would not receive orders from any of the provincial authorities. Such a decision was manifestly attended with the greatest inconvenience to China; for only the provincial authorities knew what the interests of the state demanded, and where the fleet might co-operate with advantage in the attacks on the Taepings. Unless Captain Sherard Osborn were to act on the orders of Tseng Kwofan, and particularly of Li Hung Chang, it was difficult to see what possible use he or his flotilla could be to China. The founders of the new Chinese navy claimed practically all the privileges of an ally, and declined the duties devolving on them as directing a department of the Chinese administration. Of course it was more convenient and more dignified for the foreign officers to draw their instructions and their salaries direct from the fountain head; but if the flotilla was not to be of any practical use to China, it might just as well never have been created.

The fleet arrived in safety, but remained in inaction. The whole summer and autumn of 1863, with its critical state of affairs round Soochow, passed away without anything being done to show what a powerful auxiliary the new ships might be. The ultimate success of those operations without the smallest co-operation on the part of Captain Osborn or his flotilla virtually sealed its fate. In October, Wansiang, in the name of the Foreign Office, declared that the Chinese could not recognize or ratify the private arrangement between Mr. Lay and his naval officer, and that it was essential for Captain Osborn to submit to receive his instructions from the provincial authorities. In the following month Mr. Lay was summarily dismissed from the Chinese service, and it was determined, after some delay and various counter suggestions, to send back the ships to Europe, there to be disposed of. The miscarriage of the whole affair was, as Sir

SIR ROBERT HART.

427

Frederick Bruce said, probably due to Mr. Lay's taking upon himself the responsibility not merely of Inspector-General of Customs, but also of supreme adviser on all matters connected with foreign questions. His views were of the largest scope and most benevolent character so far as the progress of China was concerned. But then it was all to be attained under his own direction. The Chinese themselves were to take quite a subordinate position in their realization, and were to be treated, in short, as if they did not know how to manage their own affairs. Mr. Lay's dreams were suddenly dispelled, and his philanthropic schemes fell to the ground. Neither Prince Kung nor his colleagues had any intention to pave the way for their own effacement.

After Mr. Lay's departure the Maritime Customs were placed under the control of Mr. (now Sir) Robert Hart, who had acted during Mr. Lay's absence in Europe. This appointment was accompanied by the transfer of the official residence from Pekin to Shanghai, which was attended with much practical advantage. Already the customs revenue had risen to two millions, and trade was steadily expanding as the rebels were gradually driven back, and as the Yangtsekiang and the coasts became safer for navigation. Numerous schemes were suggested for the opening-up of China by railways and the telegraph; but they all very soon ended in nothing, for the simple reason that the Chinese did not want them. They were more sincere and energetic in their adoption of military improvements. English officers drilled Chinese troops in their permanent camp at Fungwang, and Sir Halliday Macartney constructed and organized a great arsenal at Soochow, which was afterwards removed to Nankin, as a town more conveniently situated. In 1866 the arsenal at the latter place was in full working order. Arrangements were also made to supply from America the places of the gun-boats which had returned to Europe, but the dilatoriness of the Chinese postponed the commencement of a fleet for ten years.

The anxieties of Prince Kung on the subject of the dynasty, and with regard to the undue pretensions and expectations of the foreign officials who looked on the