little loss and handed over to an Imperial garrison. After this the native force was augmented by a corps which had been specially trained by the English officers; and Captain Holland, of the Marine Infantry, was placed at Burgevine's disposal to act as his chief of the staff. The subsequent operations of the disciplined native force were for a time to be conducted under the supervision of Burgevine, whose base still remained at Sunkiang; while the new Futai, Li Hung Chang, with his lieutenant, General Ching, an ex-rebel who had come over to the Imperialists at Ganking, operated against the rebels from Shanghai. Mow Wang was worsted in more than one encounter, and his son was killed in battle by Ward's old lieutenant, Vincente. Unfortunately the progress of the campaign was greatly retarded by the feud which existed, and which soon broke out into acts, between Burgevine and Li, the Futai.

More than one circumstance contributed to embitter the quarrel. The Futai took all the credit of the successes over Mow Wang to his force, and ignored Burgevine's. General Ching was personally jealous of the Contingent, and hoped to secure a great military reputation from the overthrow of the rebels; and the chief obstacle in the way of the realization of his own wishes was "the Ever-Victorious Army." On the other hand, Burgevine was a man of high temper and strong passions, who was disposed to treat his Chinese colleagues with lofty superciliousness, and who met the wiles of the Futai with peremptory demands to recognize the claims of himself and his band. Nor was this all. Burgevine had designs of his own. Although the project had not taken definite form in his mind-for an unsubdued enemy was still in possession of the greater part of the province— the inclination was strong within him to play the part of military dictator with the Chinese; or, failing that, to found an independent authority on some convenient spot of Celestial territory. The Futai anticipated perhaps more than divined his wishes. In Burgevine he saw, very shortly after their coming into contact, not merely a man whom he disliked and distrusted, but one who, if allowed to pursue his plans unchecked, would in the end form a greater danger

to the Imperial authority than even the Taepings. It is not possible to deny Li's shrewdness in reading the character of the man with whom he had to deal.

Although Burgevine had succeeded to Ward's command, he had not acquired the intimacy and confidence of the great Chinese merchant Takee and his colleagues at Shanghai, which had been the main cause of his predecessor's influence and position. In Ward they felt implicit faith; Burgevine was comparatively unknown, and where known only regarded with suspicion. The patriotism of the Shanghai merchants consisted in protecting their own possessions. Having succeeded in this, they began to consider whether it was necessary to expend any longer the large sums voluntarily raised for the support of the contingent. Whatever doubt they may have felt was sensibly strengthened by the representations of the officials, who declared that Li and Ching were quite able to hold the Taepings in check, and that Shanghai was perfectly secure. This argument had the excellent recommendation that it coincided with their wishes, and in a few weeks Burgevine at Sunkiang found that the liberal supplies accorded to his predecessor were beginning to fall away. As the immediate consequence of this step, the force was reduced to inaction with all its attendant evils, and the remaining months of the year 1862 passed without any resumption of military operations on their part.

Having thus succeeded in crippling the efficiency of the contingent, the Chinese officials determined to proceed still further for the confusion of Burgevine. At first, in order to test his obedience, it was proposed that he and his men should be sent round by sea to Nankin to take part in the siege of that city, about to be resumed. The ships were actually prepared for their despatch, and the Taotai Wou, who had first fitted out a fleet against the rebels, was in readiness to accompany Burgevine, when Li and his colleague, as suspicious of Burgevine's compliance as they would have been indignant at his refusal, changed their plans and countermanded the expedition. Instead of carrying out this project, therefore, they laid a number of formal complaints before General Staveley as to Burgevine's conduct, and requested

the English Government to remove him from his command, and to appoint an English officer in his place. The charges against Burgevine did not at this time amount to more than a certain laxness in regard to the expenditure of the force, a disregard for the wishes and prejudices of the Chinese Government, and the want of tact, or of the desire to conciliate, in his personal relations with the Futai. There was an incompatibility between the Chinese and the foreign commanders in the field; that was all. Had Burgevine been an English officer there would have been an end of the difficulty at once, by his requesting to be relieved from an irksome position in which his actions were misunderstood and misrepresented.

But Burgevine, although a man of some birth and education, regarded the position from the standpoint of the adventurer who believes that his own interests form a supreme law and are the highest good. As commander of the Ever-Victorious Army he was a personage to be considered even by foreign Governments. He would not voluntarily surrender the position which alone preserved him from obscurity. Having come to this decision, it was clear that even the partial execution of his plans must draw him into many errors of judgment which could not but embitter the conflict, at the same time that it compromised the good name of Europeans.

The reply of the English commander was to the effect that personally he could not interfere, but that he would refer the matter to London as well as to Mr. Bruce at Pekin. In consequence of the delay thus caused the project of removing the force to Nankin was revived, and, the steamers having been chartered, Burgevine was requested to bring down his force from Sunkiang and to embark it at Shanghai. This he expressed his willingness to do on payment of his men, who were two months in arrear, and on the settlement of all outstanding claims. Burgevine was supported by his troops. Whatever his dislike to the proposed move, theirs was immeasurably greater. They refused to move without the payment of all arrears; and on the 2nd of January, 1863, they even went so far as to openly mutiny. Two days later

CHARLES GORDON.

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Burgevine went to Shanghai, and had an interview with Takee. The meeting was stormy. Burgevine used personal violence towards the Shanghai merchant, whose attitude was at first overbearing, and he returned to his exasperated troops with the money, which he had carried off by force. The Futai Li, on hearing of the assault on Takee, hastened to General Staveley to complain of Burgevine's gross insubordination in striking a mandarin, which by the law of China was punishable with death. Burgevine was dismissed the Chinese service, and the notice of this decree was forwarded by the English General, with a recommendation to him to give up his command without disturbance. This Burgevine did, for the advice of the English General was equivalent to a command, and on the 6th of January, 1863, Burgevine was back at Shanghai. Captain Holland was then placed in temporary command, while the answer of the Home Government was awaited to General Staveley's proposition to entrust the force to the command of a young captain of engineers. named Charles Gordon.

The fortunes of the Ever-Victorious Army were not destined to be more favourable or less chequered under the leading of Captain Holland than they had been under his predecessors. Chung Wang, whose campaign in Anhui had produced such small results that he had even recommended Tien Wang to abandon Nankin and to seek his fortune elsewhere, had returned to Soochow, and in Kiangsu the cause of the Taepings again revived through his energy, although it languished elsewhere. In February a detachment of Holland's force attacked Fushan, but met with a check, when the news of a serious defeat at Taitsan, where the former Futai Sieh had been defeated, compelled its speedy retreat to Sunkiang. Li had had some reason to believe that Taitsan would surrender on the approach of the Imperialists, and he accordingly sent a large army, including 2500 of the contingent, to attack it. The affair was badly managed. The assaulting party was stopped by a wide ditch; neither boats nor ladders arrived. The Taepings fired furiously on the exposed party, several officers were killed, and the men broke into confusion. The heavy guns stuck

in the soft ground and had to be abandoned; and despite the good conduct of the contingent, the Taepings achieved a decisive success (February 13).

Chung Wang was able to feel that his old luck had not deserted him, and the Taepings of Kiangsu recovered all their former confidence in themselves and their leader. This disaster was a rude blow for Li Hung Chang; and it was resolved that nothing should be attempted until the English officer, at last appointed, had assumed the active command. The campaign in Kiangsu had up to this point only contributed to increase the military reputation and experience of Chung Wang, whose energy more than counterbalanced the superior resources of the Imperialists and their European allies. A second attempt under Major Tapp to relieve Fushan had failed with loss. Several encounters had taken place round Ningpo, in which many officers were killed. A force had indeed been created claiming the brave boast of assured and endless victory; but after more than two years' campaigning it had done little to justify its title. Perhaps intuitively it awaited the advent of its true leader. Although something had been accomplished since the conclusion of peace at Pekin towards restoring the Emperor's authority, there was no sign that the end of this protracted and sanguinary struggle was near. The energy of Chung Wang might have even justified a belief in its indefinite prolongation.