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CHAPTER XIV.

THE PROGRESS OF THE TAEPING REBELLION.

DURING these years of foreign war and difficulty the Taepings had not been inactive. Repulsed in their first attempts to subdue the provinces north of the Yangtsekiang, their leaders had returned to Nankin only to indulge their antipathies and to decide questions of rivalry by the sword. Had the Emperor's officers been prompt in mustering their forces in the year 1857, they would have found the Taepings a comparatively easy prey. But the Chinese have always preferred the slowest method in their proceedings, and it happened to be an occasion when no time should have been wasted. The favourable moment was permitted to pass by unutilized, and the main object with the officials was ' to conceal from Pekin the progress which the rebels were making in Central China. It was not until the end of the year 1860 that Prince Kung learnt from Mr. Bruce of the rapid successes of the Taepings, and that they had established their authority almost to the sea. Then the Emperor's immediate advisers realized for the first time that, having adjusted their disagreements with the foreigners, they would have to achieve the not less difficult task of asserting their authority in the most populous and productive region of the Empire. The undertaking to be seriously commenced in 1861 promised to be all the more difficult and protracted because of the delay that ensued after the first check inflicted upon the Taepings in 1857.

After the sanguinary events which occurred at Nankin in the year 1856, the E Wang or Assistant King left that city

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to oppose Tseng Kwofan, who, with the levies of Hoonan, was operating in Kiangsi. The departure of this leader had obliged Tien Wang to call to the front new men, and among the most capable of these was Li-su-Ching, who, for his valour and capacity around Nankih, had obtained the title of Chung Wang, or the Faithful King. During the operations of the year 1858 the Taepings fairly held their own in the valley of the Yangtsekiang, and, thanks to the great energy of Chung Wang, they forced the Imperialists to retire to a more respectful distance from Nankin, which they had actually beleaguered. The principal leaders on the Emperor's side were Tseng Kwofan and his brother, Tseng Kwo-tsiuen, Paochiaou, Tso Tsung Tang, and Li Hung Chang.

The Imperialists endeavoured to capture one of the principal posts of the Taepings at the town of Ganking, on the north bank of the Yangtse, and about 200 miles above Nankin. The advantage of this post was that it gave the latter the command of a second passage across the great river, and that it enabled them to check the advance of fresh troops down the river. The siege of Ganking was raised by Chung Wang; but a victory at Soosung won by General Paochiaou more than compensated for it. In 1858 the Imperialists, under Tseng on the one side, and Chang Kwoliang on the other, invested the Taeping capital for a second time, despite the efforts of Chung Wang to prevent it. As the town was well supplied with provisions, and as it was known that the Imperialists had no intention of delivering an assault, the Taepings were comparatively indifferent to the fact, and waited until their opponents should be tired out, or until the arrival of fresh troops from their own comrades in the other provinces would enable them to assume the offensive.

Although the Imperial commanders were lethargic, only one result could follow their operations if allowed to proceed without interruption. Nankin would have to yield in the end to starvation. In these straits Chung Wang proved the saviour of his party. The garrison was not large enough to attempt a sortie; and the other bodies of the Taepings scattered throughout the provinces did not possess any recognized leader from whom aid might be expected, or to whom

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an appeal for succour might be sent-now that E Wang had retired in disgust, and gone westwards to advance his own interests. The Imperialists had already invested the city upon three sides; only one remained open if the news of Tien Wang's sufferings were to reach his followers before it was too late. In such a moment of peril there was general reluctance to quit the besieged town; but unless some one did, and that promptly, the place was doomed. In this supreme moment Chung Wang offered to go himself. At first the proposal was received with a chorus of disapproval; but at last, when he went to the door of Tien Wang's palace and beat the gong which lay there for those who claimed justice, he succeeded in overcoming the opposition to his plan, and in impressing upon his audience the real gravity of the situation. His request was granted, and, having nominated trusty men to the command during his absence, he quitted the besieged city by the southern gate. A few days later, and Tseng's last levies had constructed their fortified camp in front of it.

Chung Wang reached in twenty-four hours Woohoo, where a cousin of his commanded a small body of Taeping troops. They concocted a plan of campaign, having as its principal object the worrying of the Imperial forces, with the view of making them relax their efforts against Nankin. In this they succeeded in an almost marvellous manner, considering the smallness of their force, the strength of the Imperialists in numbers and position, and the all-importance of the capture of Nankin.

Hienfung's generals long failed to realize that it was the possession of Nankin which alone made the Taepings formidable. Without that city in their power they would cease to be anything more than a band of brigands. So long as they held it they were able to claim the rights and privileges of a separate dynasty. Yet the capture of Nankin was put off until the last act of all, in order to effect the overthrow of the scattered armies of the rebels who would probably have dispersed immediately on its fall, and who would certainly have become the mark of popular resentment. The Imperial commanders had shown great apathy all through the crisis, but in 1858 they revealed more clearly than ever their utter

inability to grasp the central fact in the position. Had they been able to do so, they would not have played the whole game into the hands of Chung Wang.

Chung Wang had escaped from Nankin towards the end of 1858. He collected some 5000 good men, and with these he at once began operations. The Imperialists were much too strong south of the river for him to attempt anything against them on that side. He therefore crossed to the northern bank and began his campaign by the capture of Hochow. He continued his advance, hoping to cut in two the more numerous army of General Tesinga who was opposed to him; but the enemy were too strong, particularly in cavalry, for him, and he was repulsed and obliged to retire. Even north of the river there did not seem much chance for the Taeping leader. The Imperialists gave him a short respite, during which he managed to drill his recruits; but on his making a second effort to reach Poukou, the small town opposite Nankin, he was defeated with the loss, as he admitted, of one thousand men. Chung Wang returned south of the river, held a hurried council at Tsinyang, recalled all the troops he could from Ganking, and, again returning to the northern bank, resumed his efforts to reach Poukou. There seemed, if possible, less chance than ever of success, for General Te had been reinforced, if only at the price of weakening the army round Nankin, and even Chang Kwoliang had left his camp to see what was being done against Chung Wang. Things were in this state when the Taeping leader suddenly returned and resumed with all the energy of desperation his attempt to cut his way through the Imperial lines to Poukou. Whether the Imperialists were taken by surprise, or were so full of confidence from their recent success that they did not think it necessary to take precautions, they were beaten in one battle after another. The principal towns north of Nankin were occupied by the Taepings after little resistance, and in several encounters round Linchow the lieutenants of Hienfung were decidedly worsted.

But although the pressure on Nankin was relieved by these successes, the siege continued on the southern side, where the Imperial troops remained in excellent condition. The

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anxieties of Tien Wang were increased by a suspicion of Chung Wang's fidelity, and that there was some reason to believe him meditating desertion rested on apparently good foundation. The supplies of the rebels were falling short, and powder in particular was needed to enable them to carry on the struggle. The year 1859 was consequently one of little movement, partly from this cause, and partly also on account of the exhaustion of the combatants. The Imperialists, convinced that time was all in their favour, proceeded in the most leisurely manner, and were quite content to sustain a rigid blockade without risking their lives in unnecessary battles. They were the more reconciled to this deliberate plan of proceeding, because the Taepings had been gradually expelled from one town after another until all that was left in their possession were the places between Nankin and Ganking. It seemed as if nothing could then prevent the Taeping cause expiring from pure inanition.

Chung Wang's campaign north of the Yangtse had gained a respite for the Taepings; but, although the reverses of the Government troops were not few, superior numbers and resources had more than counterbalanced misfortune in the field. The environment of Nankin, weakened on the north by the capture of Poukou, was sustained with undiminished rigour on the southern side of the great river. In this extremity Chung Wang conceived a fresh plan for relieving the pressure on Nankin, if not of extricating the Heavenly ruler from his predicament. He resolved to get in the rear of the Imperial army and to operate along its base of supply. The idea was an extremely happy one, proving that Chung Wang possessed considerable natural capacity, at the same time that it showed that a desperate situation suggests remedies that would not, under ordinary circumstances, be deemed either prudent or possible.

In January, 1860, all Chung Wang's arrangements were completed. He had distributed considerable sums of money among his men in order to put them in a good humour, and he succeeded in eluding the vigilance of Chang Kwoliang, and in reaching Woohoo unobserved with the greater portion of his force. The Imperialists thought that the expedition was

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