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satisfactory by either Mr. Bruce or the British Government. As Mr. Wade stated, the Government and people of China will hold ambassadors received in this manner at precisely the same value as a Loochooan or Siamese envoy.

The length of time required for communication between England and China entailed a delay which the impossibility of conducting naval operations in the Gulf of Pechihli during the winter further extended. But a demand arrived from London requiring the amplest apology to be promptly made for the attack on the ships by the Taku forts, and that if this were not forthcoming a heavy indemnity would be demanded and obtained by force as compensation for the insult and injury. In November, 1859, a plan of joint action was proposed and agreed upon between the Governments of France and England. An armed expedition was to be sent to the China Sea, and the island of Chusan was to be again occupied as a base for further operations in the Gulf of Pechihli. It was hoped that the expedition would have assembled at its rendezvous by the middle of April, 1860, and that decisive operations would have been begun before the end of that month. An ultimatum, with thirty days' grace, was presented by Mr. Bruce on the 8th of March, embodying certain terms with which the strictest compliance was stated to be necessary.*

but at Pehtang. An Imperial Decree of the 9th of August draws an unfavourable comparison to the English between the conduct of Mr. Bruce and Mr. Ward."

The objects of the English Government were described in the official despatch of Lord John Russell dated the third of January, 1860, which were detailed by Mr. Bruce in his proclamation as follows:"The Emperor of China made, in June, 1858, a treaty of peace with my sovereign, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The Emperor ordered, by special command, that this treaty should be signed by his ministers. It was provided and agreed to by the Emperor that the treaty should be ratified at Pekin within a year. But when, in pursuance of the orders of the Queen my sovereign, I attempted to go by the ordinary route of the Peiho to Tientsin, with a view to travel with my retinue from the mouth of the Peiho to Pekin, in the most friendly manner, I found the river blocked with stakes and rafts, and when the Queen's ships endeavoured to remove these obstacles they were fired upon, and many of the Queen's subjects were killed and wounded by the cannon of the Emperor of China. No notice had been given to me that

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The troops which were to form the expedition were mainly drawn from India, and Sir Hope Grant,* who had not merely distinguished himself during the Mutiny, but who had served in the first English war with China during the operations round Canton, was appointed to the command of the army; while Admiral Hope, strongly reinforced in ships and with Admiral Jones appointed to assist him, retained the command of the naval forces. A force of five batteries of artillery, six regiments of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, together with a body of horse and foot from the native army of India, amounting in all to about 10,000 men, was to be placed at the general's disposal in addition to the troops. already in China. The French Government had agreed to send another army of about two-thirds this strength to cooperate on the Peiho, and General Montauban had been named to the command. The collection of this large expedition brought into prominence the necessity of employing as ambassador a diplomatist of higher rank than Mr. Bruce's; and accordingly in February Lord Elgin and Baron Gros were commissioned to again proceed to China for the purpose of securing the ratification of their own treaty. They were instructed to demand from the Chinese Government as compensation to both countries a sum equivalent to nearly five millions sterling.t

the way to Pekin by this the ordinary passage was to be prohibited, although a year had gone by since the signature of the treaty. The Queen has ordered me to ask for an apology for this injury, and to demand the ratification of the treaty. The Queen has asked that the Emperor should fulfil his solemn promise. This has been refused. It has been refused, also, to the Queen's august ally, the Emperor of the French. We go to seek redress for these wrongs and to require that the word of the Emperor should be observed, and that an indemnity should be paid for the loss of men and the heavy expense of obtaining redress. We wish to continue the friendly relations of commerce and peaceable communications with the people of China. We wish to carry on the war only against armed men, and the advisers of the Emperor of China who urge him to war. Rely upon our disposition to respect your property and your families. Peace may thus continue between our nations, and the Emperor be forced to do justice."

* Sir William Mansfield was first named for the command; but the Duke of Cambridge very justly insisted that, by right both of seniority and active experience, the command was the due of Sir Hope Grant. † 60,000,000 francs to each, or £4,800,000 in all.

The impossibility of obtaining these concessions in any other way than by force was clearly shown in the reply sent by the minister Pang Wanching to the ultimatum of the English representative. In this document all his demands were categorically refused. No indemnity would be paid, no apology given. If the English went to Pehtang they might perhaps be allowed to proceed to Pekin; the route by Taku and the Peiho would never be open to them, and there was much more to the same effect expressed in language the reverse of courteous. To place their hostility in the most unequivocal light, the Grand Secretary Pang Wanching directed his reply to the Viceroy of the Two Kiang for transmission, thus openly ignoring that clause of the Tientsin Treaty which provided that there should be direct communication between the English representative and the ministers at the capital.

*

For a time the interest in the situation ceased to be diplomatic, and all attention centred in the military movements for curbing the pride of an arrogant Government. Sir Hope Grant reached Hongkong in March, and by his recommendation a stronger native contingent was added, raising the English force in the field to more than 13,000 men. A lease, through the skilful negotiation of Mr. Parkes, was obtained in perpetuity, of Kowlun and Stonecutter island, where, from their salubrious position, it was proposed to place the troops on their arrival from India or England. Chusan was occupied the following month without opposition by an English brigade of 2000 men; but the effect produced by this move was practically none, and it may be doubted whether any end could be served by the temporary occupation of an island about the fate of which the Emperor cared nothing at all. The French commanders were opposed to it, and the views of the allies were already far from being completely in accord the usual experience of all alliances.

The summer had commenced before the whole of the expedition assembled at Hongkong, whence it was moved

* One Sikh regiment, four Punjab regiments, two Bombay regiments, one Madras regiment of foot, and two irregular regiments of Sikh cavalry, known as Fane's and Probyn's Horse. Sir John Michel and Sir Robert Napier commanded divisions under Sir Hope Grant.

THE TAKU FORTS.

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northwards to Shanghai about a year after the failure of the attack on the forts of the Peiho. A further delay was caused by the tardiness of the French, and July had begun before the expedition reached the Gulf of Pechihli. Then opposite opinions led to different suggestions, and while the English advocated proceeding to attack Pehtang, General Montauban drew up another plan of action. But the exigencies of the alliance compelled the English, who were ready, to wait for the French, who were not, in order that the assault might be made simultaneously. Before that time arrived the French commander had been brought round to the view that the proper plan of campaign was that suggested by the English commander; viz. to attack and capture Pehtang, whence the Taku forts might be taken in the rear. It is somewhat remarkable to observe that no one suggested a second time endeavouring to carry by a front attack these forts, which had in the interval since Admiral Hope's failure been rendered more formidable.

At Pehtang the Chinese had made few preparations for defence, and nothing of the same formidable character as at Taku. The forts on both sides of the river were neither extensive nor well armed. One contained thirteen guns, the other eleven. The garrison consisted largely of Tartar cavalry, more useful for watching the movements of the foreigners than for working artillery when exposed to the fire of the new Armstrong guns of the English. The attacking force landed in boats and by wading, Sir Hope Grant setting his men the example. No engagement took place on the night of disembarkation, and the advanced force slept on an elevated causeway bordered on both sides by the sea which had flooded a considerable extent of the country. When morning broke, a suspicious silence in the enemy's quarters strengthened the belief that Pehtang would not be defended; and Mr. Parkes, ever to the front when information was wanted, soon was able to confirm the impression. While the garrison had resolved not to resist an attack, they had contemplated causing their enemy as much loss as if he had been obliged to carry the place by storm, by placing shells in the magazine which would be exploded by the moving of

VOL. II.

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some gunlocks put in a spot where they could not fail to be trodden upon. This plot, which was thoroughly in accordance with the practices of Chinese warfare, was fortunately divulged by a native more humane than patriotic, and Pehtang was captured and occupied without the loss of a single man.

This success at the commencement enabled the whole of the expedition to be landed without further delay or difficulty; but Pehtang was itself an inadequate base for so large a military force. The great merit of the movement was that it avoided a direct attack by the Peiho. The inconveniences of Pehtang as a station were so great that no longer halt would be made there than was inevitable, and three days after its capture reconnoitring parties were sent out to ascertain what the Chinese were doing, and whether they had made any preparations to oppose an advance towards Taku or Tientsin. Four miles from Pehtang the scouts came in sight of a strongly-entrenched camp, when several thousand men opened fire upon the reconnoitring parties with their gingals, and a dozen Europeans were wounded. The object being only to find out what the Celestial army was doing, and where it was, the Europeans withdrew on reaching the proximity of so strong a force. The great difficulty was to discover a way of getting from Pehtang on to some of the main roads leading to the Peiho; for the whole of the surrounding country had been under water, and was more or less impassable. In fact, the region round Pehtang consisted of nothing but mud, while the one road, an elevated causeway, was blocked by the fortified camp just mentioned as having been discovered by the reconnoitring party. A subsequent reconnaissance conducted by Colonel Wolseley revealed the existence of a cart-track which might prove available for troops.

This track was turned to advantage for the purpose of taking the Chinese position in flank, and to Sir Robert Napier's division was assigned this, as it proved, difficult

Now Lord Wolseley, then Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General to the Chinese Expedition, and the author of an excellent account of the campaign, published in 1862.

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