and in consequence Lord Elgin declined to meet them. On the 6th of May he again addressed the Chinese representative to the effect that he could only negotiate with a minister having plenipotentiary powers, that the instances of Keying and Elepoo in 1842 formed a precedent for it, and that he would delay further proceedings for six days in order to allow time for the necessary authority to be received from Pekin. Five days later a reply was received, asserting that the powers of the officials appointed were as full as those of Keying had been, and that in any case they were quite ample for the adjustment of affairs.

To this distinct refusal there could only be one reply, and that was that the English Ambassador would proceed up the Peiho to place himself in nearer communication with the Pekin Government, and that the temporary possession of the forts at the mouth of that river would be requisite for the effectual execution of the measure. A delay of some days ensued in consequence of an informal representation by the Russian Envoy, Count Poutiatine, who had tried to play the part of a mutual friend throughout, that a settlement was not hopeless; but when that officer wrote that "the Chinese Emperor refused to admit foreign envoys to Pekin," it became impossible to doubt that the same violent remedies which had been employed in the south would have also to be used in the north.

The harmony of action which usually marks the relations of high English diplomatic officers and the military commanders with whom they may have to act in concert had been disturbed, a few weeks before the question with China had reached this crisis, by the feeling of disappointment which Lord Elgin experienced at what seemed to him the tardy arrival of the fleet in the Gulf of Pechihli. Unfortunately, as it must be considered, he gave expression to his sense of dissatisfaction in a long despatch to Lord Clarendon, which partook very much of the character of a charge against Sir Michael Seymour of supineness and inaction. It should be stated that that gallant admiral had said at Hongkong that he expected to reach Shanghai about the 16th of March, but he qualified that statement a few days later

by saying that he could not leave Hongkong till the 15th of March; and that, therefore, he would not be in readiness to move from Shanghai with his force until the end of the first week of April. This delay at the outset might have suggested the idea that there was a possibility of the preparations requiring some longer time than had been supposed or allowed for. Be that as it may, Sir Michael Seymour was prevented leaving Hongkong until the 25th of March, and he did not reach the Gulf of Pechihli until the 24th of April, and the various vessels of the fleet arrived in the course of the following fortnight. Early in May twenty-five war-ships were drawn up opposite the forts which guarded the entrance to the Peiho, and the approach to Pekin from the sea.

Lord Elgin was not unnaturally annoyed at the delay which he termed "a most grievous disappointment," for he believed that if he had had ten or twelve gun-boats he would have been allowed by the forts to proceed unresisted to Tientsin, and that the Emperor's Government would have yielded at once everything that was demanded of them. It is certainly possible that the affair might have had that satisfactory issue; but hopes are a bad basis on which to found a charge against a gallant colleague, in connection with whom sluggishness was the last term that could be justly used. Of course it was intelligible that Lord Elgin and his diplomatic assistants should be disappointed at their month's delay off the Taku forts; but remembering the monsoon and the possibility of accident interfering with what was at the most an indefinite understanding, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that greater caution would have been shown in staying at Shanghai till the naval force had been assembled than in hastening on to the Peiho, or, as that course was adopted, that a better and more generous feeling towards a colleague would have been evinced if the delay in the arrival of the ships had been attributed to circumstances coming under the category of the unavoidable.

On the 19th of May the allied fleet proceeded to the mouth of the river, and summoned the commandant to surrender his forts on the following morning. No reply being

received to the summons, the gun-boats proceeded in-shore to make the attack. The Chinese fired the first shots, which were returned after the different vessels had arrived at short range. The bombardment continued for one hour and a quarter, when, all the gunners having been driven out of the batteries, the troops and sailors landed and seized the forts. Further resistance was encountered higher up the river, and a desperate attempt was made to let down a fleet of fire-ships among the foreign vessels. But the former was overcome, and the fire-junks drifted ashore instead of among the boats of Sir Michael Seymour and Admiral Rigault de Genouilly. The victors proceeded as far as the village or town of Taku, where they had established their advanced position while the forts in their rear were being dismantled. The resistance made by the Chinese, who included some of the best troops from the capital, was creditable without being obstinate. The forts had been renovated and armed with guns sent from Pekin and Tientsin. The élite of the Imperial Guard was stated to have held the entrenched camp in the rear of the batteries. But neither their courage nor their preparations availed them. Their commander, in despair at his defeat, committed suicide, and others imitated his example. The loss among the English was slight. The French suffered more heavily, partly from the accidental explosion of a magazine, partly from the unequal fortunes of battle.

The capture of the forts on the Peiho roused the Pekin Government to a sense of the imminent danger in which they stood. Their military resources had been devoted to their defence, and with their fall they were for the time exhausted. Tientsin could offer no resistance. The foreigners there commanded the entrance to the Grand Canal, and with it the route by which the capital was supplied with grain. No opposition could be made save at Pekin itself, and a siege of the capital might entail dangers far greater than were involved in the unconditional surrender of every claim advanced by the dreaded and still more hated Europeans. The fleet proceeded up the river to Tientsin, and Lord Elgin also hastened to that city, where he could count with some degree of confidence on the Chinese showing a more conciliatory demeanour. Before

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he reached that place he had received another communication from the Imperial Commissioners, stating that they would repair in person to the Emperor and ascertain what arrangements he would sanction. At the same time they had the courage to declare that the ascent of the river by the English ships was highly improper. Their representations produced an immediate effect on the mind of the Emperor, as Kweiliang and Hwashana, both Manchus and dignitaries of the highest order, were instructed "to go by post route to the port of Tientsin for the investigation and despatch of business."

The powers conferred upon these officers were of the

amplest kind, and greater even than those previously bestowed upon Keying.

It is a distinctive feature of the Chinese character that when the season has arrived for making concessions it can adapt itself to the necessities of the time, and show as broad and generous a spirit of toleration as those who have constantly in their mouths the assertion of human equality and mutual rights. These moments have, no doubt, been rare, but one of them had arrived when the English Ambassador reached Tientsin, and when it seemed as if the allied forces could make their way almost unresisted to the capital. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the proposals of

*The following is the text of the Imperial decree appointing them, dated 1st of June: "Tau having failed in his treatment of the questions regarding which the different nations had been earnestly preferring requests, we have specially commissioned Kweiliang and Hwashana to proceed to Tientsin and to devise means by which (these questions) may be satisfactorily discussed and decided. As, however, to judge from the communications written by the different nations, they are in doubt as to whether Kweiliang and his colleague are competent or not to act independently, we command Kweiliang and Hwashana, with affectionate earnestness, to set the right before them. If the matters (in question) be reasonable, the desire for a cessation of hostilities sincere, anything not injurious to China will certainly be granted them: there is no occasion for further doubt or suspicion. Kweiliang and his colleague have been specially chosen by us; they will not fail (on the one hand) to be careful of the dignity of the State; (on the other) to watch in silence the feelings of the people. In any conjunction requiring that the action taken be suited to the emergency, unless the case be in contravention of what is right and proper, their course is to deviate (from the beaten track) accordingly. Let them be zealous!"

the new Chinese representatives. They were most anxious to settle all matters without the least delay, and they had been invested with the fullest possible authority to arrange matters without reference to Pekin. Had the two Manchus been brought up in the school of Talleyrand and Metternich they could not have shown greater tact in managing the details of an important negotiation, or more eagerness to make as speedy an end as possible of an unpleasant business.

At this point in the negotiations there re-appeared upon the scene a man whose previous experience and high position entitled him to some consideration. Less than a week after Lord Elgin's preliminary interview with Kweiliang and Hwashana, he received a letter from Keying stating that he had come in obedience to the Emperor's commands to discuss and decide the foreign question. Keying acted separately from the other Commissioners; and his intervention promised to produce embarrassment and delay. It was not clear at first what he really wanted, or with what object he had sought an interview with Lord Elgin; but when he told Mr. Wade that the solution of the difficulty was the withdrawal of the fleet from the river, the motives of his visit and overtures became sufficiently evident. He had been sent in the expectation that from his special knowledge of the English he might succeed in inducing them to forego the great advantage of position which they had acquired by the possession of Tientsin.

The idea was probably his own, and he undertook the task in the hope of recovering the political power and rank of which he had been deprived eight years before. But it may have been that the Emperor Hienfung recollected the existence of the author of the Nankin Treaty, and thinking that he might be able to mislead the foreigners, or to obtain some concession from them, had commanded him to proceed to Tientsin. His fervour in the task he had accepted was increased by the knowledge that the penalty of failure would be death. Perhaps his efforts would have been not altogether unavailing, for Keying's reputation had been great among Europeans, if documents found in Yeh's yamen had not