one in hardly a less degree of convenience. And it was admitted that, although there was no doubt as to the concession having been made by the Chinese Government, it remained a matter of questionable policy whether it was advisable to insist on the compliance with a diplomatic stipulation if it was clear that compliance could only be secured by resorting to violence and at the cost of constant friction. The question had to be discussed, therefore, not so much on its merits as with regard to its practical consequences,* for already it was becoming clear that to yield to the Chinese on one point meant to set a precedent of concession that could not fail to be very inconvenient and in the end attended with many dangers.

No other conclusion can be drawn from the despatches of Lord Palmerston and Sir George Bonham than that they were both most anxious to avoid all occasion of serious disagreement with China. In the interest of peace itself they were desirous to obtain the fulfilment of the pledges made by the responsible Chinese officials, and they never failed to realize that the objections of the Canton Viceroy to execute

* Mr. Bonham wrote as follows to Lord Palmerston on October 23rd, 1848: "If the gates of Canton can only be opened by the force of arms, the consequences of such a step become a matter for deep consideration. I am thoroughly persuaded that the populace and the 'braves' of the adjacent country will join heartily in resisting our approach, and the result will be that we should require a very respectable force to gain our point, for the opposition will be infinitely greater than it was in 1841, when the troops and mandarins were in the first instance its only defenders. A military operation of this nature would, under the most favourable circumstances, not only for a time put a stop to all trade, but it would furthermore require a very long period to elapse before confidence would be restored. This would cause much loss to the native as well as to our own merchants, and operate most detrimentally on our revenues at home." Lord Palmerston stated in reply to this letter that the entrance into Canton was a privilege which we have indeed a right to demand, but which we could scarcely enjoy with security or advantage if we were to succeed in enforcing it by arms. It may be true that the Chinese might be encouraged, by their success in evading compliance with their engagements in this matter, to attempt to violate other engagements; but this consideration does not seem to me to be sufficient to determine Her Majesty's Government to put the issue of peace and war upon this particular point."

A STATE PAPER.

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what he was bound to perform, arose from a dislike to the whole transaction, and not from inability to coerce the populace and to afford protection to foreigners. In his dilemma Su had appealed to the Emperor himself, and the Imperial Council presided over by Muchangah had sent him but cold words of comfort, if he thought that there was only fear at the capital of admitting the foreigners into a provincial city. At that price the Emperor and his ministers would have been very glad to have got rid of the foreign question once and for all. When the central administration and the highest executive in the realm stated that it was a matter of right, and beyond that, moreover, one of comparative unimportance, that the barbarians should insist on the privilege, conceded by Keying, of entering the city of Canton, it can no longer be contended that either the English Cabinet or the Chief Superintendent of Trade in China was mistaken in maintaining that only a little firmness was needed to carry the point. A mistaken consideration of the difficulties of the Chinese led to the postponement of the enforcement of a right ceded in the most formal manner, and, so far as official intercourse was concerned, one that was absolutely necessary to tranquillity.*

The consideration of these early disputes is not to be avoided if the true meaning of the grave difficulties which broke out, shortly after Hienfung's accession, between his officers and the representatives of the English Government,

* The decision of the Chinese Council was conveyed in a remarkable State paper, which should alone suffice to preserve the name of Muchangah from oblivion. In it he said: "It may be said that these barbarians are of an insatiable nature, and that after being admitted into the city they will again give rise to disturbance and cause the commencement of hostilities. But you do not consider that the outside of the city is the same as the inside of the city. If they may give rise to disturbance inside the city, may they not also give rise to disturbance outside the city? ... We therefore conclude that the repugnance to this proceeds from the ignorant populace, which relies on mere animal courage, and is deluded by false reports. . . . We now look up to your Sacred Majesty to issue orders to the Governor of that province to persuade and guide the people, and impress upon them the great principles of justice. Let them not act wantonly, and cause war upon our frontiers."-Blue Book, pp. 177-78.

is to be mastered. Those disputes did not arise out of any single occurrence, but entirely from a chain of events, of antagonistic views and of opposite readings of accepted obligations, which followed the refusal in 1849 of the Viceroy Su to carry out the promise of Keying to open the gates of Canton. The populace were noisy in their expression of the resolve to make no surrender, and the policy of the English Government was never expressed in that emphatic language which foreshadowed the employment of force. The Chinese were very shrewd in detecting that the hands of the English Superintendent of Trade were tied, and the tokens of success already rested with them when the accession of Hienfung strengthened the influence of those whose sympathies were adverse to Europeans. The long delay in enforcing the right, and the appearance of a new and less pacifically disposed sovereign on the throne, put an end to all hopes of obtaining the surrender of the principal stipulation with Keying* in 1847, of course unless force was to be employed.

The question had progressed in this manner when in 1852 Sir George Bonham returned to Europe on leave, and was temporarily succeeded by Dr. John Bowring, who had officiated for a short period as Consul at Canton. In his first instructions received from Lord Granville, at that moment beginning a very long career at the Foreign Office, he was informed that it was "the anxious desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid all irritating discussions with that of China." The new representative of the English Government in that country, who was regarded as no more than a temporary official, was also directed to avoid pushing arguments on doubtful points in a manner to fetter the free action of his Government, but he was at the same time to recollect that it was his duty to carefully watch over and insist upon the performance by the Chinese authorities of their engagements. It will be admitted that the proper

*It may be interesting to state that Keying, applied to by Su for his advice, had replied that the opinion of the people was greatly to be considered, but that the will of the Emperor overruled all. He was careful to point out that what he had done had been sanctioned by a special Edict of the Vermilion Pencil.

SIR JOHN BOWRING.

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fulfilment of the latter necessarily involved some infringement of the former recommendation; and while the paramount consideration with the Government in London was to keep things quiet, it was inevitable that the agent on the spot should think a great deal, if not mostly, of how best to obtain compliance to the fullest extent with the pledges given in the treaty and subsequent conventions. The emphatic manner in which the Foreign Office impressed on the acting Governor the necessity of abstaining from all decisive measures in his dealings with the Chinese was partly explained by his being a new man, and one moreover who might naturally be thought not to possess the same perfect agreement with official views. as Sir George Bonham had held.*

A change of Government having taken place at home, and a Conservative Administration having been installed in office, it is necessary to state that Lord Malmesbury repeated, in language more emphatic if possible than Lord Granville's, that "all irritating discussions with the Chinese should be avoided," and that the existing good understanding was to be in no way imperilled.

The first communication from Dr. Bowring to the Chinese was dated in April, 1852, and contained the expression of a desire for an opportunity of paying his personal respects to the high Chinese officials at Canton, with a view to arranging such matters as remained unsettled. The reply of the Viceroy Su was to compliment him upon his appointment, but at the same time to express the wish that the interview should be postponed until the hostilities against the rebels had been triumphantly concluded. Dr. Bowring accepted the excuse, and more than two years passed by before the question of an interview was resumed. By that time Dr.

* In his reply, Dr. Bowring said: "The Pottinger Treaties inflicted a deep wound upon the pride, but by no means altered the policy, of the Chinese Government. . . . Their purpose is now, as it ever was, not to invite, not to facilitate, but to impede and resist the access of foreigners. . . . It must then ever be borne in mind, in considering the state of our relations with these regions, that the two Governments have objects at heart which are diametrically opposed except in so far that both earnestly desire to avoid all hostile action, and to make its own policy as far as possible subordinate to that desire."

Bowring had been knighted, and had received full powers as Governor of Hongkong in succession to Sir George Bonham; and the Viceroy Su had experienced the opposite extreme of fortune, and, having fallen from the position of popular champion to that of a disgraced official, his place had been taken at Canton by his former subordinate, Yeh.

Up to this point all Sir John Bowring's suggestions with regard to the settlement of the questions pending with the Chinese had been received in London with the official reply, expressed indeed in peremptory terms, that he was to abstain from all action, and that he was not to press himself on the Canton officials. But in the early part of the year 1854 there was a modification in the rigidity of this policy of doing nothing; and Lord Clarendon admitted that it was desirable to secure certain points, of which the two principal were "free and unrestricted intercourse with the Chinese officials," and "admission into some of the cities of China, especially Canton." Encouraged by this statement, Sir John Bowring felt justified in detailing his views on the points at issue, and in seizing the opportunities that presented themselves for obtaining what had been formally granted.

Sir John Bowring's first step after his definitive appointment was to notify the fact to Yeh; but the reply to this notification was so long delayed, that he had written, before any answer to the first communication had reached him, a second letter inviting the Chinese Commissioner to an early interview, but at the same time stating that there could only be one mode of reception, viz. within the city of Canton at the official yamen or residence of the Viceroy. The question which had long lain dormant was thus brought to a clear issue, and it only remained to be seen what would be the outcome of it. But while Sir John Bowring, with commendable frankness, at the very commencement of the controversy stated the conditions on which he would alone proceed to Canton, it must be observed that he was demanding less than Keying's arrangement had provided for. That convention had opened the gates of Canton, after an interval long expired, to all Englishmen. The English Government