beyond this point neither then nor at any other time did the rebels succeed in getting.

The forcing of the Limming pass produced great confusion at Pekin. It was no longer a question of suffering subjects and disturbed provinces; nor was the danger one only affecting the privileges of the Manchus as a ruling caste. The capital of the Empire, the very person of the Emperor, was in imminent peril of destruction at the hands of a foe sworn to exact a ruthless vengeance. The city was denuded of troops. The levies were hastily summoned from Mongolia in order to defend the line of the Peiho and the other approaches to the capital. Had the Taepings shown better generalship, there is no saying that they would not have captured the capital. Had they seized Chingting, and marched as rapidly through Powting and Tso as they had shown that they could march, they might have obtained a decisive success, for the Imperial preparations had been made in the scare and hurry of the moment to defend Tientsin and the line of the Peiho; and by the other advance all these arrangements would have been outflanked.

But the Taepings themselves were far from being in the best of spirits. Their march from the Yangtse had been remarkable for the great distance covered; it had also been remarkable for the absence of any striking success on the part of an army which was credited with carrying terror in its train and with holding the fate of the Empire in its hands. On the 28th of October they were attacked by the Tientsin militia, defeated, and compelled to retire into their camp, which they hastened to fortify, at Tsinghai and Tuhlow. Here they were invested by the Tartar troops under the great Mongol chief, Sankolinsin, who was soon reinforced by the Chinese troops from Honan, that had followed the march of the Taepings. From October, 1853, until March of the next year, they were shut up in this position; but the timidity or prudence of the Imperial commanders induced them to believe that the sure and safest course was to starve them out. And so it might have been had not Tien Wang, hearing of the dilemma of his army, sent another to relieve it. This second body marched direct through Shantung, and in March, 1854,

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succeeded in effecting a junction at the city of Lintsing, with the original force, which had already begun its retreat from Tsing.

The army under Sankolinsin had closely pursued them, and several keenly-contested encounters had taken place in the hundred miles between the two towns named. The Taepings had suffered very severe losses, but cheered by the sudden appearance of the new force they succeeded in carrying Lintsing by storm. At Lintsing the Taepings made

a further stand, establishing their quarters there, and occupying several towns in the neighbourhood. But their successes were few and unimportant. They were vigilantly watched by the Imperial army, and, if they did not suffer any great defeat, the range of their activity was circumscribed. Gradually their numbers were thinned by disease as well as by the losses in constant action. The exact nature of their collapse cannot be accurately described, though it may be easily imagined. In March, 1855, they had finally abandoned all their possessions in Shantung, and the Imperial authorities could truthfully declare that the whole of the country north of the Yellow river was free of the presence of the Taepings. Long before that they ceased to be formidable; and it may confidently be declared that only a very small number of the two armies sent to effect the capture of Pekin ever returned to the head-quarters of the Heavenly leader at Nankin.

Having described the course of the principal offensive movement made by the Taeping forces up to the point when it terminated, two years after the occupation of Nankin, it is necessary to return and describe the other military operations. which were directed by Tien Wang and his principal military officers. Encouraged by the repulse of Tseng Kwofan's attempt on Kiukiang as already described, the Taepings fitted out a naval expedition, and, crossing Lake Poyang, attacked the important city of Kanchang. The siege began in June, 1853, but their ill-directed efforts were all repulsed; and in September, after one defeat in the field, the Taepings embarked on their junks and hastily retreated to the Yangtse. But after the departure of the main body the whole of the northern portion of Kiangsi was constantly subjected to raids

on the part of Taeping detachments, who levied black-mail in the region round Poyang and along the valley of the Kan.

They also spread themselves in a different direction over the plains of Hoonan, and up the valley of the Seang river, pillaging the villages and capturing all the towns with the exception of Changsha, where Tseng had left a strong garrison. They made their way, too, for some distance up the Great River itself. They failed in their attempt on Kingchow, where a Manchu force valiantly held its ground; but they succeeded in reaching Ichang, now a treaty port, but then only remarkable as denoting the entrance to those great gorges which defend the approaches to the magnificent province of Szchuen. Just as the Taeping movement exhausted its forces at Tsing in the north, so had it at a still earlier date reached on the west the limit of its influence at Ichang.

During these operations the Taepings recaptured the cities of Wouchang and Hankow at the close of a siege of eighty days; but after three months' occupation they were again abandoned. Once again the need of increasing the area of the region whence they drew their supplies compelled them to retake these important places. This last occupation occurred in the early part of the year 1855. Perhaps the most important event in connection with the former attack was that the Governor of the province was beheaded for failing to defend his charge-the first recognition of the fact that the situation was desperate, and that the officials must no longer evince apathy in their measures for the restoration of order. Without some act impressing upon the mandarins at large that the old day of robbing had passed away and must give place to one of decisive action, the great body of the Chinese service would even in the extreme hour of the crisis have continued to think only of making personal profit, without entering into any larger considerations of the danger to the State and of their duty to their sovereign.

The progress of the Taeping revolt had been watched by the European community with close attention, but with feelings of an opposite character. While the missionaries, whose

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influence was the greater and more obtrusive because they possessed the almost complete control of the literature dealing with China, were disposed to hail the Taepings as the regenerators of China and as the champions of Christianity; the merchants saw in them the disturbers of trade, and men who threatened to destroy the prosperity of the country, and with it eventually their own. While on the one hand confident declarations were made that the last hour of the Manchu dynasty had arrived, that the knell of fate had sounded for the descendants of Noorhachu, the murmurs on the other hand were not less emphatic that the Taepings had ruined trade, and that the only way to continue it under any equal conditions was by the cessation of the payment of the stipulated customs to the Chinese authorities. It is difficult to understand how the Shanghai merchants brought themselves to the frame of mind to think that the English Government could shape its action and suspend the provisions of the Treaty of Nankin in accordance with the condition of their ledgers. But Mr. Rutherford Alcock pointed out in emphatic language that he had no choice save to abide by the Treaty of Peace and to preserve a strict neutrality. It was much more difficult for either Mr. Alcock or the Vice-Consul, Mr. Thomas Wade, to check the impulsive tendencies of those who believed in the mission of the Taepings, and who as strongly disbelieved in the vigour and resources of the Manchus. The armoury of criticism has not yet forged the weapon that shall pierce the self-sufficiency of prophets, who are little amenable to facts.

With the occupation of Nankin by Tien Wang it was thought necessary to acquaint the Taepings with the position which the English Government wished to occupy during the progress of the struggle. That position was to be one of strict neutrality coupled with the proviso that the Taepings were to observe, or at all events not to violate, the principal stipulations of the Treaty of Nankin. It is impossible to doubt that there must have been a strong feeling of curiosity at work when Sir George Bonham himself proceeded to Nankin in order to acquaint the Taepings with the existence of the English and of what they expected to be done. Several

of the more experienced English officials were extremely sceptical of the good faith of the Taepings, and of their chances of permanent success; but Sir George Bonham was not equally cautious. By going out of his way to hold relations of a formal character with Tien Wang, he proclaimed that he as the representative of the English Government recognized in him something more than an insurgent leader, while the people of the great ports saw in the action of the English Government further reason to believe that Tien Wang was destined to be a great national monarch. The visit of Sir George Bonham to Nankin was not intended to be so, but it was none the less a distinctly unfriendly act to the Government of Pekin.

The decision of Sir George Bonham to proceed to Nankin was hastened by the fact that Wou the Taotai of Shanghai, an energetic official who had been a merchant at Canton and who had purchased his way to power, was endeavouring to obtain assistance from the foreign Governments at the same time that he spread abroad the report that they were anxious and prepared to support the cause of the Imperialists. He purchased several European vessels, and he sent in a request for the loan of an English warship then at Shanghai. The response to this application was not only the verbal reply that the English intended to remain neutral, but the open deed, as we have said, that the English representative hastened to Nankin to acquaint the rebel leaders with the fact.

In April, 1853, Sir George Bonham left for Nankin in the war-steamer Hermes. Mr. Interpreter Meadows had been previously sent to collect information about the rebels; but navigation by the canal being found impossible, he returned to Shanghai without having established any relations with the Taepings. The Hermes was fired upon by the batteries at Chinkiang and Kwachow; but as she did not return the fire, she succeeded in running the gauntlet and making her way without any damage or accident to Nankin. The Taepings subsequently explained that they had only fired upon the Hermes because they believed her to be the advance-guard of Wou's squadron. On the 27th of April