CHANG KWOLIANG. 225 been extremely doubtful. They had overrun a long strip of country, but the strong places had baffled them. They had lost several of their leaders, and more of their followers. Their advance had borne some resemblance to a flight. The soldiers of the new Heavenly Ruler were beginning to ask what was to be the reward of their labours, and where they were to repair their losses and recover from their weariness. The capture of the wealthy towns of Wouchang and Hankow at once removed all these causes of doubt and discouragement. The Taepings were able to repay themselves for the losses of hardships they had undergone, and they saw in the rich prize in their power the surest proof that the enterprise which they had in hand was not likely to be unprofitable. During one month they remained at Hankow, not only collecting their spoil and a vast quantity of provisions in the numerous junks on the river, but also in organizing and subjecting to the oath of allegiance to Tien Wang the many thousand recruits who from all parts now hastened to join a leader whose cause and pretensions had received the ratification of success. But even now it was no part of their mission to stand still. The possibility of pursuit by Tseng Kwofan with the levies of Hoonan was never absent from their minds. The Imperialist commanders were hampered by their want of authority and concord. Tseng had been joined by the ex-Triad chief Chang Kwoliang, but he had neither name nor authority outside Hoonan. He had performed his duty in his own province; he could only hope that his fellowcountrymen in other provinces would do theirs. Tseng and his colleagues re-established the Emperor's authority throughout Hoonan. Unfortunately the report of the success they had achieved blinded people to the danger nearer home, and the Taepings swept like an irresistible wave or torrent down the valley of the Yangtsekiang. The capture of Kiukiang, a town situated on the river near the northern extremity of the lake Poyang, and of Ganking followed in quick succession; and on the 8th of March they sat down before Nankin, the old capital of the Mings. The siege went on until the 24th of the same Q VOL. II. month; but notwithstanding that there was a large Manchu force in the Tartar city, which might easily have been defended apart from the Chinese and much larger city, the resistance offered was singularly and unexpectedly faint-hearted. The Taepings succeeded in blowing in one of the gates, the townspeople fraternized with the assailants, and the very Manchus, who had looked so valiant in the face of Sir Hugh Gough's force, ten years before, now surrendered their lives and their honour after a mere show of resistance to a force which was nothing better than an armed rabble. The Manchu colony of Nankin, to the number of some four thousand families, had evidently fallen off from their high renown, and had lost the military courage and discipline which could alone enable them to maintain their position in China. Instead of dying at their posts, they threw themselves on the mercy of the national leader, imploring him for pity and for their lives when the gate was blown in by the Taeping soldiery. Their cowardice helped them not; of twenty thousand Manchus not one hundred escaped. The tale rests on irrefragable evidence. "We killed them all, to the infant in arms; we left not a root to sprout from; and the bodies of the slain we cast into the Yangtse." The capture of Nankin and this sweeping massacre of the dominant race seemed to point the inevitable finger of fate at the Tatsing dynasty. It was no longer possible to regard Tien Wang and his miscellaneous gathering as an enemy beneath contempt. Without achieving any remarkable success, having indeed been defeated whenever they were opposed with the least resolution, the Taepings found themselves in possession of the second city in the Empire. With that city they had acquired the complete control of the navigation of the Yangtse, and had cut off a part of the communications between the north and the south. They definitely abandoned Hankow, and contented themselves with holding the country from Kiukiang to Nankin. But they continued their progress down the great river with the object of securing the passage of the Grand Canal, and on the 1st of April, 1853, they occupied Chinkiangfoo, where the principal battle had been fought in the war of 1842. Chinkiang is on the MARCH TO PEKIN. 227 southern side of the Yangtse, and to this they resolved for the present to strictly confine themselves. Yangchow, on the northern side and some miles up the canal, was indeed occupied, but it was evacuated in a few days. It was stated that here they captured a long succession of batteries covering three miles and full of guns, not one of which had been fired upon them. Everywhere the garrisons fled without attempting resistance, or waiting to incur the implacable vengeance of the Taepings. The rebels, even after these successes, seemed less dreadful to those in their rear, who had some reason to believe them not invincible, than they did to the garrisons in their front. Tseng Kwofan had gathered up his forces, and after some hesitation had entered the province of Kiangsi and advanced to attack the Taepings at Kiukiang. He made his attack, but fortune did not smile on his effort. He was repulsed with some loss, and compelled to draw off his defeated army, which he established in quarters at Kanchang, where he placed himself in communication with the authorities at Hangchow. Another Imperialist army, under General Heang Yung, had been moved forward from Kiangsu, and had taken up a position ten miles south of Nankin. So far as further action on the part of the Imperialists went, it was confined to observation, while urgent appeals for aid were repeatedly sent to the capital. To that summons no heed could be paid in consequence of the peril which beset Pekin itself. By extraordinary rapidity, and by a rare combination of fortunate circumstances, the Taeping leader had transferred his operations from remote Kwangsi to the very centre of the country, and by seizing the great river and one outlet of the Grand Canal he had, figuratively speaking, cut the Empire into two parts. But it was obvious to him and his advisers that, their success being little short of miraculous, there was no certainty about its continuing, unless it could be followed up by some decisive victory over the Manchus in the capital itself. At a council of war held at Nankin it was decided to send a force against Pekin as soon as Nankin had been placed in a proper state to withstand a siege. In that portion of their task they succeeded admirably. The old fortifications were repaired, new ramparts and batteries were erected, and, above all, provisions were stored to enable them to hold out for, as it was said, six or eight years.* In the month of May these defensive measures were sufficiently far advanced to justify the despatch of a considerable portion of the Taeping army on an offensive campaign against Pekin. At this time it was computed that the total number of the Taepings did not fall short of 80,000 trustworthy fighting men, and without the adjective the number does not appear excessive, while there were perhaps more than 100,000 Chinese pressed into their service as the hewers of wood and drawers of water. The lines of Nankin and the batteries along the Yangtse were the creation of the forced labour of the population which had not fled before the Taepings. On the 12th of May an army stated to consist of 200,000 men, but probably not half that number, crossed the Yangtse and marched northwards. The movements of this body borrowed their rapidity from Tien Wang's first advance beyond Kweiling. They captured several places on the way, and overthrew more than one detachment; and on the 19th of June they appeared before Kaifong, the chief town of Honan, and once the capital of China. They had thus transferred their advanced posts in a few weeks from the Yangtse to the Hoangho. They attacked Kaifong, but were defeated with loss. Resuming their former tactics, they abandoned their attack on Kaifong, and hastened to cross the Yellow river. That they were able to do this without opposition says very little for the enterprise of the commandant of Kaifong. They then marched westwards against the important prefectural town of Hwaiking, where they met with a valiant and unexpected resistance. After a siege of two months they were compelled * On the occupation of Nankin it was given the title of Heavenly Capital, and the city was consecrated. The Tung Wang, or Eastern King," was made Minister of State, and strict laws were passed to maintain order and discipline. We shall see that the irregular levies chafed at these restrictions. The families of the non-combatant Chinese employed in the works were detained as hostages for the fidelity of the males. A GREAT MARCH. 229 to admit that they had been baffled for a second time, and that they must resort to some other plan. Alarmed as to their position, which was rendered extremely precarious by the gradual recovery of the Imperial troops from their state of panic, the Taepings quitted their camp at Hwaiking, and marched westwards along the northern bank of the Yellow river as far as the small town of Yuenking; then they turned suddenly north to Pingyang, whence, reversing their line of march, they hastened eastwards towards the metropolitan province of Pechihli. The whole of the autumn of 1853 was taken up with these manœuvres ; but having defeated a Manchu force at the Lin Limming pass, the Taepings appeared in Pechihli for the first time on the 30th of September. The object of their march was plain. Not only did they mystify the Emperor's generals as to their plan, for it was thought much more likely that the Taepings, repulsed at Hwaiking, were in search of an easy crossing over the Yellow river, or at the worst intended an attack on Singanfoo, than that they meditated a descent upon the capital. But the Taepings had yet another object to serve by this detour. They passed through an agricultural country which had been untouched by the operations of war, and as they avoided the main high road, it was as difficult to ascertain what their movements were as it was to pursue them. Their march was unopposed. The few towns lying along this route were unfortified and without a garrison, The population was unwarlike, and the Taepings had only to overrun the country and to drain it of its resources. Having forced the Limming pass, the Taepings found no difficulty in occupying the towns on the south-west border of Pechihli. The defeat of the Manchu garrison in the pass that was considered almost impregnable gave the Taepings the prestige of victory, and the towns opened their gates one after the other. They crossed the Hootoo river on a bridge of boats which they constructed themselves, and then occupied the town of Shinchow. On the 21st of October they reached Tsing, not much more than twenty miles south of Tientsin. which, again, is only eighty miles from the capital; but |