a view of showing that the English were in earnest and were no longer to be put off with specious promises. The growing importance of the question was shown on the one hand by the steady arrival of reinforcements for the English army and navy, and on the other by the advent of a French commercial mission under Colonel de Jancigny who reached Macao in the last month of the year 1841.

But neither the swift recurring visitation of disaster, nor the waning resources of the Imperial Government both in men and treasure, could shake the fixed hostility of Taoukwang,* or induce him to abate the proud pretensions which imperatively demanded that he should triumph in some decisive fashion over the arrogant and hitherto too successful Europeans. Minister passed after minister into disgrace and exile.+ Misfortune shared the same lot as incompetence, and the more the embarrassments of the State increased the heavier fell the hand of the ruler and the verdict of the Board of Punishments upon beaten generals and unsuccessful ministers. Preparations for defending the approach to the capital were made at Tientsin and along the Peiho; and in every other part of the Empire measures were taken to resume at the earliest possible date a vigorous offensive against the invaders. Long before the necessary levies had been made, the Imperial will which decreed the prolongation

* At this point in the struggle an interesting event occurred which merits attention. In 1839 the Dalai Lama of Tibet wrote to Lord Auckland (see Gleig's "Life") offering "to invade and conquer China" on the receipt of a sum of money and some horse artillery. This correspondence, of which nothing came, was in the possession of the East India Company; but, in reply to inquiries we have made as to its present existence, all we can ascertain is that it is not now in the Indian Office. Almost at the same moment the Goorkhas had come to a precisely opposite decision. Meng Pao, the Chinese Resident at Lhasa, wrote that an envoy came to him from Nepaul, offering aid against the Li-ti, who had often molested the Goorkhas, and who were then at war with China. The Amban did not know that the English were the Li-ti, and proudly replied that "China should not trouble herself with the quarrels of such petty states."-See M. Imbault Huart's translation of "A Chinese Account of their Conquest of Nepaul," 1879.

† Lin was appointed Commissioner of the Yellow River in consequence of great floods-an elevation. Elepoo, once one of the foremost ministers, was banished to Ili.

CABUL AND CHINA.

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of the struggle was reflected in the acts of some of the more fanatical or desperate among his subjects, who lost no opportunity of attacking solitary individuals or weatherbound vessels. Outrages upon the Canton river again became frequent; and more than one ship's crew, after having experienced the treachery of the China seas, felt that also of the Chinese people.

There ensued a lull also on the English side, partly because the trade went on smoothly enough at Canton, and because it was thought that the continued occupation of Amoy, Chusan, and Ningpo must eventually bring the Celestial Court to reason, but also and principally because the disaster in Afghanistan, which lent so sombre a colour to British history during the winter of 1841-2, monopolized the attention of the Indian executive and prevented the vigorous prosecution of the Chinese question until the Cabul catastrophe had been retrieved and avenged. Therefore the early months of the year 1842 proved uneventful, although a foreign army was in possession of several of the strongest and most important places along the coast south of the great river Yangtsekiang. This inaction greatly encouraged Taoukwang to adhere to his warlike resolutions, and invested with an appearance of increased credibility the official reports from the Chinese commanders, who alleged that, although defeated, they had inflicted heavy losses on the foreigners.

The month of February 1842 brought many rumours to the English head-quarters at Ningpo of the contemplated resumption of hostilities on the part of the Chinese, and small detachments sent out from that city to various places from ten to thirty miles distant never failed to come into contact with parties of braves. Nothing serious occurred until the following month, when the Chinese, having suddenly collected a number of men, made a vigorous attack upon Ningpo itself. It is not unlikely that the delay was caused by some disturbances which broke out in the province of Hupeh, probably in connection with the raising of recruits and revenue for the purposes of the war. The reconnoitring of the country beyond Ningpo had shown, indeed, that there were still armed parties of Chinese in the province, but it also seemed

to prove that the rumours current as to their numbers and military efficiency were exaggerated. Both Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker were absent at Chusan when these suppositions were suddenly and rudely dispelled by the appearance of a large body of Chinese troops on the 10th of March at daybreak, outside the south and west gates of Ningpo. Not fewer than ten thousand men, and by some as many as twelve thousand, were computed to have taken part in this attack, which fulfilled all the conditions of a surprise. The Chinese got over the walls and reached the very heart of the city; but, instead of being the way to victory, this early success proved only a trap for their more complete discomfiture. Attacked in the market-place by artillery and foot, they suffered very heavy loss, and were only too glad to beat a hasty retreat from their meditated prize. During this contest at close quarters and the subsequent pursuit, which was kept up with great vigour, the Chinese suffered very heavily, and 250 killed alone were found within the city walls. At the same time an attack was made on Chinhai, at the mouth of the river, but it was comparatively feeble and was repulsed without difficulty. Similar attempts were made from the islands neighbouring to Chusan, but all were defeated. The Chinese lost a large number of men; they suffered more seriously and irreparably in war material of every kind.

The Chinese, no doubt encouraged by the absence of the English commanders, had played a bold card, and they had lost. They were approaching the end of their resources; for the Imperial Exchequer was exhausted, and the task of defraying the expenses had been cast on those provinces which were near the sea, and which were consequently the scene of operations. The prolongation of the war promised to become most unpopular, for it affected the people in their purses, and they really did not know what they were to fight for. But while these sentiments were acquiring further force from the failure of the attack on Ningpo, the English had determined to assume the offensive and to strike a decisive blow against the Chinese army reported to be assembled in some strength in the neighbourhood of the important city of Hangchow, the Kincsay of the mediæval travellers.

A STRIKING ATTACK.

123

The first blow was struck at the small town of Tszeki, where the men who had attacked Ningpo, reinforced from Hangchow, had taken up a strong position in a fortified camp on a hill. A picked force, some 1100 strong, was conveyed by water to attack this position. The town of Tszeki offered only a nominal resistance, and was evacuated by the Chinese on the near approach of the English; but they had resolved to make a more vigorous stand in the fortified camps which they had constructed, with great pains and skill, on two hills. of some altitude immediately outside the town. The operations of the day were carried out under the direct supervision of Sir Hugh Gough, who was accompanied by the admiral, Sir William Parker, and they were marked by all the dash and impetuosity for which the former was so well known. Although the Chinese position at first appeared imposing, it proved, on examination, to be extremely faulty. Large as the Chinese army was, it could only occupy a small part of the long range of hills which surround this place on three of its sides; and the Segaou hills, on which they had pitched their camps, were commanded by some loftier altitudes in the same or the adjoining range. So it happened that, while they were confident in their fancied security, the English commander had detected the fact that their left was commanded from some hills on his right, and that their left again commanded their own right. It was, evident, therefore, that the capture of the left portion of the Chinese encampment would entail the surrender of the rest, and the attack of the key of the position was attended by such facilities that it left little or no doubt as to the result. The difficulties of the ground caused a greater delay in the advance than had been expected, and the assault had to be delivered along the whole line, as it was becoming obvious that the Chinese were growing more confident, and, consequently, more to be feared from the delay in attacking them. The assault was made with the striking impetuosity with which good troops always attack an inferior enemy, no matter how great the disparity of numbers may be; and, notwithstanding that the Chinese stood their ground in a very creditable manner, they were driven out of their encampments over the range of hills to the fields below,

and pursued for a considerable distance. The Chinese, it afterwards appeared, were picked troops selected from the Imperial Guard and the garrisons of the frontier provinces of Kansuh and Shensi. They lost not fewer than one thousand men killed-a tremendous loss relatively to the number of men engaged and the shortness of the engagement. The English loss was only six men killed and thirty-seven wounded, of whom a large proportion were officers. As a consequence of this victory, the strongly-situated Changki pass fell into the hands of the English, and all the Chinese forces retired to Hangchow.

For a time it was thought that the next step would be to make a direct attack upon that city, where a new High Commissioner, Chulahang, had arrived with fresh warlike instructions, and with the Emperor's authority to freely confer decorations for valour and enterprise, but, above all things, for success. The arrival of large reinforcements from India for the English army more than compensated for the fresh forces Taoukwang had succeeded in putting in the field; but the change in the plans of operation caused by the fresh instructions received from the new Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, produced a still greater effect so far as the final result was concerned. Lord Ellenborough has been charged with committing some acts of doubtful policy, and with overlooking the practical side in the affairs with which he had to deal; but it should be remembered to his credit, that he was the first to detect the futility of operations along the coast as a means of bringing the Chinese Government to reason, and to suggest that the great water-way of the Yangtsekiang, completely navigable for war-ships up to the immediate neighbourhood of Nankin, afforded conveniences for effecting the objects which the English Cabinet wished to secure. The opinion among the older English residents was altogether in favour of a direct attack on the capital itself; but this presented too many risks, and, indeed, was hardly feasible, considering the smallness of the English force, and

Five hundred of these were present, and Sir Hugh Gough described them as being "remarkably fine men."