kind, from their Creator, and of those institutions and privileges which they inherited from their ancestors as subjects of the British crown, modified by their situation and circumstances as colonists, and subsequently varied by their successful vindication of their natural and political rights in the assertion of their independence; that it was formed on the Republican principle of representation in all its branches, adopted by the people themselves, and not by their state legislatures, and establishes a GOVERNMENT proper, operating upon every individual residing under its jurisdiction, and extending over the Union as one national community or body politic-composed, not only of the people of the several states, but to a certain degree of the states themselves, thus happily combining the principles of federation and consolidation, for the purpose of investing the states, as well as the people, with one national character; that, as the Union thus formed constitutes the nation, so the people of the several states have, for all the purposes of the Constitution, become one people, owing local allegiance to the states in which they reside, paramount allegiance to the National Government; that all the powers requisite to secure the objects of national union are vested in the General Government, while those only which are not essential to that purpose are reserved to the states or the people; that the National Government, though united in its powers to national objects, is supreme in the exercise of those powers; and that, whenever any of those powers, in their exercise, come in collision with the powers reserved to the states, the state authority, which is subordinate, must yield to the national authority, which is supreme.

Each state, nevertheless, although no longer possessing the absolute independence essential to it as

a separate national sovereignty, must still be regarded as sovereign in all matters not transferred to the General Government. The supremacy of the Union on all those points which are thus surrendered, and the sovereignty of the states in those not ceded to the nation, have been justly considered as two coordinate qualities, in attempting to ascertain the real meaning of the Constitution, in cases which, from the uncertainty and imperfection of human language, it is liable to dispute or doubt. As different views and interests have prevailed, different theories for the construction of the Constitution have been advanced. It has sometimes been regarded as a mere confederacy or alliance between the states, implying no surrender of their sovereign power or character; but this opinion is inconsistent with the nature of the federal compact, as explained by judicial interpretation of conclusive authority. Some jurists and politicians, however, who admit that it constitutes a government, have yet contended that, inasmuch as it establishes a government of limited powers, it should be construed strictly; while others have asserted that, from the extensive and high objects to be accomplished by the exercise of these powers, the most liberal interpretation should be allowed. As, on the one hand, a strict adherence to the letter, without regarding the spirit or pursuing the manifest sense of the instrument, can only proceed from groundless jealousy or concealed hostility to the system, so, on the other, a liberal construction may, from the possession or desire of power under it, be carried to a pernicious extreme. Limitations and restrictions may be conceived to exist, by some, which would render nugatory the national authority, and were, therefore, never meant to be imposed; while concessions of power may be imagined or as

sumed by others, incompatible with the sovereignty actually retained by the states, if not necessary to give effect to the federal supremacy. The true rule of interpretation seems to be no other than that which is applied, in all cases of correct and impartial exposition, to deduce the meaning of the contract from its known design and entire language; to reconcile, and, if possible, give effect, to every part of the instrument, and, at the same time, preserve the unity and harmony of the whole, in due regard to the expressions as well as the intentions of the parties.

On many questions which have already arisen, we have the benefit of the learned elucidations of the judicial departments of the General, and many of the State Governments; and wherever the supreme federal tribunal has pronounced its solemn decision, its authority must be deemed conclusive, because that court, and that alone, possesses ultimate jurisdiction upon all points of controversy arising under the Constitution of the United States. But where a guide so certain and authoritative cannot be found, I must endeavour, with the aid of inferior lights, to discover the true, but latent meaning of a Constitution which, in the language of that venerable and accomplished jurist, the late chancellor of this state, "must always be more admired as it is more considered and better understood."

LECTURE III.

OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.

THE first general point of view in which it was proposed to consider the Federal Constitu

tion was, "with regard to the particular structure and organization of the government, and the distribution of its powers among its several branches."

I have already had occasion to advert to the rule inculcating the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government, and to remark that it had been substantially adhered to in framing our National Constitution. These different branches, however, have not, in all cases, been kept entirely distinct; and it therefore becomes necessary to ascertain, in limine, the meaning of a political apothegm, of which none is of more intrinsic value, or stamped with the approbation of more enlightened authority.

From the sense in which the maxim in question was first applied by Montesquieu to the English Constitution, as well as from the mode in which it has been practically acknowledged in several of our state constitutions, it is evident that it was never understood to require that the three departments should be wholly unconnected with each other; on the contrary, it has been satisfactorily shown by the authors of the "Federalist," that, unless they be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the rule requires cannot be maintained. It is obvious, indeed, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the others. It is equally clear that, in reference to each other, neither branch should possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the execution of their respective powers. And although in our governments each department

derives its authority from the same source, and equally represents the people, yet the legislative branch, as its constitutional powers are at once more extensive and less susceptible of precise limitation than either of the others, must necessarily possess a greater preponderance in the political system, and act with greater force upon the public mind. In order, therefore, to maintain in practice the requisite partition of power, the internal structure of the government would be so contrived as to render its constituent parts, by their mutual relations, the means of keeping each other within their proper spheres of action.

The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers of government in the same hands consists in giving to those who administer them in one department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments from the others. A dependance on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience had shown the framers of our Constitution the necessity of auxiliary precautions; and the remedy they devised for the natural predominance of the legislative authority was the divis ion of the legislative body into two branches, and rendering them, by different modes of election and principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and dependance on the people would admit. The comparative weakness of the executive branch, on the other hand, was fortified, by investing it with a qualified negative on the acts of the Legislature, and connecting it with the weaker branch of that stronger power, by allowing the latter to participate in certain executive