as plainly the expediency of vesting it in the President.

As the sense of responsibility is always stronger in proportion as it is undivided, it may justly be inferred that one man will be most ready to listen to the force of motives and reasons for mitigating the rigour of the law, and least apt to yield to inducements calculated to shelter a fit object from its exemplary visitation; while, on the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, it may, with equal justice, be apprehended that they might often encourage each other in acts of obduracy, and be less sensible to the dread of censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. The power of pardon vested in the President is not, however, without limitation. He is precluded, as we have seen, in cases of impeachment, from screening public officers, with whom he might possibly have formed a dangerous or corrupt coalition, or may frequently be his favourites and dependants.

4. The President has power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur.

Much difference of opinion seems to prevail among writers on government upon the question whether, in the natural distribution of power, the authority to negotiate and conclude compacts and arrangements with foreign nations is properly of legislative or of executive cognizance. As treaties are declared by the Constitution to be a part of the supreme law of the land; as by means of these national engagements new relations are formed, and new obligations contracted, it seems more consonant to the principles of the government to consider the right of entering into them as falling within the jurisdiction of the Legislature. On the other hand, the preliminary negotia

tions which may be required, and the secrecy and despatch proper to take advantage of a sudden and favourable turn in public affairs, render it expedient to place this power in the hands of the executive. The framers of the Constitution were influenced by the latter more than the former consideration; but although the power in question, if we carefully at'tend to its operation, will be found to partake more of the legislative than of the executive character, yet it does not seem to fall strictly within either. The essence of the legislative power is to prescribe laws for the regulation of the commonwealth; while the execution of those laws, and the employment of the public force, either for that purpose, or for the common defence, comprise all the proper functions of the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties relates neither to the execution of subsisting laws, nor to the making of new ones. Its objects are contracts, which have, indeed, the force of laws, but derive that force, not from legislation, but from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the supreme legislative power to the citizens of the state, but agreements between sovereign and independent states. This power, then, forms a distinct department, and the Constitution has wisely confided it to the President.

The qualities indispensable in the management of international intercourse and negotiation, point to the President as the most fit organ of communication with foreign powers, and the efficient agent in the conclusion of treaties; while the vast importance of the trust,, and the operation of treaties as laws, strongly recommend the participation of a portion, at least, of the legislative power in the office of making them. The Senate was most judiciously selected for that purpose, not only as the deposite of the power in

that body imparts additional strength and security to it as the weaker branch of the Legislature, but because, from its smaller number and greater permanence, it may be more readily convened, and is governed by steadier and more systematic views of public policy, and enabled to act with due promptitude and firmness.

5. The President is invested with the power to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, and other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. But Congress may vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they may think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

The exercise by the people at large of this power of appointing the subordinate officers of the government would be impracticable; and a concurrent right of nomination by the Legislature, or any other select body, would afford great temptation and opportunity to intrigue, favouritism, and corrupt cabals, besides releasing the appointing power from all responsibility. No plan, I think, could have been devised better calculated, on the whole, to promote a judicious choice of men to fill the public offices, than that which was adopted. The power of selecting the heads of departments (which, by-the-way, are not otherwise recognised in the Constitution) established by law, to aid the President in the discharge of his executive duties; of nominating agents, to whom the, immediate conduct of our international affairs and the negotiation of foreign treaties are confided; and of selecting the proper men for high judicial stations, is, with peculiar propriety, vested in the President, who is held

responsible for those acts of his immediate assistants and confidential advisers which receive his sanction, who is charged with the management of foreign affairs, and bound to see both treaties and the laws faithfully executed.

But the association of the Senate with the President in the exercise of this power is an exception to the general delegation of the executive authority which, were it not accompanied by the provision vesting in him the exclusive right of nomination, would be attended by the evils already adverted to. This power of nomination is, for all the useful purposes of restraint, equivalent to the power of absolute appointment, and imposes upon the President the same vivid sense of responsibility, and the same necessity of meeting the public approbation or censure; while the advice and consent of the Senate, which are necessary to render the nomination effectual, can never be attended with any mischievous consequences, and must at all times prove a check upon the misinformation or errors of the President. To prevent the inconvenience which would arise from occasional vacancies in office when the Senate is not in session, the President has power to fill up those which happen during recess, by granting commissions which expire at the end of the next session of Congress.

6. The remaining duties of the President consist in giving information to Congress of the state of the Union, and recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary or expedient. He may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses of Congress, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, he may, as we have seen, adjourn them to such time as he may think proper. It is his duty to receive ambassadors

and other public ministers, to commission all officers of the United States, and generally and comprehensively to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

III. The support of the President, which is the next subject of examination, is secured by a provision in the Constitution, which declares that he shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he was elected; and that he shall not receive within that time any other emolument from the United States, or any of them. This provision was intended to strengthen and preserve the proper independence and energy of the executive department. It would be in vain to declare that the different departments of the government should be separate and distinct, if the Legislature possessed a control over the salaries of the chief executive magistrate and the judicial officers. This, indeed, would be to disregard the voice of experience, and the operation of invariable principles of human conduct. The Constitution of Virginia, for instance, considers it a fundamental axiom of gov ernment, that the three great departments should be kept distinct, so that neither of them should exercise the powers properly belonging to another. But, without taking any precautions to preserve this principle in practice, it renders the governor dependant upon the Legislature for his annual existence and support. The result was, as Mr. Jefferson informs us, "that during the whole session of the Legislature, the direction of the executive by that body was habitual and familiar."

The Constitution of Massachusetts discovered more wisdom, and afforded the first example of a constitutional provision for the support of the execu