Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises BrokenPrinceton University Press, 22 de set. 2008 - 344 pàgines Even in the wake of the biggest financial crash of the postwar era, the United States continues to rely on Securities and Exchange Commission oversight and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set tougher rules for boards, management, and public accounting firms to protect the interests of shareholders. Such reliance is badly misplaced. In Corporate Governance, Jonathan Macey argues that less government regulation--not more--is what's needed to ensure that managers of public companies keep their promises to investors. |
Continguts
1 | |
The Dominant Role of Equity | 18 |
CHAPTER 2 Corporate Law and Corporate Governance | 28 |
A Taxonomy | 46 |
CHAPTER 4 Boards of Directors | 51 |
CHAPTER 5 Case Studies on Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance | 69 |
CHAPTER 6 Dissident Directors | 90 |
The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission the Stock Exchanges and the CreditRating Agencies | 105 |
Derivative Lawsuits | 130 |
CHAPTER 11 Accounting Accounting Rules and the Accounting Industry | 155 |
Insider Trading Short Selling and Whistleblowing | 165 |
CHAPTER 13 Shareholder Voting | 199 |
CHAPTER 14 The Role of Banks and Other Lenders in Corporate Governance | 223 |
CHAPTER 15 Hedge Funds and Private Equity | 241 |
CONCLUSION | 274 |
Notes | 279 |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken Jonathan R. Macey Previsualització limitada - 2008 |
Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken Jonathan R. Macey Previsualització limitada - 2010 |
Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken Jonathan R. Macey Previsualització no disponible - 2008 |