so fully occupied by other business, that it is impossible for them to devote proper attention to the specifications referred to them, and we come to the conclusion that this part of the public service must, necessarily, be conducted in a careless and inefficient manner. This is, in fact, the case, and yet the cost of maintaining it is so great, that if the money were more judiciously applied, in addition to paying for the administration of that part of the patent law now under our consideration, in a much more efficient manner than it is now administered, it would be sufficient to enable us to provide a special court for the trial of all questions respecting patent rights, to the great relief of the ordinary courts of the country, and to the great advantage of patentees, and of all persons having interests under patents.

The above considerations are sufficient to show us, that our first step in Patent Law Reform should be to enact, that the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, Her Majesty's Attorney-General for England, Her Majesty's Solicitor-General for England, the Lord Advocate, Her Majesty's Solicitor-General for Scotland, Her Majesty's AttorneyGeneral for Ireland, and Her Majesty's Solicitor-General for Ireland, for the time being respectively, together with all other persons who are now Commissioners of Patents for Inventions, shall cease to be such Commissioners, and that the ordinary Courts of Law and Equity shall cease to have jurisdiction in cases involving the consideration of patent rights. The ground having been thus cleared, our next step should be the establishment of a system of patent law administration of such efficiency, that it would be of real service, both to inventors and to the public. In order to accomplish this, we propose that a sufficient number of men should be selected for their special fitness for the duties which they would have to discharge, and that they should be appointed Commissioners of Patents for Inventions, and also Judges of a Patent Court, which should be established

for the trial of all causes involving the consideration of patent rights. It would not be difficult to find men, who would be both willing and well qualified to undertake the administration of the patent laws in all their departments, and the services of a sufficient number of such men should be secured for this purpose. To these officers, who would be both Commissioners of Patents for Inventions and Judges of the Patent Court, should be handed over the entire administration of the law of patents, and they should be given exclusive jurisdiction in all questions arising under it. The granting of letters patent for inventions, and the determination of disputes respecting them after they had been granted, would thus belong to one department of the public service, and would be under the administration of one set of officials, and we think that this concentration of jurisdiction and authority would be both advantageous and economical. As Commissioners of Patents, these officials should be charged with the duty of examining applications for patent rights, and of granting letters patent, and they should be provided with a seal with which letters patent should be sealed instead of with the Great Seal. As judges of the Patent Court they should, in cases within their jurisdiction, have all the powers now exercised by the judges of the Superior Courts, both of Law and Equity; they would then have concentrated in themselves all the powers necessary to enable them to do complete justice between the parties coming before them.

Each case should be tried by a single judge in the first instance; from his decision an appeal should lie to the full Court, and the decision of the full Court should be final. Trial by jury should be abolished in all cases within the jurisdiction of the Patent Court, questions both of law and of fact, in the cases coming before them, being determined by its judges alone. We should then cease to commit the absurdity of charging any twelve men who chance to be called into the jury box with the determination of questions, which can only be fully understood by persons who have had

a special training, and who have peculiar mental characteristics. For the purposes of patent law administration, the United Kingdom should be divided into districts, and a judge of the Patent Court should sit, at fixed intervals, in some central town in each district, and should try all causes which had arisen therein.

The next point to which we shall direct our attention, is the employment of what are called "skilled witnesses." Witnesses of this kind, in addition to deposing to facts within their knowledge, are allowed to give their opinions on points respecting the matter in dispute, as to which they are considered to be skilled, and their employment is, in our opinion, the great curse of modern litigation. We say this advisedly, for it is well known that scarcely any case is so desperate that witnesses of this character, and sometimes men of eminence, cannot be retained to give evidence in support of it, to the great cost of the parties, and at the risk of a failure of justice. Sometimes an arbitrator who has listened for days to the examination, cross-examination, and re-examination of the skilled witnesses produced by the parties, is at last reduced to such a state of doubt and perplexity by their swearing and counter-swearing, that he finds it necessary to take the opinion of a man of his own selection, who is skilled as to the matter in dispute. When this occurs, the arbitrator is of course guided in coming to his decision by the opinion which he has thus obtained, since it is the only opinion. before him which has not been given by a partisan, brought forward and paid to support a particular view of the case; the opinions expressed by the skilled witnesses called by the parties are entirely disregarded by him, and much time and money is wasted, which might have been profitably employed in some other way, if the expression of such opinions had been prohibited, and the arbitrator had done at first what he was compelled to do at last. The above example of what sometimes happens in arbitration cases, both illustrates the evil which we are now considering, and suggests its remedy.

VOL. XXX.--NO. LIX.

C

In the Patent Court, and in all courts for the trial of civil cases, the witnesses called by the parties should be required to depose to facts within their knowledge alone, and should not be allowed, under any circumstances, to give their opinions respecting the points in dispute. If, however, either of the parties was anxious to have the opinion of a skilled witness given at the trial of his cause, it should be open to him to apply to the Court or to a judge at chambers, to appoint one. If satisfied that it would be necessary or desirable that the opinion of a witness, who was skilled as to the matter in dispute, should be given in evidence at the trial of the case, the Court or judge so applied to, should have power to grant the application, and to select and to appoint one or more such witnesses to attend for that purpose, every witness, so selected and appointed, being considered to act as an officer of the Court, and being entirely independent of both the parties. In cases where a view was required, the parties or their agents should be allowed to accompany the witness or witnesses to take it, in order to point out the matters to which they thought attention ought to be directed. At the time and place appointed for that purpose, the witness or witnesses should appear, and should give evidence when required by the Court to do so; the counsel of either party to the cause having a right to cross-examine each skilled witness, in order to ascertain whether he had duly considered all things necessary to be considered in forming a sound and reliable opinion. If this cross-examination showed that any skilled witness had overlooked some points to which he ought to have directed his attention, the Court should have power, either to remit the case back to him for further consideration, or to select and appoint one or more additional skilled witnesses to consider the matter on which information was required, and to give evidence respecting it.

When an action is brought for the infringement of patent rights, the defendant is allowed to dispute the validity of the

plaintiff's patent, if he give him notice of his intention to do 80. In this notice the defendant must give explicit information as to the objections to its validity upon which he intends to rely, and if at the trial of the cause he succeed in establishing any of them, the plaintiff is defeated in his action. and has to pay the costs. Now, though the plaintiff may thus be defeated in his action for infringement, on the ground that his patent is invalid and ought to be cancelled, it does not thereby become void; for, as our law now stands, a patent does not become void, until it has been declared to be so in a suit brought expressly to try the validity of the grant. The legal proceeding required by our law for this purpose is prosecuted in the name of the Queen, and is called a writ of scire facias. Any person may petition Her Majesty to direct a writ of scire facias to try the validity of a patent, and the petitioner who puts the law in motion is liable for the costs of prosecuting the writ, and is also required to give a bond to secure the patentee's costs in the event of its failure. The evidence required in a proceeding of this kind is similar to that which is required in an ordinary action for infringement, in which the validity of the patent is disputed, and if the verdict is for the Crown, the patent is void and the Court orders it to be cancelled. Now the interests of the public demand, that patents which ought to be cancelled shall be cancelled as speedily as possible, so that all persons wishing to make use of the arts and manufactures described in the specifications, may know that they are at liberty to do so. In order to protect these interests, we propose that it shall be the duty of any judge of the Patent Court who tries an action for infringement, in which the validity of the patent is disputed, to order it to be cancelled, if it be proved to his satisfaction that it ought to be cancelled, sufficient time, however, being allowed for an appeal to the full Court, between the date of his order and the date fixed for its execution.

There are many other particulars in which our patent laws require to be simplified and otherwise improved, but we are