God, as a body of light, the primary atoms issued ;' and Védů-Vyasů delivers a similar opinion: The primary elements, at creation, were produced in an atomic form.'2

Yet there were some philosophers whose conceptions of God as the creator were more correct: Půtůnjulee says, The universe arose from the will or the command of God, who infused into the system a power of perpetual progression ;'3 and Jatookúrnů, another sage, delivers a similar opinion: Creation arose out of the will of God, who created a power to produce and direct the universe.' Yet here the christian reader will perceive an essential

error in the idea that the power to create was something derived from the deity. None of the ancient heathen could divest themselves of the idea, that the creation and government of the universe would be too troublesome to the Divine Being; an idea which contains the grossest reflection on the infinite wisdom, power, and benevolence of God.

Such were the ideas of the Hindoo philosophers relative to the origin of things. Respect ing the world itself, both as the product of divine wisdom and as a stage of action, their opinions were equally incorrect:-Vyaghrükürnù says, "The world is false, though God is unit ed to it.'5 Kŭpilă delivers a similar idea: That part of the world which is permanent is intellect all the rest is contemptible, because unsubstantial.' Again, 'This error-formed world is like a bubble on the water: we can never say that it does not exist, nor that it does. It is as unreal as when the thirsty deer mistakes the fog on the meadow for a pool of water.'5 Visible things were regarded by Plato as fleeting shades. Yet Kupilů speaks more rationally when he says, 'The world resembles a lodging-house; there is no union between it and the occupier' and Kunadů thus corrects the folly of these ascetics: Visible objects are not to be despised, seeing the most important future effects arise out of them.'8

As far as these philosophers were yogees, or advocates for the system of abstraction, they necessarily felt but little reverence for the gods, since they considered absorption, to which the gods themselves had not attained, as a felicity far greater than all their heavens could supply: hence says Kŭpilů, 'Even the residence of Brimha is hell, for it is full of the impurity of death: among the inhabitants of that place, those who are more glorious than yourself, are

1 Page 227. have been eternally the source of matter. 2 Page 231.

Those philosophers, says Enfield, who held the system of emanation, conceived God to

3 Page 228.

4 Page 262.

5 Page 261.

miserable in consequence of their subjection to the three goonus; and being constantly terrified with the fear of transmigration, even they seek liberation.'

The Hindoo philosophers never directed their disciples to worship Brumhu, the one God, except by the forms denominated yoga, and in which we find little that can be called worship their object was not to enlarge the understanding and elevate the passions, but rather to destroy both in their attempts to attain perfect abstraction of mind. So that what Cudworth says, 'Some contend that the supreme God was not at all worshipped by the pagans,' is substantially true respecting the Hindoos.

6

When these ascetics condescend to notice the gods, they speak of Brumha just as Hesiod and others speak of Jupiter, that he is the father of the gods, and that to him the creation of all things is to be attributed.' They also give Brimha two associates, Vishnoo and Shivă, and in the hands of this triumvirate place the work of general creation, preservation, and destruction, thus holding up a most surprising and unaccountable union between the Hindoos, the Greeks, and Romans: Maximus Tyrius observes,' says Cudworth, that Homer shares the government of the world among the triumvirate of gods, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. The Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, worshipped altogether in the capitol, were Jupiter, Minerva and Juno.'

It is inculcated in every part of the Hindoo writings that the gods were created. All the sages, though some of them made matter and even the world eternal, agree with Vrihuspŭtee, who certainly meant to include the gods, 'God is from everlasting: every thing else has a derived existence."2 'All beings,' says Harēētů, 'from Brumha to the smallest insect, constantly reap what they have sown in former births.'3 Cudworth says, the heathen poets, though seeming sticklers for polytheism, except one only unmade deity, asserted all the other to be generated, or created gods.'

It might be asked, If Brimha, Vishnoo, and Shivů preside over human affairs, what work is there assigned to the other gods? Most of the gods, who are not the varied forms of these three, preside over some particular part of creation or of terrene affairs: thus Kartikeyù is the god of war, Lukshmee is the goddess of prosperity, &c. Cicero did not suppose,' says Cud

worth, the supreme god to do all things immediately and by himself, but he assigned some certain parts and provinces to other inferior gods.' 'Amongst the pagans,' adds the same writer, there was nothing without a god: one presided over the rocking of the cradle, another over the sweeping of the house, another over the ears of corn, another over the husk, and another over the knots of straw and grass.'

Exactly the same idea prevailed among the Hindoo philosophers as is attributed to Scævola and Varro, who, says Cudworth, 'agreed that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws, was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the true; that there was another called the theology of wise men and of truth.' Still we must remind the reader, that it was not the grossness or absurdity of image worship that offended the Hindoo sages; they aspired to a state of abstraction from earthly things which was beyond the reach of the vulgar, and which they proudly expected would elevate them to a perfect union with the deity, leaving the gods and their worshippers in a state of subjection to death, and to transmigration through every reptile form.

Respecting the state of man in this world the Hindoo philosophers appear to have taught, that all men are born under the influence of the merit or demerit of actions performed in some prior state; and that the preponderance of merit or demerit in these actions regulates the quantity of each of the three qualities (goonus) in each individual, viz. of the quality leading to truth and consequent emancipation, of that to activity, and of that to darkness, respectively termed the sǎtwů, rujō, and tămú goonus; which qualities have an overwhelming influence on the actions and effects of the present birth. Kupilŭ thus describes these qualities: The quality leading to truth, produces happiness; that giving rise to activity, inclines the person to seek his happiness among the objects of sense; and that leading to darkness, produces insensibility. The first quality leads to liberation; the second to temporary happiness in the heavens of the gods, and the last to misery."2

According to this system, therefore, men are not born as candidates for a celestial prize, or as probationers having life and death set before them, every thing depending on their cha1 Poit heen see says, 'Merit and demerit, as well as the universe, are eternal.' p. 255. Chyvůnů says, "The fates of men arise out of works having no beginning,' p. 257.

2 Pages 223, 221.

"God created every

racters and conduct in the present state; but they are placed under the effects of actions which are said to have had no beginning, and which regulate the qualities or complexion of the character so entirely as to remind us of what is said of the doctrine of fate according to Zeno and Chrysippus, that it implies an eternal and immutable series of causes and effects to which the deity himself is subject.' On this point, take the following authorities: Men are born subject to time, place, merit and demerit.' 'God formed creatures according to the eternal destiny connected with their meritorious or evil conduct.”2 thing in an inseparable connection with the merit and demerit of actions."3 subject in his government to the merit and demerit of works."4 dy, the senses, and the faculties also, are the fruits of actions.'s merit in one birth, naturally give rise to virtue or vice in the next.'6 ed periods of passing through the effects of meritorious and evil actions are expired, the soul will obtain emancipation."7 'Birth is an evil, for with birth all manner of evils are con

nected.'8

Some

'God himself is say, that the very bo• Works of merit or de"When the appoint

Seneca says, 'Divine and human affairs are alike borne along in an irresistible current; cause depends upon cause; effects arise in a long succession.'

Respecting the human body, the opinions of three distinguished philosophers may suffice: Künadů says, 'The body is composed of one element, earth: water, light, air, and ether are only assistants,' page 436. Kupilů, respecting the origin of bodies, delivers this opinion: In the midst of that universe surrounding egg, which is ten times larger than the fourteen spheres, by the will of the self-existent was produced the st❜hoolü-shŭreerů1o,' page 335.Causing the rare or subtle parts of his own lingu-shurēērů11 to fall as clothing upon the souls 'proceeding from himself, God created all animals page 334. Vŭshisht'hň says, 'From the quality leading to truth in space, arose the power of hearing; from the same in air, arose feeling; in fire, the sight; in water, taste; in matter, smell. From the quality leading to activity united to space, arose speech; from the same in air, arose the power of the hands; in light, that of the feet; in water, that of production; and in earth, that of expulsion; and from this quality in the whole of the five elements, arose the power of the five breaths, or air received into or emitted from the body. The five senses, the five organs of action, the five breaths, with the mind and the understanding, form the embryo body: a particular combina

1 Goutămă, page 227.

4 Ushira, page 256.

8 Goutůmů, page 423.

the world is represented 11 From linge, atomic.

2 Bhrigoo, page 238.

6 Dévůlů, page 243.

5 Goŭtŭmů, page 407.

3 Dŭkshŭ, page 242. 7 Dŭkshů, page 242.

9 An orphic fragment is preserved by Athenagoras, in which the formation of under the emblem of an egg. 10 From st❜hōōlů, gross, and shčíēērů, body.

ON THE HINDOO LITERATURE.

Plato says, "When that principle which tion of these forms the body in its perfect state.'l we call quality is moved, and acts upon matter, it undergoes an entire change, and those forms are produced from which arises the diversified and coherent system of the universe.'

The soul was considered by all these philosophers as God. The védantees were of opinion, that there existed no distinction between spirit and the soul, while Kupilu and Pǎtǎnjülee maintained, that besides the soul there was no such thing as spirit, preserving a distinction at the same time between the soul as liberated from birth, and as confined in a bodily state. Those who made a distinction between the soul and spirit contended, that spirit as connected with the body was there in an unmixed and intangible state, as simple light or energy, and not as in any respect polluted by evil actions, the painful consequences of which, in a sense of misery, they contended were confined to the soul; and if in any part of this work an idea should have been given, that the Great Spirit, in an individuated state, enjoys or endures the fruits of actions, except by its confinement to a bodily state, the reader is entreated to substitute, in any such passage, the term soul. By the term jēēvů, or soul, the Hindoos understand an uncreated being or power, separate from spirit, the subject or worshipper of spirit, which though individuated has one source common to all souls. Kupilu says, some maintain the doctrine of the individuality of souls; but this is false; for all souls have the same vitality."2 Jēēvu signifies life, and the author knows no term by which to identify it, but that of soul in a lower sense. The soul thus, according to some of these sages, is dependent on spirit for all its power, and under spirit regulates all the motions of the body: to the soul is also ascribed all the merit and demerit of actions. The seat of spirit is said to be in the brain, and of the soul in the heart. Strato taught, 'that the seat of the soul was in the middle of the brain.' The soul is also said to be subject, in its powers and actions, to the bodily state in which it is placed.

These philosophers further taught, that munй, the mind, and booddhee, the understanding, were assistants to the soul, and not faculties of the spirit. They considered all living creatures as possessed of souls; the soul of a beast being the same as that in rational creatures, that in beasts being only more confined than that in man. All life is Brumhu,' says Védů Vyasă. Archelaus of Miletus taught, that animals have souls which differ in their powers according to the structure of the bodies in which they reside. The Hindoo sages distinguished, however, between the soul and animal life, the latter of which they spoke of as being mere vital breath. The following opinions on the intellectual part of man are found in the Hindoo 2 Page 313,

1 Page 236.