cases arise, cease to possess either merit or demerit; the desires of the mind after sensible objects are extinguished, and hence future birth is wholly prevented, and all sorrow annihilated: this is liberation.

SECTION XXVII.

Of the Mermangsa* Durshunů.

Of the three divisions of the védă, the first relates to ceremonies: this portion Joiminee has attempted to explain in his soōtrus, and in the Poorvi-Meemangsa, sometimes called Meemangsa, which terms, in this case, import, that the writer has rendered the meaning of the védă certain. This work contains twelve chapters, each subdivided into four sections. The name of the first commentator on these soōtrus was Shavŭră, whose work was afterwards explained by Ranŭků; these works have met with commentators in Bhuttǎ and Vachăspŭtee-Mishrů; since which period a number of works have been written on the doctrines of this school, principally, however, in the form of comments on the originals. The Dhurmu-Deepika, the Údhikŭrŭnă-Mala, and the Shastrů-Deepika, three abridgments, as well as a comment on the Shastru-Deepika, are read by a few bramhans in Bengal. Many dundees at Benares, and a still greater number of learned men in the Deccan, study the works of this philosophy. A few years ago, Bodhanăndă-Ghũnéndră-Swamee, a dundee, visited Bengal, and gave lectures on this philosophy at Calcutta.† A pupil of his, Shobha-Shastree, at present one of the pundits in the Sudur-Déwance court at Calcutta, is perhaps the best acquainted of any person now in Bengal with the works which have been written on the doctrines of this school: it is said, that he has made an abridgment from the sootrus of Joiminee, and, as is not uncommon among the Hindoo writers, is preparing an explanation of his own work before it is published.

SECTION XXVIII.

Treatises still extant belonging to this school of philosophy.

The sootrus of Joiminee.--The Bhashyň, by Shavuru.--A comment on ditto, by Ranŭků.-Comments on these works by Bhattŭ and Vachuspŭtee-Mishrŏ.-The Süteeku-Shastrů-Deepika, by Somů-Nat'hu.-The Udhikörünü-Koumoodee, by Ooddichyŭ. Another work under the same name, by Dévi-Nat'hu.-The Bhuttu-Deepika.-The Nyayŭ- Rutnů-Mala.—A comment on ditto, entitled, Nyayŭ- Rŭtnakŭrů.— The Joiminee-Nyayŭ-Mala.—The Meemangsa-Nyayu-Vivékŭ.—The Ŭdhikărănă-Pŭribhasha.-The Meemangsa-Vartiku.-The Vidhee-Rusayănă.-The Oopudéshŭ-Sōōtră, by Joiminee. The Shastrů-Deepika-Vyakhya, by Chimpŭki-Nat'hй.-Another work under the same name, by Somi-Nat'hu.-The Körmŏ-Prădeepů-Bhashyň.--The Meemangsa-Bhashyŭ.-The Meemangsa-Nyayй-Průkashů.--The Meemangsa-SōōtrăDhidheetee. The Dhurmi-Deepika, by Krishnŭ-Yujwunů.-The Meēmangsa-Sară.— The Meemangsa-Sungruhů, by Krishnů-Nat'hů.

SECTION XXIX.

An Abridgment of the doctrines of the Mēēmangsa school, translated from the DhürmŭDeepika, the Mēēmangsa-Sarů, and the Meemangsa-Săngrăhă.

Sound is uncreated; it is of two kinds, that which is produced by an impression on the air, or simple sound not requiring an agent, as, the name of God: simple sounds may also become known by impressions on the air. This may be thus illustrated, the state of the sea in a perfect calm represents simple uncreated sound, but the sea in a state of agitation represents sound as made known by an agent.

Symbols of sound, or letters, are uncreated, as is also the meaning of sounds. For instance, when a person has once pronounced ko, however long he may continue to utter ku, ku, it is the same sound, sometimes present and sometimes absent; but

sound is never new; manifestation alone is new by an impression made upon the air. Therefore sound is God (Brúmlŭ), and the world is nothing but name.

The védü has no human origin, but contains in itself evidence of a divine origin, and comes forth as the command of a monarch. It is incumbent on men to receive as divine those works [of the sages] which are found to agree with the védů, to contain clear definitions of duty, and which are free from contradictions.

If it be asked, why we should

What is religion? That which secures happiness. regard religion, it is answered, that it flows from the divine commands, which have no human origin. The commands and interdictions by which men are excited to duty and deterred from evil, are called vidhee, a law.

Should any one say, then I have nothing to do with other kinds of instruction, since this alone is pronounced to be divine. To this it is replied, that forms of praise, motives to duty, and religious practice, are auxiliaries to the divine law, and have therefore a relative sanctity and obligation.

There are five modes of ascertaining the commands of God: first, the subject to be discussed is brought forward; secondly, questions respecting it are to be stated; thirdly, objections are to be started; fourthly, replies to and refutation of these objections; and fifthly, the decision of the question. He who acts in religion according to the decision thus made, does well; and so does he who rejects what will not bear this examination; but he who follows rules which have been hereby condemned, labours in vain.

Those actions from which future happiness will arise, are called religious or good, because productive of happiness; and those which give birth to future misery are called evil on account of their evil fruits. The divine commands are to be observed accord

Here, among many other instances, [see page 423] the fatal incorrectness of the Hindoo theology is apparent: Joiminee maintains, that actions of themselves have in them neither good nor evil, that their nature can only be inferred from the declarations of the védŭ resp cting them, or from future consequences. In other words, murder is not an evil unless punishment falls upon the offender.

appear to have no idea of moral evil.

The Hindoos

ing to time, to personal qualifications, &c. but the divine interdictions are to be obeyed at all times. This obedience refers to a series of conduct directed by these commands whether positive commands or prohibitions.

There are three incentives to duty: 1. The promises which relate to personal benefits; 2. to visible benefits; and 3. to those which draw the mind to an assured persuasion of the certainty of possessing future benefits: the last incentive relates to the natural perfections of God, to the benefits following the performance of ceremonies, to future rewards, to the nature of these rewards, to the miseries of neglecting duty, to the rewards obtained by the pious in former ages, to the praise of holy sages, &c.

Of all the works on the civil and canon law, that of Munoo is to be held in the greatest reverence, for Munoo composed his work after a personal study of the védů; other sages have composed theirs from mere comments.

He who wishes to practise the duties of religion, must, with a pious mind, study the sacred writings, not perverting their meaning according to his own wishes or opinions; nor confounding one part with another; nor suffering himself to fall into an endless perplexity of ideas; nor mistaking the rules of the shastru; nor refusing the most entire subjection to these rules; nor indulging doubts, where different duties are mentioned, a regard to which leads to the same benefits; nor embracing a meaning unworthy of the shastră; nor neglecting to enquire into the nature of duties, as whether they can be performed with ease or with difficulty.

From the evidence of things which God has afforded, especially the evidence of the senses, mistake cannot arise either respecting secular or religious affairs: by this evidence all secular and religious actions are perfected. If it were otherwise, then the whole economy of things respecting both worlds would be destroyed. Where there may exist error in this evidence, it will diminish, but it cannot destroy the nature of things. If there be an imperfection in seed, the production may be imperfect, but its nature will not be changed. If it be then asked respecting the seat of error and inattention,

we affirm, that they are found in the reasoning faculty, and not in the senses; and that they arise from the confused union of present ideas (ŭnoobhŭvă) with recollection.

Some affirm, that ideas are received into the understanding separately, and never two at the same instant. This is incorrect, for it must be admitted, that while one idea is retained, there is an opening left in the understanding for the admi sion of another; this is particularly evident in arithmetical calculations, as, one added to one makes two.

The shastră teaches, that each individual should attend to duty according to that degree of virtue which he possesses: he who has acquired the qualifications requisite to the perfect accomplishment of all that which is enjoined in the sacred books, is bound to act accordingly, and he who possesses only one virtue, is under obligation to obedience so far as he is hereby qualified. The rewards of the perfect will be great, while the recompense of those less perfect will be diminished.

The védŭ has in some parts forbidden all injury to sentient creatures, and in others has prescribed the offering of bloody sacrifices. Joiminee explains this apparent contradiction, by observing, that some commands are general, and others particular; that the former must give way to the latter, as a second knot always loosens in a degree the first: so, when it is said Săruswütee is altogether white, it is to be understood not literally, but generally, for the hair and eye-brows of this goddess are not white. Therefore in cases where general commands are given, they must be observed with those limitations which are found in the shastrů.

The promises of reward contained in the shastrů upon a minute attention to the different parts of duty, have been given to draw men to the performance of their duty in a proper manner, rather than with the intention of fulfilment; but where they produce a right effect, and tend to perfect the performance of the whole duty, they are of the highest importance, since they secure the real reward which the shastrů has promised after the merit is acquired which follows the completion of certain duties. Still, however, he who has begun a ceremony, but in consequence of impediments is unable to finish it, shall not be unrewarded.