1859. July 19. One of the Ross, we might just as well say that the ship should not be sold at all; because it appears upon the evidence in this case, that those were the only two shipwrights in the place, except one surveyors justi- other person who is said to have had very little or no business: those two persons were the only two purchasers that could be procured, and if they were rejected there was the strongest possible probability that the vessel would have laid there to rot. fied by the cir cumstances in becoming pur chaser. Communication with the owner was im practicable. Where the owner disap proves of a sale of his ship by the master, he must seek recovery with the greatest possible promptitude, or he may be held to ratify acquiescence. the sale by Then it was said that Mr. Burrows might have been written to, and that an answer might have been had from him. That argument wholly fails, because, supposing the answer to be obtained in the smallest possible space of time, say in four months, the expenses during that period of four months, it is obvious, would eat up the whole value of the ship; and it was impossible to have waited that period of time without the ship deteriorating to a very great extent in value, as well as incurring the great expenses which have been stated. A word as to the conduct of Mr. Burrows, the original owner. In all these cases we think it is the duty of the individual who has been divested of his property by means of the act of his own master, and who disapproves of that act, and considers his property to have been sacrificed, to act with the greatest possible promptitude in demanding that justice should be done to him, and for very plain and obvious reasons; because the greatest injustice might be done to the purchasers of vessels so circumstanced, unless means of inforcing the rights of the original owner are taken at an early period. For instance, in this present case, this is not the purchase of Mr. Lamont, but a purchase fourteen months after the first sale by two gentlemen who reside in Hong Kong. They might have sold the ship again, so that there might have been transfer after transfer, until at last it would have been scarcely practicable for the last purchaser to have ascertained all the circumstances under which the ship was originally sold by the master. Now, has Mr. Burrows followed this course? The precise time when he was informed of the sale does not, I think, distinctly appear upon these proceedings; but in the month of May, 1852, he sent his son in another vessel to this port of Hong Kong, and he must have been apprised of these proceedings, and he must have had an opportunity of instructing his son to assert his right at a much earlier period than the month of November, 1854, that is, the time when he does institute this suit. Now it is very true that delay alone may not destroy the original owner right of a party to institute a suit; but when unnecessary delay arises, and when injury to others may result from that delay, Conduct of the to blame in this respect. that delay may import acquiescence in the sale; and if there be acquiescence in the sale, then, according to all the authorities, however unauthorized the sale might have been at its commencement, it is then ratified by the act of the owner himself. There is a letter of Mr. Burrows which is of considerable importance with regard to this part of the case. This letter has been very much commented upon by the counsel on both sides. It is not necessary to say that it amounts to a declaration of acquiescence or to ratification; but it clearly amounts to this: that after being fully informed of all the circumstances relating to the sale of this ship, he adopts no measures for asserting his rights at the earliest period that the circumstances allowed. It cannot be said that he, being resident at San Francisco, therefore had no means to assert his rights. It would have been very easy for him to have asserted them through the medium of his son; it would have been very easy for him to have asserted them through the medium of his correspondent at Hong Kong; but he took no step of this description, until when? Until the whole state of things had undergone a perfect and entire change, and instead of the market for shipping being, as it had been, exceedingly dull and inauspicious to shipowners, it rose to a state of the greatest activity, in consequence of the accidental circumstance of there being a large passenger traffic carried on from China to San Francisco; and then, when this vessel had been improved to the extent of 17,600 dollars, and also an additional sum expended on the part of the purchaser, so that she was worth 22,000 or 23,000 dollars, then he thinks it expedient to come forward and demand restitution of his vessel, and her earnings subsequently to the sale. Their Lordships are of opinion that in this case the entire destitution of this vessel is satisfactorily proved; that she was so damaged that the repairs which would have been indispensably necessary in order to enable her to convey a cargo would have much exceeded her value; and that even if that had not been the case, the money necessary for the repairs could not have been obtained; that, upon the whole, the conduct of the master in selling the vessel was not merely an act of prudence—not merely an act done for the advantage of his owner-but was an act of absolute necessity in the sense in which we use that term; and that there is no doubt that the sale was a justifiable sale according to the exposition of the law which is laid down by the highest authorities. 1859. July 19, The sale by the master was legal. 1859. July 19. Judgment reversed, with costs. Vice-Admiralty Courts have only the ordinary juris diction possessed by the Court of Admiralty Their Lordships are of opinion that the decree of the Court below must be reversed, and that the Respondent must pay the costs in this Court and in the Court below. I ought to have said one word with respect to the jurisdiction in cases of this kind. Their Lordships have decided this case upon its merits, because it appeared to them that it would be more satisfactory on the whole so to do, but the state of the law must be taken to be this. A Vice-Admiralty Court has no before the 3 & more than the ordinary Admiralty jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is the jurisdiction which was possessed by Courts of Admiralty antecedent to the passing of the statute which enlarged it. What is the nature of that jurisdiction in a cause of this description will be seen from the judgments of Lord Stowell upon that subject, which are collected together in Mr. Pritchard's Digest. It would be a dangerous thing, after the hearing of this cause, to resort to a Vice-Admiralty Court for the purpose of trying the title to a ship in a case of this description. 4 Vict. c. 65: they cannot therefore try causes of title to ships. Sequestration 7 & 8 Vict. c. 69, s. 12. Toller, proctor for the Appellants. Clarkson for the Respondent. The bill of costs of the proctor for the Appellants having been porrected and taxed at 540l. 17s. 4d., the Surrogate decreed a monition against Burrows the Respondent to pay the same, with expenses of the monition, into the Registry, within six days after service. The monition was returned, personally served on the Respondent at Paris. The Respondent did not obey the monition, nor give any appearance to it. On a subsequent day Hannen moved their Lordships, under granted under the provisions of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 69, s. 12, to pronounce the Respondent to be contumacious and in contempt, and to cause process of sequestration to issue under the seal of her Majesty in Ecclesiastical and Maritime causes, against the real estate, goods, chattels and effects wheresoever lying of the Respondent, within the dominions of her Majesty. Their Lordships granted the motion. In the High Court of Admiralty. THE MARTHA, Gorz, Master. Salvage-Misconduct of Salvors-Costs. Salvors guilty of misconduct in resisting the employment of a steamer, held to have forfeited thereby all claim to salvage reward; but, under the circumstances, not condemned in costs. Negotiation by the owner to refer a claim of salvage to arbitration is no conclusive admission of salvage services rendered, or negation of a defence on the ground of the salvors' misconduct. THIS HIS was an action of salvage, brought by the master and crew of the Dreadnought, a Ramsgate lugger, for alleged services rendered to the Martha, a barque belonging to Rostock, in Mecklenburg Schwerin. On the 5th of March, 1859, about 4 P.M., the Martha got aground on the north sand head of the Goodwin Sand at low water, in consequence of missing stays; and after an ineffectual attempt to back off, hoisted two lights as a signal for steam assistance. The crew of the Dreadnought observing the lights, and also some rockets which were sent up about the same time from the Light-ship, put off from the shore, and boarded the vessel, and shortly afterwards engaged further hands from two other Broadstairs boats. It was disputed between the parties whether the master of the barque then committed his vessel to their charge, or whether the boatmen forced their services upon him; they proceeded, however, to anchor their lugger, and make preparations to get the barque's bower anchor into her, with a view to lay it out and haul the barque off thereby, and were so engaged, when a Ramsgate steamer came up. The evidence. was very conflicting as to what then ensued. The master certainly engaged the steamer, and the steamer finally towed the barque off, and into Ramsgate harbour before ten o'clock; but the boatmen alleged that in various ways they contributed to getting the vessel off the sand in safety. On the other side it was alleged that they committed great misconduct in resisting the crew of the barque availing themselves of the aid of the steamer; that they attempted to cut the hawser; that they made a great riot and confusion on deck; and that they wrongfully let go the barque's anchor, and thereby detained the vessel on the sand, all of which was in turn denied. The boatmen, in addition to their direct evidence, also relied on the fact that - 1859. August 4. 1859. August 4. Judgment. after the vessel was arrested, the London broker of the barque had called on the agent of the boatmen, and suggested that their salvage services should be referred to arbitration. Jenner, Q.C., and Spinks, for the salvors. Deane, Q.C., and Tristram, for the owners. DR. LUSHINGTON:-In causes of salvage the Court is well accustomed to meet with statements and evidence which cannot altogether be reconciled; such contradictions arise sometimes on matters of fact, but more generally on matters which to a great degree may be questions of opinion, as the degree of danger, or probability of total loss. In such cases the Court arrives at the best conclusion it can, without absolutely discrediting the evidence on either side: it makes deductions, remembering that interest, partisanship, and similar considerations, often lead to exaggeration, yet it may be not to wilful falsehood and perjury. But on the present occasion all attempts to reconcile the evidence are obviously vain: facts of a most striking description are unequivocally alleged, and as distinctly denied. Either the statements are wilfully false, or the denial.—[The learned Judge then proceeded to examine the evidence in detail.] These charges of misconduct against the salvors are very serious, and, if proved, would take away all claim to salvage. They are, however, as might be expected, denied, and it is further alleged that the owners could not believe them to be true, for they had entered into negotiations for the settlement of the Negotiation by salvage. I am of opinion that little force can be attributed to conclusive ad- these negotiations, for unless all the parties negotiating are fully apprised of all the circumstances of the case, which may often not happen, it cannot be maintained that a negotiation is an admission of the services, or a negative of a defence to the claim. the owner is no mission of a salvage claim. I cannot shut my eyes to the great change which has taken place with regard to salvage services by the introduction of steam power. In almost all cases of distress, the services of a steamer are infinitely more efficient than those of boatmen. The consequence is that steamers are constantly employed instead of boatmen who formerly mainly depended on their salvage exertions for their subsistence, and this has most particularly been the case in the neighbourhood of Deal. We cannot be surprised if, under such circumstances, the boatmen are very reluctant to relinquish their prizes, for such they are to them, to |