Imatges de pàgina
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a village, it is better that one fhould addict himfelf entirely to arms, and the other two stay conftantly at home to cultivate the ground, than that all the three fhould mix the avocations of a camp with the bufinefs of husbandry. By the former arrangement the country gains one complete foldier, and two induftrious hufbandmen; from the latter it receives three raw militia-men, who are at the fame time three idle and profligate peasants. It should be confidered, alfo, that the emergencies of war wait not for feafons. Where there is no flanding army ready for immediate fervice, it may be neceffary to call the reaper from the fields in harveft, or the ploughman in feed-time; and the provifion of a whole year may perish by the interruption of one month's labour. A ftanding army, therefore, is not only a more effectual, but a cheaper method of providing for the public fafety, than any other, becaufe it adds more than any other to the common firength, and takes lefs from that which compofes the wealth of a nation, its flock of productive industry.

There is yet another diftinction between ftanding armies and militias, which deferves a more attentive confideration than any that has been mentioned. When the ftate relies for its

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tic by training up its fubjects to the knowledge and exercife of arms, but that it would ere long be forced to give way to defpotifm in fome other shape; and that the country would be liable to what is even worse than a fettled and conftitutional defpotifm-to perpetual rebellions, and to perpetual revolutions; to fhort and violent ufurpations; to the fucceffive tyranny of governors, rendered cruel and jealous by the danger and inftability of their situation.

The fame purposes of ftrength and efficacy which make a standing army neceffary at all, make it neceffary, in mixed governments, that this army be fubmitted to the management and direction of the prince: for however well a popular council may be qualified for the offices of legislation, it is altogether unfit for the conduct of war; in which, fuccefs ufually depends upon vigour and enterprize; upon fecrecy, difpatch, and unanimity: upon a quick perception of opportunities, and the power of feizing every opportunity immediately. It is likewife neceffary that the obedience of an army be as prompt and active as poffible; for which reason it ought to be made an obedience of will and emulation. Upon this confideration is founded the expediency of leaving to the prince not only the

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government and deftination of the army, but the appointment and promotion of its officers: because a design is then alone likely to be executed with zeal and fidelity, when the perfon who iffues the order, chooses the inftruments, and rewards the fervice. To which we may fubjoin, that, in governments like ours, if the direction and officering of the army were placed in the hands of the democratic part of the conftitution, this power, added to what they already poffefs, would fo overbalance all that would be left of regal prerogative, that little would remain of monarchy in the conflitution but the name and expence; nor would these probably remain long.

Whilst we defcribe, however, the advantages of ftanding armies, we must not conceal the danger. Thefe properties of their conftitutionthe foldiery being feparated in a great degree from the rest of the community, their being clofely linked amongst themfelves by habits of fociety and fubordination, and the dependency of the whole chain upon the will and favour of the prince-however effential they may be to the purposes for which armies are kept up, give them an aspect in no wife favourable to public liberty. The danger however is diminished by

maintaining, upon all occafions, as much alliance of intereft, and as much intercourfe of fentiment, between the military part of the nation and the other orders of the people, as are confiftent with the union and difcipline of an army. For which purpofe officers of the army, upon whofe difpofition towards the commonwealth a great deal may depend, fhould be taken from the principal families of the country, and at the fame time alfo be encouraged to establish in it families of their own, as well as be admitted to feats in the fenate, to hereditary diftinctions, and to all the civil honours and privileges that are compatible with their profeffion : which circumftances of connection and fituation will give them fuch a fhare in the general rights of the people, and fo engage their inclinations on the fide of public liberty, as to afford a reafonable fecurity that they cannot be brought, by any promises of perfonal aggrandizement, to affift in the execution of measures which might enflave their pofterity, their kindred, and their country.

FINIS.

DEC 2 6 1917

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