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urgency of his sufferings to destroy his own life, would not have been thought by the author of this text “to have been weary,” to have u fainted in his mind," to have fallen off from that example which is here proposed to the meditation of Christians in distress? And yet, secondly, whether such an act would not have been attended with all the circumstances of mitigation, which can excuse or extenuate suicide at this day?
3. The conduct of the Apostles, and of the Christians of the apostolic age, affords no obscure indication of their sentiments upon this point. They lived, we are sure, in a confirmed persuafion of the existence, as well as of the happiness, of a future state. They experienced in this world every extremity of external injury and distress. To die was gain. The change which death brought with it was, in their expectation, infinitely beneficial. Yet it never, that we can find, entered into the intention of one of them to haften this change by an act of suicide; from which it is difficult to say what motive could have so universally withheld them, except an apprehension of some unlawfulness in the expedient.
Having stated what we have been able to cola lect in opposition to the lawfulness of suicide, by way of direct proof, it seems unnecessary to open a separate controversy with all the arguments which are made use of to defend it; which would only lead us into a repetition of what has been offered already. The following argument, however, being fomewhat more arrificial and imposing than the rest, as well as distinct from the general consideration of the subject, cannot so properly be passed over. deny to the individual a right over his own life, it seems impossible, it is said, to reconcile with the law of nature that right which the state claims and exercises over the lives of its subjects, when it ordains or inflicts capital punishments. For this right, like all other just authority in the state, can only be derived from the compact and virtual consent of the citizens which compose the state; and it seems self-evident, if any principle in morality be so, that no one, by his con. fent, can transfer to another a right which he does not possess himself. It will be equally difficult to account for the power of the state to çommit its subjects to the dangers of war, and to expose their lives without scruple in the field of battle; especially in offensive hostilities, in
which the privileges of self-defence cannot be pleaded with any appearance of truth : and still more difficult to explain, how in such, or in any circumstances, prodigality of life can be a virtue, if the preservation of it be a duty of our na
This whole reasoning sets out from one crror, namely, that the state acquires its right over the life of the subject from the subject's own consent, as a part of what originally and personally belonged to himself, and which he has made over to his governors. The truth is, the state derives this right neither from the consent of the subject, nor through the medium of that consent; but, as I may say, immediately from the donation of the Deity. Finding that such a power in the sovereign of the community is expedient, if not necessary, for the community itself, it is justly presumed to be the will of God that the sovereign Mould posless and exercise it. It is this presumpiion which constitutes the right; it is the same indeed which consitutes every other: and if there were the like reasons to authorize the presumption in the case of private perfons, suicide would be as jußifiable as war, or capital executions. But, until it can be Thewn that the power over human life may be converted to the fame advantage in the hands of individuals over their own, as in those of the ftate over the lives of its subjects, and that it may be entrusted with equal safety to both, there is no room for arguing, from the existence of such a right in the latter, to the toleration of it in the former.
N one sense, every duty is a duty towards
God, since it is his will which makes it a duty: but there are fome duties of which God is the object, as well as the author; and these are peculiarly, and in a more appropriated sense, called duties toward's God.
That silent piety, which consists in a habit of wracing out the Creator's wisdom and goodness in 其 !