which the privileges of felf-defence cannot be pleaded with any appearance of truth: and still more difficult to explain, how in fuch, or in any circumstances, prodigality of life can be a virtue, if the prefervation of it be a duty of our na

ture.

This whole reafoning fets out from one error, namely, that the ftate acquires its right over the life of the fubject from the fubject's own confent, as a part of what originally and perfonally belonged to himfelf, and which he has made over to his governors. The truth is, the state derives this right neither from the confent of the fubject, nor through the medium of that confent; but, as I may fay, immediately from the donation of the Deity. Finding that fuch a power in the fovereign of the community is expedient, if not neceffary, for the community itfelf, it is juftly prefumed to be the will of God that the fovereign fhould poffefs and exercife it. It is this prefumption which conftitutes the right; it is the fame indeed which conflitutes every other and if there were the like reafons to authorize the prefumption in the cafe of private perfons, fuicide would be as juflifiable as war, or capital executions. But, until it can be fhewn that the power over human life may be converted

converted to the fame advantage in the hands of individuals over their own, as in thofe of the ftate over the lives of its fubjects, and that it may be entrusted with equal fafety to both, there is no room for arguing, from the existence of fuch a right in the latter, to the toleration of it in the former.

MORAL

MORAL PHILOSOPHY,

BOOK V.

DUTIES TOWARDS GOD,

CHAP. I.

DIVISION OF THESE DUTIES.

IN

N one sense, every duty is a duty towards God, fince it is his will which makes it a duty but there are fome duties of which God is the object, as well as the author; and these are peculiarly, and in a more appropriated fenfe, called duties towards God.

That filent piety, which confifts in a habit of tracing out the Creator's wifdom and goodness in

the

the objects around us, or in the hiftory of his difpenfations; of referring the bleffings we enjoy to his bounty, and of reforting in our diftreffes to his fuccour; may poffibly be more acceptable to the Deity than any visible expreffions of devotion whatever. Yet thefe latter (which, although they may be excelled, are not fuperfeded by the former) compose the only part of the subject which admits of direction or difquifition

from a moralift.

Our duty towards God, so far as it is external, is divided into worship and reverence. God is the immediate object of both; and the difference between them is, that the

one confifts in

action, the other in forbearance. When we go to church on the Lord's day, led thither by a fenfe of duty towards God, we perform an act of worship; when, from the fame motive, we reft in a journey upon that day, we discharge a duty of reverence.

Divine worship is made up of adoration, thankf giving, and prayer. But, as what we have to offer concerning the two former may be observed of prayer, we fhall make that the title of the following chapters, and the direct fubject of our confideration.

СНАР.

СНАР. II.

OF THE DUTY AND OF THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, SO FAR AS THE SAME APPEAR FROM THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

WHEN one man defires to obtain any thing

of another, he betakes himself to entreaty and this may be observed of mankind in all ages and countries of the world. Now what is univerfal, may be called natural; and it feems probable that God, as our fupreme governor, fhould expect that towards himself, which by a natural impulfe, or by the irrefiftible order of our conftitution, he, has prompted. us to pay to every other being on whom we depend.

The fame may be faid of thanksgiving.

Prayer likewise is neceffary to keep up in the minds of mankind a fenfe of God's agency in the universe, and of their own dependency upon

him.

Yet, after all, the duty of prayer depends upon its efficacy: for I confefs myself unable to conceive