feldom be fo neceffary to thofe of the public as to justify a departure from that wholefome policy, by which the laws of a commercial ftate punish and ftigmatize infolvency. But whatever reafon may be pleaded for their perfonal immunity, when this privilege of parlia ment is extended to domeftics and retainers, or when it is permitted to impede or delay the courfe of judicial proceedings, it becomes an ab furd facrifice of equal juftice to imaginary dig nity.

There is nothing in the British conftitution fo remarkable, as the irregularity of the popular representation. The house of commons. confists of five hundred and forty-eight members, of whom two hundred are elected by seven thou fand conftituents; fo that a majority of these feven thousand, without any reasonable title to fuperior weight or influence in the ftate, may, under certain circumftances, decide a queftion against the opinion of as many millions. Or to place the fame object in another point of view; if my eftate be fituated in one county of the kingdom, I poffefs the ten thousandth part of a fingle representative; if in another, the thou→ fandth; if in a particular diftrict, I may be one in twenty who choose two reprefentatives; if

in a still more favoured ípot, I may enjoy the right of appointing two myself. If I have been born, or dwell, or have ferved an apprenticeship in one town, I am represented in the national affembly by two deputies, in the choice of whom I exercife an actual and fenfible share of power; if accident has thrown my birth, or habitation, or fervice into another town, I have no representative at all, nor more power or concern in the election of those who make the laws by which I am governed, than if I was a fubject of the Grand Signior-and this partiality fubfifts without any pretence whatever of merit or of propriety, to juftify the preference of one place to another. Or, thirdly, to defcribe the state of national reprefentation as it exists,in reality, it may be affirmed, I believe, with truth, that about one half of the houfe of commons obtain their feats in that affembly by the election of the people, the other half by purchafe, or by the nomination of fingle proprie tors of great eftates.

This is a flagrant incongruity in the conftitution; but it is one of thofe objections which ftrike moft forcibly at firft fight. The effect of all réafoning upon the fubject is to diminish the firft impreffion on which account it deferves

the

the more attentive examination, that we may be affured, before we adventure upon a reforma❤ tion, that the magnitude of the evil juftifies the danger of the experiment. In the few remarks that follow, we would be understood, in the first place, to decline all conference with those who wish to alter the form of government of these kingdoms. The reformers with whom we have to do, are they, who, whilft they change this part of the fyftem, would retain the reft. If any Englishman expect more happiness to his country under a republic, he may very confiftently recommend a new modelling of elections to parliament; because, if the king and house of lords were laid afide, the prefent difproportionate representation would produce nothing but a confufed and ill-digefted oligarchy. In like manner we wave a controversy with thofe writers who infift upon representation as a natural right* we confider it fo far only as a right at

*If this right be natural, no doubt it must be equal; and the right, we may add, of one fex, as well as of the other." Whereas every plan of reprefentation, that we have heard of, begins by excluding the votes of women; thus cutting off, at a single stroke, one half of the public from a right which is afferted to be inherent in all; a right too, as fome reprefent it, not only univerfal, but unalienable and indefeasible and imprefcriptible.

all,

all, as it conduces to public utility; that is, as it contributes to the establishment of good laws, or as it fecures to the people the juft adminiftration of thefe laws., Thefe effects depend upon the difpofition and abilities of the national counfellors. Wherefore, if men the most likely by their qualifications to know and to promote the public intereft, be actually returned to parliament, it fignifies little who return them. If the propereft perfons be elected, what matters it by whom they are elected? At leaft, no prudent ftatefman would fubvert long-established or even fettled rules of reprefentation, without a profpect of procuring wifer or better representatives. This then being well obferved, let us, before we feek to obtain any thing more, confider duly what we already have. We have a house of commons compofed of five hundred and fortyeight members, in which number are found the moft confiderable landholders and merchants of the kingdom; the heads of the army, the navy, and the law; the occupiers of great offices in the ftate; together with many private individuals, eminent by their knowledge, eloquence, or activity. Now, if the country be not fafe in fuck hands, in whofe may it confide its interefts? If fuch a number of fuch men be Hable to the influence of corrupt motives, what

affembly

I

affembly of men will be fecure from the fame danger? Does any new fcheme of reprefentation promife to collca together more wisdom, or to produce firmer integrity? In this view of the fubject, and attending not to ideas of order and proportion (of which many minds are much enamoured), but to effects alone, w may discover juft excufes for those parts of the prefent representation, which appear to a hafty observer most exceptionable and abfurd. hould be remembered, as a maxim extremely applicable to this fubject, that no order or affembly of men whatever can long maintain their place and authority in a mixed government, of which the members do not individually poffefs a refpectable share of perfonal importance. Now whatever may be the defects of the prefent arrangement, it infallibly fecures a great weight of property to the houfe of commons, by rendering many feats in that houfe acceffible to men of large fortunes, and to fuch men alone. By which means thofe characters are engaged in the defence of the feparate rights and interests of this branch of the legislature, that are beft able to support its claims. The conftitution of most of the fmall boroughs, efpecially the burgage tenure, contributes, though undefignedly, to the

fame