Imatges de pàgina
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ferred upon the crown the nomination to all employments in the public fervice, the authors of this arrangement were led to it, by the obvious propriety of leaving to a mafter the choice of his fervants; and by the manifeft inconveniency of engaging the national council, upon every vacancy, in those perfonal contefts which attend elections to places of honour and emolument. Our ancestors did not observe that this difpofition added an influence to the regal office, which, as the number and value of public employments increased, would fuperfede in a great measure. the forms, and change the character of the ancient conftitution. They knew not, what the experience and reflection of modern ages has discovered, that patronage univerfally is power; that he who poffeffes in a fufficient degree the means of gratifying the defires of mankind after wealth and distinction, by whatever checks and forms his authority may be limited or disguised, will direct the management of public affairs. Whatever be the mechanifmn of the political engine, he will guide the motion. Thefe inftances are adduced in order to illuftrate the propofition which we laid down, that, in politics, the most important and permanent effe&s have, for the most part, been incidental, and unforefeen: and this

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propofition we inculcate, for the fake of the caution which it teaches, that changes ought not to be adventured upon without a comprehensive discernment of the confequences-without a knowledge, as well of the remote tendency, as of the immediate defign. The courage of a statesman fhould resemble that of a commander, who, however regardless of perfonal danger, never forgets, that with his own he commits the lives and fortunes of a multitude; and who does not confider it as any proof of zeal or valour, to take the fafety of other men upon the success of a perilous or defperate enterprise.

There is one end of civil government peculiar to a good conftitution, namely, the happiness of its fubjects; there is another end effential to a good government, but common to it with many bad ones-its own prefervation. Obferving that the best form of government would be defective, which did not provide for its own permanency, in our political reasonings we confider all fuch provifions as expedient; and are content to accept as a fufficient ground for a measure, or law, that it is neceffary or conducive to the prefervation of the conflitution. Yet, in truth, fuch provifions are abfolutely expedient, and fuch an excufe final, only whilft the conflitution is worth

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preserving; that is, until it can be exchanged for a better. I premise this distinction, because many things in the English, as in every conftitution, are to be vindicated and accounted for, folely from their tendency to maintain the government in its prefent ftate, and the feveral parts of it in poffeffion of the powers which the conftitution has affigned to them; and because I would with it to be remarked that such a confideration is always fubordinate to another-the value and usefulness of the conftitution itself.

The Government of England, which has been fometimes called a mixed government, fometimes a limited monarchy, is formed by a combination of the three regular fpecies of government; the monarchy, refiding in the King; the aristocracy, in the Houfe of Lords; and the republic, being reprefented by the House of Commons. The perfection intended by fuch a scheme of government is, to unite the advantages of the feveral fimple forms, and to exclude the inconveniencies. To what degree this purpose is attained or attainable in the British conftitution; wherein it is loft fight of or neglected; and by what means it may in any part be promoted with better fuccefs, the reader will be enabled to judge, by a feparate recollection of these advantages and incon

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inconveniences, as enumerated in the preceding chapter, and a diftinct application of each to the political condition of this country. We will present our remarks upon the fubject in a brief account of the expedients by which the British conftitution provides,

Ift, For the intereft of its fubjects.

2dly, For its own prefervation.

The contrivances for the firft of these purposes are the following:

In order to promote the establishment of falutary public laws, every citizen of the state is capable of becoming a member of the fenate; and every fenator poffeffes the right of propounding to the deliberation of the legislature whatever law he pleafes.

Every diftrict of the empire enjoys the privilege of choofing reprefentatives, informed of the interefts and circumftances and defires of their conftituents, and entitled by their fituation to communicate that information to the national council. The meaneft fubject has fome one whom he can call upon to bring forward his complaints and requefts to public attention.

By annexing the right of voting for members of the House of Commons to different qualifications in different places, each order and profef

fion of men in the community become virtually represented; that is, men of all orders and profeffions, ftatefmen, courtiers, country gentlemen, lawyers, merchants, manufacturers, foldiers, failors, interested in the profperity, and experienced in the occupation of their respective profeffions, obtain feats in parliament.

The elections, at the fame time, are fo connected with the influence of landed property as to afford a certainty that a confiderable number of men of great eftates will be returned to parliament; and are also so modified, that men the most eminent and fuccefsful in their respective profeffions, are the most likely, by their riches or the weight of their ftations, to prevail in thefe competitions.

The number, fortune, and quality of the members; the variety of interests and characters amongst them; above all, the temporary duration of their power, and the change of men which every new election produces, are fo many fecurities to the public, as well against the fubjection of their judgments to any external dictation, as against the formation of a junto in their own body, fufficiently powerful to govern their decifions.

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