French government. This policy was first broadly laid down, and systematically acted upon, by Napoleon; and we believe it would not be difficult to show that the privations it entailed on the people of the Continent powerfully contributed to accelerate his downfall. But those by whom he has been succeeded have not hitherto seen the expediency of returning to a sounder system; on the contrary, they have carried, in some respects at least, the "continental system" to an extent not contemplated by Napoleon. Notwithstanding the vast importance to a country like France, of supplies of iron and hardware at a cheap rate, that which is produced by foreigners is excluded, though it might be obtained for a third part of the price of that which is manufactured at home. A similar line of policy has been followed as to cotton yarn, earthenware, &c. And in order to force the manufacture of sugar from the beet-root, oppressive duties have been laid, not only on foreign sugar, but even on that imported from the French colonies. The operation of this system on the commerce and industry of the country has been most mischievous. By forcing France to raise, at home, articles for the production of which she has no natural or acquired capabilities, the exportation, and consequently the growth, of those articles in the production of which she is superior to every other country, has been very greatly narrowed. All commerce being bottomed on a fair principle of reciprocity, a country that refuses to import must cease to export. By excluding foreign produce by refusing to admit the sugar of Brazil, the cottons and hardware of England, the iron of Sweden, the linens of Germany, and the cattle of Switzerland and Wirtemberg - France has done all that was in her power to drive the merchants of those countries from her markets. They are not less anxious than formerly to obtain her wines, brandies, and silks; inasmuch, however, as commerce is merely an exchange of products, and as France will accept very few products belonging to others, they cannot, how anxious soever, maintain that extensive and mutually beneficial intercourse with her they would otherwise carry on: they sell little to her, and their purchases are, of course, proportionally diminished. This, indeed, is in all cases the necessary and inevitable effect of the prohibitive system. It never fails to lessen exportation to the same extent that it lessens importation; so that, when least injurious, it merely substitutes one sort of industry for another the production of the article that had been obtained from the foreigner, for the production of that which had been sent to him as an equivalent. (See COMMERCE.) France is not only extremely well situated for carrying on an extensive intercourse with foreign countries, but she is largely supplied with several productions, which, were she to adopt a liberal commercial system, would meet with a ready and advantageous sale abroad, and enable her to furnish equivalents for the largest amount of imports. The superiority enjoyed by Amboyna in the production of cloves is not more decided than that enjoyed by France in the production of wine. Her claret, burgundy, champagne, and brandy are unrivalled; and furnish, of themselves, the materials of a vast commerce. Indeed, the production of wine is, next to the ordinary business of agriculture, by far the most extensive and valuable branch of industry in France. It is stated by the landholders and merchants of the department of the Gironde, in the admirable Pétition et Mémoire à l'Appui, presented by them to the Chamber of Deputies in 1828, that the quantity of wine annually produced in France amounts, at an average, to about 40,000,000 hectolitres, or 1,060,000,000 gallons; that its value is not less than from 800,000,000 to 1,000,000,000 francs, or from 32,000,000l. to 40,000,000l. sterling; and that upwards of three millions of individuals are employed in its production. In some of the southern departments, it is of paramount importance. The population of the Gironde, exclusive of Bordeaux, amounts to about 450,000 individuals, of whom no fewer than 230,000 are supposed to be directly engaged in the cultivation of the vine. Here, then, is a branch of industry in which France has no competitor, which even now affords employment for about a tenth part of her population, and which is susceptible of indefinite extension. She has, in this single article, the means of carrying on the most extensive and lucrative commerce. "Le gouvernement Français," says M. Chaptal, in his work Sur Industrie Française, " doit les plus grands encouragements à la culture des vignes, soit qu'il considére ses produits relativement à la consommation intérieure, soit, qu'il les envisage sous le rapport de notre commerce avec l'étranger, dont il est en effet la base essentielle." But instead of labouring to extend this great branch of industry, government has consented to sacrifice it to the interests of the iron-founders, the cotton and linen manufacturers, and the planters of Martinique and Guadaloupe! We do not, indeed, imagine that they were at all aware that such would be the effect of their policy. Theirs is only one instance, among myriads that may be specified, to prove that ignorance in a ministry is quite as pernicious as bad intentions. The consideration, apparently not a very recondite one, that, notwithstanding the bounty of nature, wine was not gratuitously produced in France, and could not, therefore, be exported except for an equivalent, would seem never to have occurred to the ministers of Louis XVIII. and Charles X. But those whose interests were at stake, did not fail to apprise them of the hollowness of their system of policy. In 1822, when the project for raising the duties on sugar, iron, linens, &c. was under discussion, the merchants of Bordeaux, Nantes, Marseilles, and other great commercial cities, the silk manufacturers of Lyons, and the winegrowers of the Gironde, and some other departments, presented petitions to the Chambers, in which they truly stated, that it was a contradiction and an absurdity to attempt selling to the foreigner, without, at the same time, buying from him; and expressed their conviction, that the imposition of the proposed duties would be fatal to the commerce of France, and would consequently inflict a very serious injury on the winegrowers and silk manufacturers. These representations did not, however, meet with a very courteous reception. They were stigmatised as the work of ignorant and interested persons. The Chambers approved the policy of ministers; and in their ardour to extend and perfect it, did not hesitate deeply to injure branches of industry on which several millions of persons are dependent, in order that a few businesses, nowise suited to France, and the support of which costs her several millions a year, might be bolstered up and protected! It is plain, had there not been some powerful counteracting cause in operation, that the exports of wine from France should have been very greatly augmented since the peace of 1815. The United States, Russia, England, Prussia, and all those countries that have at all times been the great importers of French wines, have made prodigious advances in wealth and population since 1789; and, had the commerce with them not been subjected to injurious restrictions, there is every reason to think that their imports of French wine would have been much greater now than at any former period. So far, however, from this being the case, they have declined in a most extraordinary degree. This is proved beyond all question by the following extract from a report made to the Council General of the Gironde in 1841, and published by its orders and with its sanction. Previously to 1790, the wine trade at Bordeaux had an immense development. The books of our most ancient houses, transmitted down religiously from father to son, and the registries of our lands, prove that in the years preceding 1787 our exports had reached more than 100,000 tuns of wine, 10,000 casks of brandy, and 5,000 of vinegar. They also show that from 1,200 to 1,400 vessels from the north took large quantities of wine, in return for their national produce, which they easily disposed of amongst us. It was a most lucrative commerce, for we then sent 15,000 tuns to Prussia, 18,000 to England and Ireland, 6,000 to Dantzic, 40,000 to Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen, 15,000 to Holland, 7,000 to Sweden, 5,000 to Denmark and Norway, and 12,000 to Russia. But at that period we had not closed our frontiers to the produce of all these nations-we received at moderate duties their woollens, linens, hemp, iron, wood, cattle, and other articles, the consumption of which was less expensive, and the quality better, than similar articles made at home, and forced on us by customs duties. At present, notwithstanding the rapid increase of commercial affairs, notwithstanding the new nations of America, the advantages of a more expeditious, certain, and economical navigation, the demands of nations increased in number and industry, and consequently more disposed to purchase for consumption, our commerce is declining in a most alarming manner. Authentic documents prove that, in 1839, our exports only reached 1,339 tuns to England, 2,499 to Russia, 147 to Sweden, 342 to Norway, 2,964 to Prussia, 612 to Denmark, 8,188 to the Hans Towns, and 7,621 to the Netherlands. Since then our exports have not increased, so that instead of 100,000 tuns at least taken by the north of Europe from the department of the Gironde previously to 1790, not more than 25,000 tuns are taken at present. Yet, the taste for wine and the necessity to use it, have not been weakened amongst the various nations; but the exaggerated duties with which its introduction has been loaded, only allow it to be consumed by the wealthy classes, who are everywhere the least numerous. These duties are established in retaliation of those which France lays on foreign productions. If the exportation of wine has diminished in so great a proportion, the cause must be sought in the protective system. When the variations in the exports of wine are attentively examined, and their decrease looked to since 1822, when this system attained its height, to 1840, it is impossible not to be struck with the fact that these variations are intimately connected with the system itself. The decrease in the exports of wine has followed the increased development of the protective system, and, therefore, we are forced to draw this conclusion, that it is this system which destroys our export trade. Yet foreign consumption is the most certain and most profitable for Bordeaux wines, and it is particularly in the markets of the north of Europe and of England that the wines of the finest quality which our department produces find purchasers. Let us, then, insist on the necessity of re-opening these markets, which have been closed by the enormous amount of duties imposed by foreigners in reprisal of those laid by us on their products." Besides the injury inflicted on the wine trade by the prohibitive system of commercial policy adopted in France, and the retaliatory measures it has provoked in other coun tries, it has suffered severely from the octrois and other duties on internal consumption. But the depression, though felt everywhere, is greatest in the Gironde, which is especially dependent on its export trade. This is strikingly evinced by the large stocks of wine that remain in the hands of the growers and merchants, and by the fall in its price. This has, of course, reacted on the vineyards, many of which have become all but unsaleable; and a stop has been put to every sort of improvement. Nor have matters been in the least amended during the current year: on the contrary, they seem to be gradually getting worse. Such is the poverty of the proprietors, that wine is now frequently seized and sold by the revenue officers in payment of arrears of taxes; and such is at present the extent of the evil, that, in the course of this year, 1843, the committee of wine growers have applied to government for a loan of 2,000,000 francs to be applied to the payment of taxes due by the wine growers. It is Such are the effects of the restrictive system of policy on the wine trade of France,on a branch of industry which, as already seen, employs three millions of people. satisfactory, however, to observe, that the landowners and merchants are fully aware of the source of the misery in which they have been involved. They know that they are not suffering so much from hostile or vindictive measures on the part of foreigners, as from the blind and senseless policy of their own government; that they are victims of an attempt to counteract the most obvious principles-to make France produce articles directly at home, which she might obtain from the foreigner in exchange for wine, brandy, &c. at a third or a fourth part of the expense they now cost. They cannot export, because they are not allowed to import. Hence they do not ask for bounties and prohibitions; on the contrary, they disclaim all such quack nostrums; and demand what can alone be useful to them, and beneficial to the country,—a free commercial system. And notwithstanding the powerful interests involved in the support of the prohibitive policy, we cannot doubt but that, in the end, they will be compelled to give way; and that France, by opening her ports to a freer importation of foreign products, will insure the proportional extension of her exports of wines, brandies, silks, and other products, which she can furnish more cheaply and of a better quality than any other country. It is reasonable to suppose, that the experience that has been afforded of the ruinous effects of the prohibitive system, and the more general diffusion of correct ideas with respect to the real sources of wealth, will at no distant period occasion the adoption of such changes in the commercial legislation of France, as may render it more conducive to her interest, and more in accordance with the spirit of the age. Indeed we incline to think that but for the unfortunate misunderstanding about the Turkish question, and the irritation thence arising, a commercial treaty on a comparatively liberal footing would have been already entered into between France and this country; and it is much to be wished that some such arrangement should speedily be completed. If, indeed, we were hostile to France, we should wish her to continue her present system, for it must effectually prevent her making any considerable progress either in manufactures or commerce; but we disclaim being actuated by any such feelings. We are truly anxious for her prosperity, for her sake and our own; for unless she be surrounded by Bishop Berkeley's wall of brass, whatever contributes to her wellbeing must, in some degree, redound to the advantage of her neighbours. "Were such narrow and malignant politics to meet with success," said Mr. Hume, writing in the middle of the last century, and when the prosperity of others was generally regarded with an evil eye, "we should reduce all our neighbouring nations to the same state of sloth and ignorance that prevails in Morocco and the coast of Barbary. But what would be the consequence? They could send us no commodities; they could take none from us: our domestic commerce itself would languish for want of emulation, example, and instruction; and we ourselves should soon fall into the same abject condition to which we had reduced them. I shall, therefore, venture to acknowledge, that not only as a man, but as a British subject, I pray for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France itself. I am, at least, certain that Great Britain, and all those nations, would flourish more, did their sovereign and ministers adopt such enlarged and benevolent sentiments towards each other.”—(Essay on the Jealousy of Trade.) BOSTON, a commercial city of the United States, the capital of Massachusetts, and the largest town of New England, lat. 42° 23′ N., long. 71° 4' W. Population, in 1850, 136,871. The city is situated on a peninsula near the bottom of a large and deep bay, being surrounded on all sides by water, except on the south, where it is joined to the main land by the narrow isthmus, called Boston Neck. But it communicates, by means of extensive wooden bridges, with Charleston on the north side of the bay, and with Dorchester on the south. Boston Bay is of great extent, and is studded with many islands. The plan, on the opposite side, will give a better idea of it than could be derived from any description. harbour by Castle Island (M), and Governor's Island (N). On References to Plan. A, outer lighthouse, 65 feet high, Shipping Charges.-For an account of these, see NEW YORK. How to enter the Port. In coming from the Atlantic, a ship should bring the lighthouse to bear W. by N. to W. N. w., and run direct for it. The largest ships may pass it at within less than a cable's length. If there be no pilot on board, or the master be unacquainted with the harbour, or the wind be north-westerly, which is the most unfavourable for entering, she had better steer W. by S. for Nantasket roads, where she may anchor, and get a pilot. Mooring, &c. Generally speaking, there is sufficient depth of water to enable the largest ships to come up to town at all times of the tide. They usually moor alongside quays or wharfs, where they lie in perfect safety. There are in all about GO wharfs; which, for the most part, are built on piles, with a superstructure of stone and earth. The two principal are "Long Wharf,” 550 yards in length; and "Central Wharf," Pilotage. No particular place is specified at which vessels Table of the Rates of Pilotage on Outward and Inward bound Vessels in the Port of Boston. Trade of Boston, &c. - Boston has a very extensive trade with the southern states and with foreign countries, and is also one of the principal seats of the American fisheries. She is largely indebted to her southern neighbours, and principally to New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, for supplies of flour and wheat, and for great quantities of barley, maize, oatmeal, oats, &c., as well as for cotton, tobacco, &c. Of these, the imports of flour amount, at an average, to about 1,000,000 barrels a-year; all sorts of grain, to about 8,500,000 bushels; cotton, 320,000 bales; sugar 80,000,000 lbs., coffee 16,000,000 lbs., &c. Her returns are made, partly in native raw produce, as beef, pork, lard, &c.; partly and principally in the produce of her manufacturing industry, in which Massachusetts is decidedly superior to every other state in the Union; and partly in the produce of her fisheries and foreign trade. At an average, Boston annually sends to the southern parts of the Union about 70,000 barrels of beef and pork; 200,000 barrels mackerel, herrings, alewives, &c.; large quantities of dried and smoked fish; 5,000,000 pairs of boots and shoes; besides a very large amount of cotton and woollen manufactured goods, paper, nails, ice, furniture, cordage, &c. ; so as to leave a large balance in her favour. Her exports of native produce to foreign countries consist principally of the same articles she sends to the southern States; but she also exports a large amount of the foreign produce she had previously imported. The imports from abroad consist principally of cotton and woollen goods; linens and canvas; hardware, silks, sugar, tea, coffee, wines and brandy, spices, hides, indigo, dyewoods, &c. The total imports from foreign countries into the state of Massachusetts in the year ending 30th of June, 1857, amounted to 47,265,841 dollars; while the exports of native produce, during the same year, amounted to only 26,572,659 dollars, and of native and foreign produce together, to 30,146,012 dollars; the balance against Massachusetts being paid off by bills upon the southern States, to which she exports much more than she imports. New York alone is, in fact, supposed to be at all times indebted to Boston about 5,000,000 dollars. We subjoin some statements illustrative of the trade of Boston. |