II. Four Differtations. I. On Providence. II. On Prayer. III. On the Reasons for expecting that virtuous Men fhall meet after Death in a State of Happiness. IV. On the Importance of Chriftianity, the Nature of Hiftorical Evidence, and Miracles. By Richard Price, F. R. S. 8vo. Pr. 6. Cadell.

T cannot, as this writer very justly obferves, but be a matter of anxious enquiry with every confiderate person, how far he has reafon to think well of that world in which he exifts, and of its laws and administration. If about this no satisfaction can be obtained, there will be an end of all the chief comforts and hopes of reasonable beings; the course of events must be viewed with fufpicion, and the world contemplated with difgust and pain. The doctrine of Providence, therefore, is plainly of the highest importance; and this author can want no apology for attempting to explain and defend it.

In pursuance of his defign he endeavours to prove," that all the occurrences in nature are under perfectly wife and good direction."

There are two ways of proving this. One, from the confideration of the Divine perfections; the other, from what falls under our notice of the frame and conftitution of the world.

In the first section he shews, that the perfect character of the Deity cannot be maintained without allowing an all-directing and unerring Providence.

The design of the second is to give an account of such arguments for providence, as may be gathered from confidering the general laws and constitution of the world.

Under this head he endeavours to evince, that there is not only a plan or constitution of nature, by which beings are fupported, and a general direction given to events, but that there is an influence of the Deity conftantly exerted to maintain this conftitution; or, in other words, that the Deity is always prefent, and always active, in all places; and that his energy is the first mover in every motion, and the true fource of all the powers and laws which take place in the material world.

In oppofition to this doctrine it has been alledged, "that it is impairing the beauty of the world, and reprefenting it as a production more imperfect than any work of human art, to maintain that it cannot fubfift of itfelf, or that it requires the hand of its maker to be always employed, to continue its motions and order."

The author thinks, the full answer to this objection is, that to every machine or perpetual movement for anfwering any particular purpose, there always belongs fome first mover, fome weight or spring, or other power, which is continually acting

upon

upon it, and from which all its motions are derived; and that, without fuch a power, is it poffible to have an idea of any fuch machine? The machine of the univerfe then, like all befides analogous to it of which we have any idea, muft have a firftmover. This first-mover cannot be matter itfelf, for matter is inactive; it follows, therefore, that this objection is fo far from being of any force, that it leads us to the very conclufion which it is brought to overthrow.

Having concluded his proof, that the Deity pervades and actuates the whole material world, and that his unremitting energy is the cause to which every effect in it must be traced, he fubjoins the following observation — The spiritual world is, without doubt, of greater confequence. Is his energy then wanting here? Is there not one atom of matter on which he does not act; and is there then one living being about which he has no concern? Does not a stone fall without him; and does then a man fuffer without him? Are fuch influences as may be neceffary to bring about a juft regulation of events in the moral world, lefs likely than thofe influences which we know to be exerted continually to maintain the order of the inanimate world? The truth is, the inanimate world is of no confequence abftracted from its fubferviency to the animate and reasonable aworld. The former, therefore, must be preserved and governed entirely with a view to the latter.'

This leads him to a farther argument on this subject, which offers itself to us, upon confidering the wisdom manifested in the ftructure of every object in the inanimate creation. How beautiful, fays he, is the form of every vegetable, and how curioutly arranged its parts? What exquifite mechanism, what nice workmanship and amazing art appear in every leaf and fpire of grafs?Let us now afk ourselves; has God, on objects in themselves fo worthless, poured forth fuch a profufion of wisdom and skill, and is he fparing of thefe in the concerns of reasonable beings? or does he lefs regard order and fitness in the determination of their ftates -It is not poffible to imagine this. -Whatever appearance the affairs of men may at prefent make to us, we may be certain that they are directed by the fame wifdom with that which we obferve in the reft of nature; that is, by a wisdom which we know to be infinitely fuperior to ours; by a wisdom which, in the loweft objects, is exact and incomprehenfible, and which, therefore, muft be as much more fo, in higher objects, as they are of greater. value.

The fubject of the third fection is, the manner in which providence is administered.

Many wife and good men are strongly prejudiced against the fuppofition, that there have been any interpofitions of Divine, power fince the creation, in directing affairs, as implying an impotence, unfkilfulness, and operofenefs unworthy of infinite wifdom. They, therefore, choose to frame a notion of the laws and order of the material world, as having been at first adjusted in exact correspondence to what should happen in the moral world, and the whole fcheme including all events as originally, designed and laid in the best manner, and now continually going on to open and unfold itself agreeably to the Divine idea, without any occafion for fuch interpofitions.

But, fays this ingenious author, it must furely be very evident, that influences, confiftent with the free agency of beings and uniformly exerted to exclude every event fit to be excluded, and to produce perfect order in the adminiftration of the world, are to far from unbecoming the almighty and omniprefent Parent, that we can conceive of nothing more worthy of him, or that can make his character appear more amiable. Nor is there any more reafon to be prejudiced against them, than against the influence which the conftitution of the world allows to every agent over events, in proportion to his power and knowledge. There is no perfon who does not influence in various ways what paffes within the circle of his friends and acquaintance, and it has never yet been thought that the liberty of mankind, or their scope for action, is affected by it. Invi-, fible and fuperior Beings may also be frequently employed in directing occurrences among mankind. Now, the influence of Divine Providence is a fact of the fame kind with thefe, and seems not to be on any account more liable to objections. Shall we acknowledge the influence of every agent on events, and deny that of the Supreme? Was it indeed fit that by one original act he should exclude himself from all further concern with his works; or can it be poffible to imagine that the Being who is the fountain of all energy, and whofe nature is perfect activity and power, fhould be the only inactive Being in the uni verfe? Is it not, on the contrary, much more rational to believe, that his influence over events extends as much further than that of any other Being, and is as much more conftant, as the relation in which he ftands to Beings is nearer, and his power wisdom greater

?

and

But what almoft decides the queftion I am confidering. is a point which has been already at large infifted upon; namely, That the caufe from which the general laws that govern the material world are derived, is the immediate, power of the Deity exerted every where." It has, I hope, been fhewn in the laft fection, that we have clear and ftrong evidence for this —To

what

what was there faid, I will beg leave to add, on the prefent occafion, that it is from this caufe alfo, in particular, muft bé derived that conftant fucceffion of vegetables and animals which is kept up in the world. There is not one fact in nature which can be completely accounted for by the mere powers of mechanifin. Moft certainly then this fact cannot be thus accounted for. "Tis utterly inconceivable, that works of fuch ftupendous art as the bodies of vegetables and animals, myriads of which åre continually formed about us, fhould be derived from laws planted at the creation in dead matter, which have ever fince executed themselves. Those who fay this, fay they know not what. They make unmeaning words ftand for caufes, and attribute to matter infinitely more than it is capable of. Every new vegetable or animal, therefore, I confider as a new pro duction of Divine Power, acting conftantly and regularly ac cording to an order or scheme at firft fixed by his wifdom. But there is particular reafon to think thus with respect to the confcious and living principles of animals. "Tis just as poffible that thefe fhould arife into exiftence, in confequence of laws established at the creation, without any immediate exertion of Divine Power, as it is that they fhould arise into existence of themselves without any cause at all.-On this account, the prefervation of all things appears to be indeed but very little dif ferent from a continual creation; for was creative power to cease operating, the confequence would be, that no more new beings would make their appearance in the world, and that this earth would foon become a wild and horrid defart.

The conclufion arising from these observations is very obvious. Divine Power, we fee, did not ceafe operating at the creation. It appears, on the contrary, that there is a constant exertion of it through all nature.'

In the fourth fection the author confiders the objections against Providence.

It would, he thinks, preclude much that has been objected on this fubject to remember, that the directions of Providence are, as it is certainly beft they fhould be, concealed and invifible; and that, therefore, we cannot in particular cases determine in' what manner its influence has been exerted, or what its intentions are.

Among other arguments in anfwer to the objections which are taken from the irregularities and evils, natural and moral, which we fee in the world, he infifts, that were we acquainted with the whole of nature, or had faculties for entering into the counfels of Providence, and difcovering the connections and dependences of all its parts, every irregularity would disappear, and all that now puzzles us be found completely right and

good;

good; that it is unreasonable and abfurd to expect, that the Deity should act in every single inftance, to the utmost extent of his power, and communicate the greatest poffible happiness ; and that it was necessary, there fhould be a real contingency of events in the creation, and fuch a subordination of beings to one another, and precarioufness of their states, as could not but fubject them in many inftances, and especially in the infancy of their existence, to the danger of moral defection and a failure of happiness; otherwife there could not have been room for a proper exertion of the powers of beings, or for that moral excellence by which they moft nearly refemble the fountain of all perfection; nor, in fhort, any method of attaining the righteft and the greatest happiness.

He comes now to confider the objection against Providence, arifing from the final lofs of a great part of mankind which religion teaches us to expect. As this is a matter of the greatest importance, we shall make no apology for the length of the following extract:

How great a part of mankind will be loft can be known only to that Being who fees through all futurity, and who fearches all hearts.-When I confider the general carelessness which feems to prevail with respect to religious virtue; the inexcufable defects of many who are ranked among the better fort of men; the scope of the christian doctrine, and several intimations of fcripture; I am indeed forced to entertain melancholy reflections. Every benevolent mind will, however, endeavour to think on this fubject as favourably as poffible. There is enough in the fact, as it must appear to the largest charity, to render it in the highest degree alarming, and to awaken in us the deepest concern for ourfelves and our fellowmen. Millions of reasonable Beings, naturally immortal and capable of infinite improvement, bereaved of all their hopes, cut off from every blessing of existence, caft away for ever from God and blifs, and funk in irrecoverable deftruction !—What can be imagined more fhocking ?-But though fuch a fact cannot but greatly affect an attentive mind, it furnishes with no just reasons for cenfuring Providence. God, notwithstanding, appears to be good, infinitely good. No conclufion to the contrary could be drawn, were there ever fo great a disproportion between the number of those who shall be saved, and those who will be loft. One may even venture to affert, that it would have been worth while to have created this world for the fake of only one perfon* to be faved out of it, and fitted in it

This seems to be a strange affertion. It is not to be conceived how the deftruction of millions fhould be counterbal. lanced by the happiness of one.

for