CHAP. II.

CHA P. II.

Of the Influence of Incitements and Motives upon the Will.

W

E come into the world ignorant of every thing, yet we must do many things in order to our fubfiftence and well-being. A new-born child may be carried in arms, and. kept warm by his nurfe; but he must fuck and fwallow his food for himself. And this must be done before he has any conception of fucking or swallowing, or of the manner in which they are to be performed. He is led by nature to do these actions. without knowing for what end, or what he is about. This we call inftinct.

In many cases there is no time for voluntary determination. The motions must go on fo rapidly, that the conception and volition of every movement cannot keep pace with them. In fome cases of this kind, instinct, in others habit, comes in to our aid.

When a man ftumbles and loses his balance, the motion neceffary to prevent his fall would come too late, if it were the confequence of thinking what is fit to be done, and making a voluntary effort for that purpose. He does this inftinctively.

When a man beats a drum or plays a tune, he has not time to direct every particular beat or stop, by a voluntary determination; but the habit which may be acquired by exercise, answers the purpose as well.

By instinct therefore, and by habit, we do many things without any exercise either of judgment or will.

In other actions the will is exerted, but without judgment.

CHAP. II.

Suppofe a man to know that, in order to live, he muft eat. What shall he eat? How much? And how often? His reafon can answer none of thefe queftions; and therefore can give no direction how he fhould determine. Here again nature, as an indulgent parent, fupplies the defects of his reafon; giving him appetite, which shews him when he is to eat, how often, and how much; and tafte, which informs him what he is, and what he is not to eat. And by these principles he is much better directed than he could be without them, by all the knowledge he can ac.quire.

As the Author of nature has given us fome principles of action to fupply the defects of our knowledge, he has given others to fupply the defects of our wisdom and virtue..

The natural defires, affections and paffions, which are common to the wife and to the foolish, to the virtuous and to the vicious, and even to the more fagacious brutes, ferve very often to direct the course of human actions. By thefe principles men may perform the most laborious duties of life, without any regard to duty; and do what is proper to be done, without regard to propriety; like a vessel that is carried on in her proper course by a profperous gale, without the fkill or judgment of thofe that are a

board..

Appetite, affection, or paffion, give an impulfe to a certain action: In this impulse there is no judgment implied. It may be weak or ftrong; we can even conceive it irrefiftible. In the cafe of madness it is fo. Madmen have their appetites and paf-. fions; but they want the power of felf-government; and therefore we do not impute their actions to the man but to the dif eafe.

In actions that proceed from appetite or paffion, we are paffive in part, and only in part active.. They are therefore part

ly

ly imputed to the paffion; and if it is fuppofed to be irrefiftible, we do not impute them to the man at all.

Even an American favage judges in this manner: When in a fit of drunkenness he kills his friend: As foon as he comes to himself, he is very forry for what he has done; but pleads that drink, and not he, was the caufe.

We conceive brute-animals to have no fuperior principle to control their appetites and paffions. On this account, their ac-tions are not fubject to law. Men are in a like state in infancy, in madness, and in the delirium of a fever. They have appetites and paffions, but they want that which makes them moral agents, accountable for their conduct, and objects of moral approbation or of blame.

In some cases, a stronger impulfe of appetite or paffion may oppose a weaker. Here alfo there may be determination and action without judgment.

Suppofe a foldier ordered to mount a breach, and certain of prefent death if he retreats, this man needs not courage to go on, fear is fufficient. The certainty of present death if he retreats, is an overbalance to the probability of being killed if he goes on. The man is pushed by contrary forces, and it requires neither judgment nor exertion to yield to the strongest.

A hungry dog acts by the fame principle, if meat is set before him, with a threatening to beat him if he touch it. Hunger pushes him forward, fear pushes him back with more force, and the strongest force prevails.

Thus we fee, that, in many even of our voluntary actions, we may act from the impulfe of appetite, affection, or paffion,

without

CHAP. II.

CHAP. II. without any exercise of judgment, and much in the fame manner as brute-animals feem to act.

Sometimes, however, there is a calm in the mind from the gales of paffion or appetite, and the man is left to work his way, in the voyage of life, without thofe impulfes which they give. Then he calmly weighs goods and evils, which are at too great a distance to excite any paffion. He judges what is best upon the whole, without feeling any bias drawing him to one fide. He judges for himself as he would do for another in his fituation; and the determination is wholly imputable to the man, and not in any degree to his paffion.

Every man come to years of understanding, who has given any attention to his own conduct, and to that of others, has, in his mind, a fcale or measure of goods and evils, more or less exact. He makes an estimate of the value of health, of reputation, of riches, of pleasure, of virtue, of self-approbation, and of the approbation of his Maker. These things, and their contraries, have a comparative importance in his cool and deliberate judgment.

When a man confiders whether health ought to be preferred to bodily ftrength, fame to riches, whether a good confcience and the approbation of his Maker, to every thing that can come in competition with it; this appears to me to be an exercise of judgment, and not any impulse of paffion or appetite.

Every thing worthy of purfuit, must be so, either intrinfically, and upon its own account, or as the means of procuring fomething that is intrinfically valuable. That it is by judgment that we difcern the fitnefs of means for attaining an end, is felf-evident; and in this, I think, all Philofophers agree. But that it is the office of judgment to appreciate the value of an end, or the

preference

preference due to one end above another, is not granted by fome CHAP. II. Philofophers.

In determining what is good or ill, and, of different goods, which is beft, they think we must be guided, not by judgment, but by fome natural or acquired taste, which makes us relish one thing and dislike another.

Thus, if one man prefers cheese to lobsters, another lobsters to cheese, it is vain, fay they, to apply judgment to determine which is right. In like manner, if one man prefers pleasure to virtue, another virtue to pleasure, this is a matter of tafte, judg ment has nothing to do in it. This seems to be the opinion of fome Philofophers.

I cannot help being of a contrary opinion. I think we may form a judgment, both in the question about cheese and lobsters, and in the more important question about pleasure and virtue.

When one man feels a more agreeable relish in cheese, another in lobsters, this, I grant, requires no judgment; it depends only upon the conftitution of the palate. But, if we would determine which of the two has the best taste, I think the question must be determined by judgment; and that, with a small share of this faculty, we may give a very certain determination, to wit, that the two taftes are equally good, and that both of the perfons do equally well, in preferring what fuits their palate and their stomach.

Nay, I apprehend, that the two perfons who differ in their tafte will, notwithstanding that difference, agree perfectly intheir judgment, that both taftes are upon a footing of equality, and that neither has a juft claim to preference.

Thus it appears, that, in this inftance, the office of tafte is