fome consequences may be drawn with regard to the theory of CHAP. IV.

morals.

First, If there be no virtue without the belief that what we do is right, it follows, That a moral faculty, that is, a power of difcerning moral goodness and turpitude in human conduct, is essential to every being capable of virtue or vice. A being who has no more conception of moral goodness and bafenefs, of right and wrong, than a blind man hath of colours, can have no regard to it in his conduct, and therefore can neither be virtuous nor vicious.

He may have qualities that are agreeable or disagreeable, useful or hurtful; fo may a plant or a machine. And we fometimes use the word virtue in fuch a latitude as to fignify any agreeable or useful quality, as when we speak of the virtues of plants. But we are now fpeaking of virtue in the strict and proper sense, as it fignifies that quality in a man which is the object of moral approbation.

This virtue a man could not have, if he had not a power of discerning a right and a wrong in human conduct, and of being influenced by that discernment. For in fo far only he is virtuous as he is guided in his conduct by that part of his conftitution. Brutes do not appear to have any fuch power, and therefore are not moral or accountable agents. They are capable of culture and difcipline, but not of virtuous or criminal conduct.. Even human creatures, in infancy and non-age, are not moral agents, because their moral faculty is not yet unfolded. These fentiments are fupported by the common fense of mankind, which has always determined, that neither brutes nor infants can be indicted for crimes..

It is of fmall confequence what name we give to this moral power of the human mind; but it is fo important a part of our conftitution,

CHAP. IV. conftitution, as to deferve an appropriated name.

The name of confcience, as it is the most common, seems to me as proper as any that has been given it. I find no fault with the name moral fenfe, although I conceive this name has given occafion to fome mistakes concerning the nature of our moral power. Modern Philofophers have conceived of the external fenfes as having no other office but to give us certain fenfations, or fimple conceptions, which we could not have without them. And this notion has been applied to the moral fenfe. But it feems to me a mistaken notion in both. By the fenfe of feeing, I not only have the conception of the different colours, but I perceive one body to be of this colour, another of that. In like manner, by my moral sense, I not only have the conceptions of right and wrong in conduct, but I perceive this conduct to be right, that to be wrong, and that indifferent. All our fenfes are judging faculties, fo alfo is confcience. Nor is this power only a judge of our own actions and thofe of others, it is likewise a principle of action in all good men; and fo far only can our conduct be denominated virtuous, as it is influenced by this principle,

A fecond confequence from the principle laid down in this chapter is, That the formal nature and effence of that virtue which is the object of moral approbation confifts neither in a prudent profecution of our private interest, nor in benevolent affections towards others, nor in qualities useful or agreeable to ourselves or to others, nor in fympathizing with the paffions and affections of others, and in attuning our own conduct to the tone of other mens paffions; but it confifts in living in all good confcience, that is, in ufing the best means in our power to know our duty, and acting accordingly.

Prudence is a virtue, benevolence is a virtue, fortitude is a virtue; but the effence and formal nature of virtue muft lie in fomething that is common to all these, and to every other vir

tue.

And this I conceive can be nothing else but the rectitude

of

of such conduct and

ed by a good man. fues the former and

turpitude of the contrary, which is difcern- CHAP. V.
And fo far only he is virtuous as he pur-
avoids the latter.

MR

CHA P. V.

Whether Juftice be a Natural or an Artificial Virtue.

R HUME's philofophy concerning morals was first prefented to the world in the third volume of his Treatife of Human Nature, in the year 1740; afterwards in his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which was first published by itself, and then in feveral editions of his Essays and Treatifes.

In these two works on morals the fyftem is the fame. A more popular arrangement, great embellishment, and the omiffion of some metaphysical reasonings, have given a preference in the public esteem to the last; but I find neither any new principles in it, nor any new arguments in fupport of the system common to both.

In this fyftem, the proper object of moral approbation is not actions or any voluntary exertion, but qualities of mind; that is, natural affections or paffions, which are involuntary, a part of the conftitution of the man, and common to us with many brute-animals. When we praise or blame any voluntary action, it is only confidered as a sign of the natural affection from which it flows, and from which all its merit or demerit is derived.

Moral approbation or difapprobation is not an act of the judgment, which, like all acts of judgment, must be true or falfe, it is only a certain feeling, which, from the constitution of huFff

man

CHAP. V. man nature, arifes upon contemplating certain characters or qualities of mind coolly and impartially.

This feeling, when agreeable, is moral approbation; when difagreeable, difapprobation. The qualities of mind which produce this agreeable feeling are the moral virtues, and thofe that produce the difagreeable, the vices.

These preliminaries being granted, the queftion about the foundation of morals is reduced to a fimple queftion of fact, to wit, What are the qualities of mind which produce, in the disinterefted observer, the feeling of approbation, or the contrary feeling?

In answer to this queftion, the author endeavours to prove, by a very copious induction, That all perfonal merit, all virtue, all that is the object of moral approbation, confifts in the qualities of mind which are agreeable or useful to the perfon who poffeffes them, or to others.

The dulce and the utile is the whole fum of merit in every character, in every quality of mind, and in every action of life. There is no room left for that honeftum which CICERO thus defines, Honeftum igitur id intelligimus, quod tale eft, ut detracta omni utilitate, fine ullis premiis fructibusve, per fe ipfum poffit jure laudari.

Among the ancient moralifts, the Epicureans were the only fect who denied that there is any fuch thing as boneftum, or moral worth, diftinct from pleasure. In this Mr HUME's fyftem agrees with theirs. For the addition of utility to pleasure, as a foundation of morals, makes only a verbal, but no real diffeWhat is useful only has no value in itself, but derives all its merit from the end for which it is ufeful. That end, in this fyftem, is agreeableness or pleasure. So that, in both fystems, pleasure is the only end, the only thing that is good in

rence.

itself,

itself, and defirable for its own fake; and virtue derives all its CHAP. V. merit from its tendency to produce pleasure.

Agreeableness and utility are not moral conceptions, nor have they any connection with morality. What a man does, merely because it is agreeable, or ufeful to procure what is agreeable, is not virtue. Therefore the Epicurean system was justly thought by CICERO, and the best moralifts among the ancients, to fubvert morality, and to fubftitute another principle in its room; and this fyftem is liable to the fame cenfure.

In one thing, however, it differs remarkably from that of EPICURUS. It allows, that there are disinterested affections in human nature; that the love of children and relations, friendship, gratitude, compaffion and humanity, are not, as EPICURUS maintained, different modifications of self-love, but fimple and original parts of the human conftitution; that when intereft, or envy, or revenge, pervert not our difpofition, we are inclined, from natural philanthropy, to defire, and to be pleased with the happinefs of the human kind.

All this, in oppofition to the Epicurean fyftem, Mr HUME maintains with great ftrength of reafon and eloquence, and, in this refpect, his system is more liberal and difinterested than that of the Greek Philofopher. According to EPICURUS, virtue is whatever is agreeable to ourselves. According to Mr HUME, every quality of mind that is agreeable or useful to ourselves or to others.

This theory of the nature of virtue, it must be acknowledged, enlarges greatly the catalogue of moral virtues, by bringing into that catalogue every quality of mind that is useful or agreeable. Nor does there appear any good reason why the useful and agreeable qualities of body and of fortune, as well as those of the mind, should not have a place among moral virtues in Fff 2 this