CHAP. III.

Those who have been bred to any profeffion are very prone to use the terms of their profeffion in speaking or writing on fubjects that have any analogy to it. And they may do fo with advantage, as terms of art are commonly more precise in their fignification, and better defined, than the words of common language. To fuch perfons it is also very natural to model and arrange other fubjects, as far as their nature admits, into a method fimilar to that of the system which fills their minds.

It might, therefore, be expected, that a Civilian, intending to give a detailed system of morals, would use many of the terms of civil law, and mould it, as far as it can be done, into the form of a system of law, or of the rights of mankind.

The neceffary and close relation of right to duty, which we before observed, juftified this: And moral duty had long been confidered as a law of nature; a law, not wrote on tables of stone or brass, but on the heart of man; a law of greater antiquity and higher authority than the laws of particular states; a law which is binding upon all men of all nations, and therefore is called by CICERO the law of nature and of nations.

The idea of a fyftem of this law was worthy of the genius of the immortal HUGO GROTIUS, and he was the firft who executed it in fuch a manner as to draw the attention of the learned in all the European nations; and to give occafion to feveral princes and states to establish public profeffions for the teaching of this law.

The multitude of commentators and annotators upon this work of GROTIUS, and the public establishments to which it gave occafion, are fufficient vouchers of its merit.

It is, indeed, a work fo well defigned, and so skilfully executed; fo free from the fcholaftic jargon which infected the

learned

learned at that time, fo much addreffed to the common fenfe CHAP. III. and moral judgment of mankind, and so agreeably illuftrated by examples from ancient history, and authorities from the fentiments of ancient authors, Heathen and Chriftian, that it must always be esteemed as the capital work of a great genius upon a most important fubject.

The utility of a juft fyftem of natural jurisprudence appears, 1. As it is a fyftem of the moral duty we owe to men, which, by the aid they have taken from the terms and divifions of the civil law, has been given more in detail and more fyftematically by writers in natural jurisprudence than it was formerly. 2. As it is the best preparation for the study of law, being, as it were, caft in the mould, and ufing and explaining many of the terms of the civil law, on which the law of moft of the European nations is grounded. 3. It is of ufe to lawgivers, who ought to make their laws as agreeable as poffible to the law of nature. And as laws made by men, like all human works, must be imperfect, it points out the errors and imperfections of human laws. 4. To judges and interpreters of the law it is of use, becaufe that interpretation ought to be preferred which is founded in the law of nature. 5. It is of use in civil controverfies between states, or between individuals who have no common fuperior. In fuch controverfies, the appeal must be made to the law of nature; and the standard systems of it, particularly that of GROTIUS, have great authority. And, 6. to fay no more upon this point, It is of great use to fovereigns and ftates who are above all human laws, to be folemnly admonished of the conduct they are bound to obferve to their own fubjects, to the fubjects of other states, and to one another, in peace and in war. The better and the more generally the law of nature is underftood, the greater difhonour, in public eftimation, will follow every violation of it.

Some authors have imagined, that systems of natural jurifpru

CHAP. III. dence ought to be confined to the perfect rights of men, because the duties which correfpond to the imperfect rights, the duties of charity and humanity cannot be enforced by human laws, but must be left to the judgment and confcience of men, free from compulfion. But the systems which have had the greatest applaufe of the public, have not followed this plan, and, I conceive, for good reafons. First, Because a system of perfect rights could by no means serve the purpose of a system of morals, which furely is an important purpose. Secondly, Becaufe, in many cafes, it is hardly poffible to fix the precife limit between juftice and humanity, between perfect and imperfect right. Like the colours in a prifmatic image, they run into each other, so that the best eye cannot fix the precife boundary between them. Thirdly, As wife legiflators and magiftrates ought to have it as their end to make the citizens good, as well as juft, we find, in all civilized nations, laws that are intended to encourage the duties of humanity. Where human laws cannot enforce them by punishments, they may encourage them by rewards. Of this the wifeft legiflators have given examples; and how far this branch of legislation may be carried, no man can foresee.

The fubftance of the four following chapters was wrote long ago, and read in a literary fociety, with a view to juftify fome points of morals from metaphyfical objections urged against them in the writings of DAVID HUME, Efq. If they answer that end, and, at the fame time, ferve to illustrate the account I have given of our moral powers, it is hoped that the reader will not think them improperly placed here; and that he will forgive fome repetitions, and perhaps anachronisms, occafioned by their being wrote at different times, and on different occafions.

CHA P.

CHAP. IV.

CHA P. IV.

Whether an Action deferving Moral Approbation, must be done with the belief of its being morally good.

T

HERE is no part of philofophy more fubtile and intri

cate than that which is called The Theory of Morals. Nor is there any more plain and level to the apprehenfion of man than the practical part of morals.

In the former, the Epicurean, the Peripatetic and the Stoic, had each his different fyftem of old; and almost every modern author of reputation has a fyftem of his own. At the fame time, there is no branch of human knowledge, in which there is fo general an agreement among ancients and moderns, learned. and unlearned, as in the practical rules of morals..

From this difcord in the theory, and harmony in the practical part, we may judge, that the rules of morality ftand upon another and a firmer foundation than the theory. And of this it is easy to perceive the reason.

For, in order to know what is right and what is wrong in human conduct, we need only liften to the dictates of our confcience when the mind is calm and unruffled, or attend to the judgment we form of others in like circumftances. But, to judge of the various theories of morals, we must be able to analyze and diffect, as it were, the active powers of the human mind, and especially to analyze accurately that confcience or moral power by which we difcern right from wrong.

The conscience may be compared to the eye in this, as in many other

D d d 2:

1

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CHAP. IV. other respects. The learned and the unlearned fee objects with equal diftinctness. The former have no title to dictate to the latter, as far as the eye is judge, nor is there any disagreement about fuch matters. But, to diffect the eye, and to explain the theory of vision, is a difficult point, wherein the most skilful have differed.

From this remarkable difparity between our 'decifions in the theory of morals and in the rules of morality, we may, I think, draw this conclufion, That wherever we find any disagreement between the practical rules of morality, which have been received in all ages, and the principles of any of the theories advanced upon this fubject, the practical rules ought to be the ftandard by which the theory is to be corrected, and that it is both unsafe and unphilofophical to warp the practical rules, in order to make them tally with a favourite theory.

The question to be confidered in this chapter belongs to the practical part of morals, and therefore is capable of a more easy and more certain determination. And, if it be determined in the affirmative, I conceive that it may ferve as a touchstone to try fome celebrated theories which are inconfiftent with that determination, and which have led the theorists to oppose it by very fubtile metaphysical arguments.

Every question about what is or is not the proper object of moral approbation, belongs to practical morals, and fuch is the queftion now under confideration: Whether actions deferving moral approbation must be done with the belief of their being morally good? Or, Whether an action, done without any regard to duty or to the dictates of conscience, can be entitled to moral approbation?

In every action of a moral agent, his confcience is either altogether filent, or it pronounces the action to be good, or bad,

or