Imatges de pàgina
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5. To Το every man who believes the existence, the perfections, CHAP. I. and the providence of GOD, the veneration and fubmiffion we owe to him is felf-evident. Right fentiments of the Deity and of his works, not only make the duty we owe to him obvious to every intelligent being, but likewife add the authority of a Divine law to every rule of right conduct.

There is another clafs of axioms in morals, by which, when there seems to be an oppofition between the actions that different virtues lead to, we determine to which the preference is due.

Between the several virtues, as they are difpofitions of mind, or determinations of will, to act according to a certain general rule, there can be no oppofition. They dwell together most amicably, and give mutual aid and ornament, without the possibility of hoftility or oppofition, and, taken altogether, make one uniform and confiftent rule of conduct. But, between particular external actions, which different virtues would lead to, there may be an oppofition. Thus, the fame man may be in his heart, generous, grateful and juft. These difpofitions strengthen, but never can weaken one another. Yet it may happen, that an external action which generofity or gratitude folicits, juftice may forbid.

That in all fuch cafes, unmerited generofity fhould yield to gratitude, and both to justice, is felf-evident. Nor is it lefs fo, that unmerited beneficence to those who are at ease should yield to compaflion to the miferable, and external acts of piety to works of mercy, because God loves mercy more than facrifice.

At the fame time, we perceive, that thofe acts of virtue which ought to yield in the cafe of a competition, have most intrinsic worth when there is no competition. Thus, it is evident that there is more worth in pure and uninerited benevolence than in

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CHAP. I. compaffion, more in compaffion than in gratitude, and more in gratitude than in justice.

I call thefe first principles, because they appear to me to have in themselves an intuitive evidence which I cannot refift. I find I can express them in other words. I can illuftrate them by examples and authorities, and perhaps can deduce one of them from another; but I am not able to deduce them from other principles that are more evident. And I find the best moral reasonings of authors I am acquainted with, ancient and modern, Heathen and Chriftian, to be grounded upon one or more of them.

The evidence of mathematical axioms is not difcerned till men come to a certain degree of maturity of understanding. A boy must have formed the general conception of quantity, and of more and lefs and equal, of fum and difference; and he must have been accustomed to judge of these relations in matters of common life, before he can perceive the evidence of the mathematical axiom, that equal quantities, added to equal quantities, make equal fums.

In like manner, our moral judgment, or confcience, grows to maturity from an imperceptible feed, planted by our Creator. When we are capable of contemplating the actions of other men, or of reflecting upon our own calmly and difpaffionately, we begin to perceive in them the qualities of honeft and dif honeft, of honourable and base, of right and wrong, and to feel the fentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation..

These fentiments are at first feeble, eafily warped by paffions and prejudices, and apt to yield to authority. By use and time, the judgment, in morals as in other matters, gathers strength, and feels more vigour. We begin to distinguish the dictates of paffion from those of cool reason, and to perceive, that it is not

always

always fafe to rely upon the judgment of others.
By an im-
pulfe of nature, we venture to judge for ourselves, as we ven-
ture to walk by ourselves.

There is a strong analogy between the progrefs of the body from infancy to maturity, and the progress of all the powers of the mind. This progreffion in both is the work of nature, and in both may be greatly aided or hurt by proper education. It is natural to a man to be able to walk or run or leap; but if his limbs had been kept in fetters from his birth, he would have none of those powers. It is no lefs natural to a man trained in fociety, and accustomed to judge of his own actions and thofe of other men, to perceive a right and a wrong, an honourable and a base, in human conduct; and to fuch a man, I think, the principles of morals I have above mentioned will appear felf-evident. Yet there may be individuals of the human species fo little accustomed to think or judge of any thing, but of gratifying their animal appetites, as to have hardly any conception of right or wrong in conduct, or any moral judgment; as there certainly are some who have not the conceptions and the judgment neceffary to understand the axioms of geo

metry.

From the principles above mentioned, the whole fyftem of moral conduct follows fo eafily, and with fo little aid of reafoning, that every man of common understanding, who wishes to know his duty, may know it. The path of duty is a plain path, which the upright in heart can rarely mistake. Such it muft be, fince every man is bound to walk in it. There are fome intricate cafes in morals which admit of difputation; but these feldom occur in practice; and, when they do, the learned difputant has no great advantage: For the unlearned man, who uses the best means in his power to know his duty, and acts according to his knowledge, is inculpable in the fight of GoD and He may err, but he is not guilty of immorality. B b b 2

man.

CHAP.

СНАР. І.

CHAP. II.

IF

CHA P. II.

Of Syftems of Morals.

F the knowledge of our duty be so level to the apprehension
of all men, as has been reprefented in the laft chapter, it
may feem hardly to deferve the name of a science.
It may
feem that there is no need for instruction in morals.

From what cause then has it happened, that we have many large and learned fyftems of moral philofophy, and fyftems of natural jurifprudence, or the law of nature and nations; and that, in modern times, public profeffions have been instituted in most places of education for inftructing youth in these branches of knowledge?

This event, I think, may be accounted for, and the utility of fuch fyftems and profeffions juftified, without fuppofing any difficulty or intricacy in the knowledge of our duty.

I am far from thinking inftruction in morals unneceffary. Men may, to the end of life, be ignorant of felf-evident truths. They may, to the end of life, entertain grofs abfurdities. Experience fhews that this happens often in matters that are indifferent. Much more may it happen in matters where intereft, paffion, prejudice and fashion, are so apt to pervert the judgment.

The most obvious truths are not perceived without fome ripenefs of judgment. For we fee, that children may be made to believe any thing, though ever so abfurd. Our judgment of things is ripened, not by time only, but chiefly by being exercised about things of the fame or of a fimilar kind.

Judgment, even in things felf-evident, requires a clear, di

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ftinct and steady conception of the things about which we judge. Our conceptions are at first obscure and wavering. The habit of attending to them is necessary to make them distinct and steady; and this habit requires an exertion of mind to which many of our animal principles are unfriendly. The love of truth calls for it; but its still voice is often drowned by the louder call of fome paffion, or we are hindered from liftening to it by laziness and defultorinefs. Thus men often remain through life ignorant of things which they needed but to open their eyes to fee, and which they would have feen if their attention had been turned to them.

The most knowing derive the greatest part of their knowledge, even in things obvious, from inftruction and information, and from being taught to exercise their natural faculties, which, without inftruction, would lie dormant.

I am very apt to think, that, if a man could be reared from infancy, without any fociety of his fellow-creatures, he would hardly ever shew any fign, either of moral judgment, or of the power of reasoning. His own actions would be directed by his animal appetites and paffions, without cool reflection, and he would have no access to improve, by obferving the conduct of other beings like himself.

The power of vegetation in the feed of a plant, without heat and moisture, would for ever lie dormant. The rational and moral powers of man would perhaps lie dormant without instruction and example. Yet these powers are a part, and the nobleft part, of his conftitution; as the power of vegetation is of the feed.

Our first moral conceptions are probably got by attending coolly to the conduct of others, and obferving what moves our approbation, what our indignation. These fentiments spring

from

CHAP. II.

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