There is little reafon to fear, that the conduct of men, with CHAP. XI. regard to the concerns of the prefent life, will ever be much affected, either by the doctrine of neceffity, or by fcepticism. It were to be wished, that men's conduct, with regard to the concerns of another life, were in as little danger from thofe opinions.

In the present state, we see some who zealously maintain the doctrine of neceffity, others who as zealously maintain that of liberty. One would be apt to think, that a practical belief of these contrary systems fhould produce very different conduct in them that hold them; yet we see no fuch difference in the affairs of common life.

The fatalist deliberates, and refolves, and plights his faith. He lays down a plan of conduct, and profecutes it with vigour and industry. He exhorts and commands, and holds thofe to be answerable for their conduct to whom he hath committed any charge. He blames those that are falfe or unfaithful to him as other men do. He perceives dignity and worth in some characters and actions, and in others demerit and turpitude. He resents injuries, and is grateful for good offices.

If any man should plead the doctrine of neceffity to exculpate murder, theft, or robbery, or even wilful negligence in the discharge of his duty, his judge, though a fatalist, if he had common sense, would laugh at such a plea, and would not allow it even to alleviate the crime.

In all such cases, he fees that it would be abfurd not to act and to judge as thofe ought to do who believe themselves and other men to be free agents, juft as the fceptic, to avoid abfurdity, muft, when he goes into the world, act and judge like other men who are not sceptics.

CHAP. XI.

If the fatalist be as little influenced by the opinion of neceffity in his moral and religious concerns, and in his expectations concerning another world, as he is in the common affairs of life, his fpeculative opinion will probably do him little hurt. But, if he truft fo far to the doctrine of neceflity, as to indulge floth and inactivity in his duty, and hope to exculpate himself to his Maker by that doctrine, let him confider whether he suftains this excufe from his fervants and dependants, when they are negligent or unfaithful in what is committed to their charge.

Bishop BUTLER, in his Analogy, has an excellent chapter upon the opinion of neceffity confidered as influencing practice, which I think highly deserving the confideration of those who are inclined to that opinion.

ESSAY

MORALS, like

ORALS, like all other sciences, must have first principles, on which all moral reasoning is grounded.

In every branch of knowledge where difputes have been raised, it is useful to distinguish the first principles from the fuperftructure. They are the foundation on which the whole fabric of the science leans; and whatever is not fupported by this foundation can have no stability.

In all rational belief, the thing believed is either itself a first principle, or it is by juft reafoning deduced from first principles. When men differ about deductions of reasoning, the appeal must be to the rules of reasoning, which have been very unanimously fixed from the days of ARISTOTLE. But when they differ about a first principle, the appeal is made to another tribunal; to that of common sense.

How the genuine decifions of common fenfe may be distinguished from the counterfeit, has been confidered in effay fixth, on the Intellectual Powers of Man, chapter fourth, to which the reader is referred. What I would here observe is, That as first principles differ from deductions of reafoning in the nature

CHAP. I. of their evidence, and must be tried by a different standard when they are called in queftion, it is of importance to know to which of these two claffes a truth which we would examine, belongs. When they are not diftinguished, men are apt to demand proof for every thing they think fit to deny: And when we attempt to prove by direct argument, what is really felf-evident, the reafoning will always be inconclufive; for it will either take for granted the thing to be proved, or fomething not more evident; and fo, instead of giving ftrength to the conclufion, will rather tempt thofe to doubt of it, who never did fo before.

I propose, therefore, in this chapter, to point out fome of the first principles of morals, without pretending to a complete enu

meration.

The principles I am to mention, relate either to virtue in general, or to the different particular branches of virtue, or to the comparison of virtues where they seem to interfere.

1. There are fome things in human conduct, that merit approbation and praise, others that merit blame and punishment; and different degrees either of approbation or of blame, are due to different actions.

2. What is in no degree voluntary, can neither deserve moral approbation nor blame.

3. What is done from unavoidable neceffity may be agreeable or disagreeable, useful or hurtful, but cannot be the object either of blame or of moral approbation.

4. Men may be highly culpable in omitting what they ought

to have done, as well as in doing what they ought not.

5. We ought to use the best means we can to be well inform

ed

ed of our duty, by ferious attention to moral inftruction; by ob- CHAP. I. ferving what we approve, and what we difapprove, in other men, whether our acquaintance, or thofe whofe actions are recorded in history; by reflecting often, in a calm and difpaffionate hour, on our own paft conduct, that we may discern what was wrong, what was right, and what might have been better; by deliberating coolly and impartially upon our future conduct, as far as we can foresee the opportunities we may have of doing good, or the temptations to do wrong; and by having this principle deeply fixed in our minds, that as moral excellence is the true worth and glory of a man, fo the knowledge of our duty is to every man, in every station of life, the most important of all knowledge.

6. It ought to be our most serious concern to do our duty as far as we know it, and to fortify our minds against every temptation to deviate from it; by maintaining a lively sense of the beauty of right conduct, and of its present and future reward, of the turpitude of vice, and of its bad confequences here and hereafter; by having always in our eye the noblest examples; by the habit of fubjecting our paffions to the government of reason; by firm purposes and refolutions with regard to our conduct; by avoiding occafions of temptation when we can; and by imploring the aid of him who made us, in every hour of temptation.

These principles concerning virtue and vice in general, must appear felf-evident to every man who hath a confcience, and who hath taken pains to exercise this natural power of his mind. I proceed to others that are more particular.

1. We ought to prefer a greater good, though more diftant, to a lefs; and a lefs evil to a greater.

A regard to our own good, though we had no conscience, dictates

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