Again he fays, "That knowledge supposes an object, which, "in this cafe, does not exift." It is true that knowledge fuppofes an object, and every thing that is known is an object of knowledge, whether paft, prefent, or future, whether contingent or neceffary.

Upon the whole, the arguments I can find upon this point, bear no proportion to the confidence of the affertion, that there cannot be a greater abfurdity or contradiction, than that a contingent event fhould be the object of knowledge.

To thofe who, without pretending to fhew a manifest absurdity or contradiction in the knowledge of future contingent events, are still of opinion, that it is impoflible that the future free actions of man, a being of imperfect wisdom and virtue, fhould be certainly forcknown, I would humbly offer the following confiderations.

I. I grant that there is no knowledge of this kind in man ; and this is the cause that we find it fo difficult to conceive it in any other being.

All our knowledge of future events is drawn either from their neceffary connection with the prefent course of nature, or from their connection with the character of the agent that produces them. Our knowledge, even of those future events that neceffarily refult from the established laws of nature, is hypothetical. It fuppofes the continuance of those laws with which they are connected. And how long those laws may be continued, we have no certain knowledge. GOD only knows when the present course of nature fhall be changed, and therefore he only has certain knowledge even of events of this kind.

The character of perfect wifdom and perfect rectitude in the

Deity,

Deity gives us certain knowledge that he will always be true CHAP. X. in all his declarations, faithful in all his promises, and juft in all his difpenfations. But when we reason from the character of. men to their future actions, though, in many cafes, we have fuch probability as we reft upon in our most important worldly concerns, yet we have no certainty, because men are imperfect in wisdom and in virtue. If we had even the most perfect knowledge of the character and fituation of a man, this would not be fufficient to give certainty to our knowledge of his future actions; because, in fome actions, both good and bad men deviate from their general character.

The prefcience of the Deity, therefore, must be different not only in degree, but in kind, from any knowledge we can attain of futurity.

2. Though we can have no conception how the future free actions of men may be known by the Deity, this is not a sufficient reafon to conclude that they cannot be known. Do we know, or can we conceive, how God knows the fecrets of mens hearts? Can we conceive how God made this world without any pre-existent matter? All the ancient Philofophers believed this to be impoffible: And for what reafon but this, that they could not conceive how it could be done. Can we give any better reason for believing that the actions of men cannot be certainly foreseen?

3. Can we conceive how we ourselves have certain knowledge by those faculties with which GOD has endowed us? If any man thinks that he understands diftinctly how he is conscious of his own thoughts; how he perceives external objects by his fenfes ; how he remembers past events, I am afraid that he is not yet fo wife as to understand his own ignorance.

4. There feems to me to be a great analogy between the pre

gents.

CHAP. X. fcience of future contingents, and the memory of paft continWe poffefs the laft in fome degree, and therefore find no difficulty in believing that it may be perfect in the Deity. But the first we have in no degree, and therefore are apt to think it impoffible.

In both, the object of knowledge is neither what presently exists, nor has any neceflary connection with what presently exists. Every argument brought to prove the impoffibility of prescience, proves, with equal force, the impoffibility of memory. If it be true that nothing can be known to arife from what does exist, but what neceffarily arises from it, it must be equally true, that nothing can be known to have gone before what does exift, but what must neceffarily have gone before it. If it be true that nothing future can be known unless its neceffary cause exist at present, it must be equally true that nothing paft can be known unless something confequent, with which it is neceffarily connected, exist at present. If the fatalist should say, That past events are indeed neceffarily connected with the present, he will not furely venture to say, that it is by tracing this necessary connection, that we remember the past.

Why then should we think prefcience impoffible in the AImighty, when he has given us a faculty which bears a strong analogy to it, and which is no lefs unaccountable to the human understanding, than prefcience is. It is more reasonable, as well as more agreeable to the facred writings, to conclude with a pious father of the church, "Quocirca nullo modo cogimur, aut retentâ præfcientiâ DEI tollere voluntatis arbitrium, aut retento "voluntatis arbitrio, DEUM, quod nefas eft, negare præfcium fu66 turorum: Sed Sed utrumque amplectimur, utrumque fideliter et " veraciter confitemur: Illud ut bene credamus; hoc ut bene " vivamus." AUG.

CHA P.

A

CHA P. XI.

Of the Permiffion of Evil.

NOTHER ufe has been made of Divine prescience by the advocates for neceffity, which it is proper to consider before we leave this fubject.

It has been faid, "That all thofe confequences follow from "the Divine prescience which are thought most alarming in the "scheme of neceffity; and particularly GoD's being the proper "cause of moral evil. For, to fuppofe GOD to foresee and per"mit what it was in his power to have prevented, is the very "fame thing, as to fuppofe him to will, and directly to caufe "it. He diftinctly foresees all the actions of a man's life, and "all the confequences of them: If, therefore, he did not think any particular man and his conduct proper for his plan of "creation and providence, he certainly would not have in"troduced him into being at all."

In this reasoning we may obferve, that a fuppofition is made which feems to contradict itself.

That all the actions of a particular man should be distinctly foreseen, and, at the fame time, that that man fhould never be brought into exiftence, feems to me to be a contradiction: And the fame contradiction there is, in fuppofing any action to be diftinctly foreseen, and yet prevented. For, if it be foreseen, it fhall happen; and, if it be prevented, it shall not happen, and therefore could not be foreseen.

The knowledge here fuppofed is neither prescience nor science,

CHAP. XI.

CHAP. XI. but fomething very different from both. It is a kind of knowledge, which fome metaphyfical divines, in their controverfies about the order of the Divine decrees, a fubject far beyond the limits of human understanding, attributed to the Deity, and of which other divines denied the poffibility, while they firmly maintained the Divine prefcience.

It was called fcientia media, to distinguish it from prescience; and by this fcientia media was meant, not the knowing from eternity all things that fhall exift, which is prefcience, nor the knowing all the connections and relations of things that exist or may be conceived, which is fcience, but a knowledge of things contingent, that never did nor fhall exist. For instance, the knowing every action that would be done by a man who is barely conceived, and shall never be brought into existence.

Against the poffibility of the fcientia media arguments may be urged, which cannot be applied to prefcience. Thus it may be faid, that nothing can be known but what is true. It is true that the future actions of a free agent fhall exift, and therefore we fee no impoffibility in its being known that they shall exift: But with regard to the free actions of an agent that never did nor fhall exift, there is nothing true, and therefore nothing can be known. To say that the being conceived, would. certainly act in such a way, if placed in fuch a fituation, if it have any meaning, is to fay, That his acting in that way is the confequence of the conception; but this contradicts the fuppofition of its being a free action..

Things merely conceived have no relations or connections but fuch as are implied in the conception, or are confequent. from it. Thus I conceive two circles in the fame plane. If this be all I conceive, it is not true that these circles are equal. or unequal, because neither of these relations is implied in the conception; yet if the two circles really exifted, they must be

either