CHAP. IX. he has drawn very important confequences from this definition, which I am far from thinking this author will adopt.

Without repeating what I have before faid of caufes in the first of these Essays, and in the second and third chapters of this, I shall here mention fome of the confequences that may be justly deduced from this definition of a cause, that we may judge of it by its fruits.

First, It follows from this definition of a cause, that night is the cause of day, and day the cause of night. For no two things have more conftantly followed each other fince the beginning of the world.

Secondly, It follows from this definition of a cause, that, for what we know, any thing may be the cause of any thing, fince nothing is essential to a cause but its being conftantly followed by the effect. If this be so, what is unintelligent may be the cause of what is intelligent; folly may be the cause of wisdom, and evil of good; all reasoning from the nature of the effect to the nature of the caufe, and all reafoning from final caufes, must be given up as fallacious.

Thirdly, From this definition of a caufe, it follows, that we have no reason to conclude, that every event must have a cause: For innumerable events happen, when it cannot be fhewn that there were certain previous circumftances that have conftantly been followed by fuch an event. And though it were certain, that every event we have had access to observe had a cause, it would not follow, that every event must have a caufe: For it is contrary to the rules of logic to conclude, that, because a thing has always been, therefore it must be; to reafon from what is contingent, to what is necessary.

Fourthly, From this definition of a cause, it would follow, that

we

we have no reason to conclude that there was any caufe of the CHAP. IX.. creation of this world: For there were no previous circumstances that had been conftantly followed by fuch an effect. And, for the fame reason, it would follow from the definition, that whatever was fingular in its nature, or the first thing of its kind, could have no caufe.

Several of these confequences were fondly embraced by Mr HUME, as neceffarily following from his definition of a caufe, and as favourable to his fyftem of abfolute fcepticism. Thofe who adopt the definition of a caufe, from which they follow, chufe whether they will adopt its confequences, or fhew that they do not follow from the definition.

may

A fecond obfervation with regard to this argument is, That a definition of a cause may be given, which is not burdened with fuch untoward confecuences.

Why may not an efficient cause be defined to be a being that had power and will to produce the effect? The production of an effect requires active power, and active power, being a quality, must be in a being endowed with that power. Power without will produces no effect; but, where these are conjoined, the effect must be produced.

This, I think, is the proper meaning of the word cause, when it is used in metaphyfics; and particularly when we affirm, that every thing that begins to exift must have a caufe; and when, by reasoning, we prove, that there must be an eternal Firft Caufe of all things.

Was the world produced by previous circumftances which are conftantly followed by fuch an effect? or, Was it produced by a Being that had power to produce it, and willed its production?

CHAP. IX.

L

In natural philosophy, the word caufe is often used in a very different fense. When an event is produced according to a known law of nature, the law of nature is called the cause of that event. But a law of nature is not the efficient caufe of any event. It is only the rule, according to which the efficient cause acts. A law is a thing conceived in the mind of a rational being, not a thing that has a real existence; and, therefore, like a motive, it can neither act nor be acted upon, and confequently cannot be an efficient caufe. If there be no being that acts according to the law, it produces no effect.

This author takes it for granted, that every voluntary action of man was determined to be what it was by the laws of nature, in the fame sense as mechanical motions are determined by the laws of motion; and that every choice, not thus determined, "is "just as impoffible, as that a mechanical motion should depend upon no certain law or rule, or that any other effect should "exift without a caufe."

It ought here to be observed, that there are two kinds of laws, both very properly called laws of nature, which ought not to be confounded. There are moral laws of nature, and phyfical laws of nature. The firft are the rules which God has prefcribed to his rational creatures for their conduct. They respect voluntary and free actions only; for no other actions can be fubject to moral rules. These laws of nature ought to be always obeyed, but they are often tranfgreffed by men. There is therefore no impoffibility in the violation of the moral laws of nature, nor is fuch a violation an effect without a caufe. The tranfgreffor is the caufe, and is juftly accountable for it.

The phyfical laws of nature are the rules according to which the Deity commonly acts in his natural government of the world; and, whatever is done according to them, is not done by man, but by GoD, either immediately or by inftruments un

der

der his direction. These laws of nature neither reftrain the CHAP. IX. power of the Author of nature, nor bring him under any obligation to do nothing beyond their sphere. He has sometimes acted contrary to them, in the cafe of miracles, and perhaps often acts without regard to them, in the ordinary course of his providence. Neither miraculous events, which are contrary to the phyfical laws of nature, nor fuch ordinary acts of the Divine administration as are without their fphere, are impoffible, nor are they effects without a caufe. GOD is the cause of them, and to him only they are to be imputed.

That the moral laws of nature are often tranfgreffed by man, is undeniable. If the phyfical laws of nature make his obedience to the moral laws to be impoffible, then he is, in the literal sense, born under one law, bound unto another, which contradicts every notion of a righteous government of the world.

But though this fuppofition were attended with no fuch shocking consequence, it is merely a fuppofition; and until it be proved, that every choice or voluntary action of man is determined by the physical laws of nature, this argument for neceffity is only the taking for granted the point to be proved.

Of the fame kind is the argument for the impoffibility of liberty, taken from a balance, which cannot move but as it is moved by the weights put into it. This argument, though urged by almost every writer in defence of neceffity, is so pitiful, and has been so often answered, that it scarce deferves to be. mentioned.

Every argument in a dispute, which is not grounded on principles granted by both parties, is that kind of fophifin which logicians call petitio principii; and fuch, in my apprehenfion, are all the arguments offered to prove that liberty of action is impoffible.

CHAP. X.

It

may farther be observed, that every argument of this class, if it were really conclufive, muft extend to the Deity, as well as to all created beings; and neceffary existence, which has always been confidered as the prerogative of the Supreme Being, must belong equally to every creature and to every event, even the most trifling.

This I take to be the fyftem of SPINOSA, and of those among the ancients who carried fatality to the highest pitch.

I before referred the reader to Dr CLARKE's argument, which professes to demonstrate, that the First Cause is a free agent. Until that argument shall be shewn to be fallacious, a thing which I have not feen attempted, fuch weak arguments as have been brought to prove the contrary, ought to have little weight.

W

The fame Subject.

ITH regard to the fecond clafs of arguments for neceffity, which are intended to prove, that liberty of action would be hurtful to man, I have only to obferve, that it is a fact too evident to be denied, whether we adopt the system of liberty or that of neceffity, that men actually receive, hurt from ⚫their own voluntary actions, and from the yoluntary actions of other men ; nor can it be pretended, that this fact is inconsistent with the doctrine of liberty, or that it is more unaccountable upon this fyftem than upon that of neceffity.

In order, therefore, to draw any folid argument against liberty, from its hurtfulness, it ought to be proved, That, if man

were