CHAP. IV. ty than that of philosophy, and philosophy must strike fail to it, if she would not render herself contemptible to every man of common understanding.

For though, in matters of deep speculation, the multitude must be guided by Philofophers, yet, in things that are within the reach of every man's understanding, and upon which the whole conduct of human life turns, the Philofopher must follow the multitude, or make himself perfectly ridiculous.

Secondly, I obferve, that whether this popular opinion be true or false, it follows from mens having this opinion, that they have an idea of power. A falfe opinion about power, no less than a true, implies an idea of power; for how can men have any opinion, true or false, about a thing of which they have no idea?

The first of the very obvious principles which the author opposes to Mr LOCKE's account of the idea of power, is, That reafon alone can never give rise to any original idea.

This appears to me fo far from being a very obvious principle, that the contrary is very obvious.

Is it not our reafoning faculty that gives rife to the idea of reasoning itself? As our idea of fight takes its rife from our being endowed with that faculty; fo does our idea of reasoning. Do not the ideas of demonstration, of probability, our ideas of a fyllogifm, of major, minor and conclufion, of an enthymeme, dilemma, forites, and all the various modes of reasoning, take their rise from the faculty of reason? Or is it poffible, that a being, not endowed with the faculty of reasoning, should have these ideas? This principle, therefore, is so far from being obviously true, that it appears to be obviously falfe.

The

The Second obvious principle is, That reafon, as distinguished CHAP. IV. from experience, can never make us conclude, that a cause, or productive quality, is abfolutely requifite to every beginning of existence.

In fome Effays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, I had occafion to treat of this principle, That every change in nature must have a caufe; and, to prevent repetition, I beg leave to refer the reader to what is faid upon this fubject, Essay VI. chap. 6. I endeavoured to fhew that it is a first principle, evident to all men come to years of understanding. Befides its having been univerfally received, without the leaft doubt, from the beginning of the world, it has this fure mark of a first principle, that the belief of it is abfolutely necessary in the ordinary affairs of life, and, without it, no man could. act with common prudence, or avoid the imputation of infanity. Yet a Philofopher, who acted upon the firm belief of it every day of his life, thinks fit, in his clofet, to call it in queftion.

He infinuates here, that we may know it from experience. I endeavoured to fhew, that we do not learn it from experience, for two reafons.

Firft, Because it is a neceffary truth, and has always been received as a neceffary truth. Experience gives no information of what is neceffary, or of what must be.

We may know from experience, what is, or what was, and from that may probably conclude what shall be in like circumftances; but, with regard to what must neceffarily be, experience is perfectly filent.

Thus we know, by unvaried experience, from the beginning of the world, that the fun and stars rise in the east and set in the weft. But no man believes, that it could not poffibly have been.

otherwise,

CHAP. IV. otherwise, or that it did not depend upon the will and

power of him who made the world, whether the earth fhould revolve to the east or to the weft.

In like manner, if we had experience, ever so constant, that every change in nature we have obferved, actually had a cause, this might afford ground to believe, that, for the future, it shall be so; but no ground at all to believe that it must be so, and cannot be otherwise.

Another reason to fhew that this principle is not learned from experience is, That experience does not shew us a cause of one in a hundred of those changes which we observe, and therefore can never teach us that there must be a cause of all.

Of all the paradoxes this author has advanced, there is not one more shocking to the human understanding than this, That things may begin to exift without a caufe. This would put an end to all speculation, as well as to all the business of life. The employment of speculative men, fince the beginning of the world, has been to investigate the causes of things. What pity is it, they never thought of putting the previous question, Whether things have a cause or not? This question has at last been ftarted; and what is there fo ridiculous as not to be maintained by fome Philofopher?

Enough has been faid upon it, and more, I think, than it deferves. But, being about to treat of the active powers of the human mind, I thought it improper to take no notice of what has been said by fo celebrated a Philosopher, to shew, that there is not, in the human mind, any idea of power.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

CHA P. V.

Whether Beings that have no Will nor Understanding may have Active Power?

TH

HAT active power is an attribute, which cannot exift but in fome being poffeffed of that power, and the subject of that attribute, I take for granted as a felf-evident truth. Whether there can be active power in a subject which has no thought, no understanding, no will, is not fo evident.

The ambiguity of the words power, caufe, agent, and of all the words related to these, tends to perplex this question. The weakness of human understanding, which gives us only an indirect and relative conception of power, contributes to darken our reasoning, and should make us cautious and modeft in our determinations.

We can derive little light in this matter from the events which we obferve in the course of nature. We perceive changes innumerable in things without us. We know that those changes must be produced by the active power of fome agent; but we neither perceive the agent nor the power, but the change only. Whether the things be active, or merely paffive, is not easily dif covered. And though it may be an object of curiosity to the fpeculative few, it does not greatly concern the many.

To know the event and the circumftances that attended it, and to know in what circumstances like events may be expected, may be of confequence in the conduct of life; but to know the real efficient, whether it be matter or mind, whether of a fuperior or inferior order, concerns us little.

CHAP. V.

Thus it is with regard to all the effects we ascribe to na

ture.

Nature is the name we give to the efficient cause of innumerable effects which fall daily under our obfervation. But if it be afked what nature is? Whether the first univerfal caufe, or a fubordinate one, whether one or many, whether intelligent or unintelligent? Upon these points we find various conjectures and theories, but no folid ground upon which we can reft. And I apprehend the wisest men are they who are sensible that they know nothing of the matter.

From the course of events in the natural world, we have fufficient reason to conclude the existence of an eternal intelligent First Cause. But whether he acts immediately in the production of those events, or by fubordinate intelligent agents, or by inftruments that are unintelligent, and what the number, the nature, and the different offices of those agents or inftruments may be; these I apprehend to be myfteries placed beyond the limits of human knowledge. We fee an established order in the fucceffion of natural events, but we fee not the bond that connects them together.

Since we derive fo little light, with regard to efficient caufes and their active power, from attention to the natural world, let us next attend to the moral, I mean, to human actions and conduct.

Mr LOCKE observes very justly, "That, from the observa"tion of the operation of bodies by our senses, we have but a very imperfect obfcure idea of active power, fince they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action, "either of motion or thought." He adds, "That we find in "ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end several "actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a "thought