CHAP. VII.

The man who, in oppofition to ftrong temptation, by roble effort, maintains his integrity, is the happiest man on earth. The more fevere his conflict has been, the greater is his triumph. The consciousnefs of inward worth gives ftrength to his heart, and makes his countenance to fhine. Tempefts may beat and floods roar, but he ftands firm as a rock in the joy of a good confcience, and confidence of divine approbation.

To this I fhall only add, what every man's confcience dictates, That he who does his duty, from the conviction that it is right and honourable, and what he ought to do, acts from a nobler principle, and with more inward fatisfaction, than he who is bribed to do it, merely from the confideration of a reward present or future.

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CHA P. VIII.

Obfervations concerning Confcience.

SHALL now conclude this Effay with fome observations concerning this power of the mind which we call confcience, by which its nature may be better understood.

The first is, That, like all our other powers, it comes to maturity by infenfible degrees, and may be much aided in its ftrength and vigour by proper culture..

All the human faculties have their infancy and their state of maturity.

The faculties which we have in common with the brutes ap pear first, and have the quickest growth. In the first period of life, children are not capable of diftinguishing right from

wrong

wrong in human conduct; neither are they capable of abstract CHAP.VIIL reasoning in matters of fcience. Their judgment of moral conduct, as well as their judgment of truth, advances by infenfible degrees, like the corn and the grass.

In vegetables, firft the blade or the leaf appears, then the flower, and last of all the fruit, the nobleft production of the three, and that for which the others were produced. Thefe fucceed one another in a regular order. They require moisture and heat and air and fhelter to bring them to maturity,, and may be much improved by culture. According to the variations of foil, season and culture, fome plants are brought to much greater perfection than others of the fame fpecies. But no variation of culture or feafon or foil can make grapes grow from thorns, or figs from thistles.

We may obferve a fimilar progrefs in the faculties of the mind: For there is a wonderful analogy among all the works of GOD, from the leaft even to the greatest.

The faculties of man unfold themfelves in a certain order, appointed by the great Creator. In their gradual progress, they may be greatly affifted or retarded, improved or corrupted, by education, instruction, example, exercise, and by the fociety and conversation of men, which, like foil and culture in plants, may produce great changes to the better or to the worse.

But these means can never produce any new faculties, nor any other than were originally planted in the mind by the Author of nature. And what is common to the whole fpecies, in all the varieties of inftruction and education, of improvement and degeneracy, is the work of GOD, and not the operation of fecond caufes..

Such we may juftly account conscience, or the faculty of diftinguishing

CHAP.VIII. ftinguishing right conduct from wrong; fince it appears, and in all nations and ages, has appeared, in men that are come to maturity.

The feeds, as it were, of moral discernment are planted in the mind by him that made us. They grow up in their proper feason, and are at firft tender and delicate, and easily warped. Their progress depends very much upon their being duly cultivated and properly exercifed.

It is fo with the power of reasoning, which all acknowledge to be one of the most eminent natural faculties of man. It appears not in infancy. It fprings up, by infenfible degrees, as we grow to maturity. But its ftrength and vigour depend fo much upon its being duly cultivated and exercised, that we see many individuals, nay many nations, in which it is hardly to be perceived.

Our intellectual difcernment is not fo ftrong and vigorous by nature, as to secure us from errors in fpeculation. On the contrary, we see a great part of mankind, in every age, funk in grofs ignorance of things that are obvious to the more enlightened, and fettered by errors and falfe notions, which the human understanding, duly improved, eafily throws off.

It would be extremely abfurd, from the errors and ignorance of mankind, to conclude that there is no such thing as truth; or that man has not a natural faculty of difcerning it, and distinguishing it from error.

In like manner, our moral discernment of what we ought, and what we ought not to do, is not fo ftrong and vigorous by nature, as to fecure us from very grofs mistakes with regard to our duty.

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In matters of conduct, as well as in matters of fpeculation, CHAP.VIIL we are liable to be miffed by prejudices of education, or by wrong inftruction. But, in matters of conduct, we are alfo very liable to have our judgment warped by our appetites and paffions, by fashion, and by the contagion of evil example..

We must not therefore think, because man has the natural power of difcerning what is right and what is wrong, that he has no need of inftruction; that this power has no need of cultivation and improvement; that he may fafely rely upon the fuggeftions of his mind, or upon opinions he has got, he knows not how.

What should we think of a man who, because he has by nature the power of moving all his limbs, fhould therefore conclude that he needs not be taught to dance, or to fence, to ride, or to fwim? All these exercises are performed by that power of moving our limbs, which we have by nature; but they will be performed very awkwardly and imperfectly by those who have not been trained to them, and practifed in them.

What should we think of the man who, because he has the power by nature of diftinguishing what is true from what is false, should conclude that he has no need to be taught mathematics, or natural philofophy, or other sciences? It is by the natural power of human understanding that every thing in those fciences has been difcovered, and that the truths they contain are difcerned. But the understanding left to itself, without the aid of inftruction, training, habit, and exercise, would make very small progress, as every one fees, in perfons uninftructed in

those matters.

Our natural power of difcerning between right and wrong, needs the aid of inftruction, education, exercise, and habit, as well as our other natural powers.

There

CHAP.VIII.

There are perfons who, as the fcripture speaks, have, by reafon of use, their senses exercised to difcern both good and evil; by that means, they have a much quicker, clearer, and more certain judgment in morals than others.

The man who neglects the means of improvement in the knowledge of his duty, may do very bad things, while he follows the light of his mind. And though he be not culpable for acting according to his judgment, he may be very culpable for not using the means of having his judgment better informed.

It may be observed, That there are truths, both peculative and moral, which a man left to himself would never discover; yet, when they are fairly laid before him, he owns and adopts them, not barely upon the authority of his teacher, but upon their own intrinfic evidence, and perhaps wonders that he could be fo blind as not to see them before.

Like a man whose fon has been long abroad, and supposed dead. After many years the fon returns, and is not known by his father. He would never find that this is his fon. But, when he discovers himself, the father foon finds, by many circumftances, that this is his fon who was loft, and can be no other perfon.

When

Truth has an affinity with the human understanding, which error hath not. And right principles of conduct have an affinity with a candid mind, which wrong principles have not. they are fet before it in a juft light, a well difpofed mind recognifes this affinity, feels their authority, and perceives them to be genuine. It was this, I apprehend, that led PLATO to conceive that the knowledge we acquire in the prefent ftate, is only reminifcence of what, in a former ftate, we were acquainted with.

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