CHAP. V. 666 "touched with the images of right and wrong; and let his pre- What we call right and honourable in human conduct, was, by the ancients, called honeftum, Tò xaλòr; of which TULLY fays, "Quod vere dicimus, etiamfi a nullo laudetur, natura effe lauda"bile." All the ancient fects, except the Epicureans, diftinguished the boneftum from the utile, as we diftinguish what is a man's duty from what is his interest. The word officium, xalñxov, extended both to the boneftum and the utile: So that every reasonable action, proceeding either from a sense of duty or a fenfe of intereft, was called officium. It is defined by CICERO to be, " Id quod cur factum fit ratio "probabilis reddi poteft." We commonly render it by the word duty, but it is more extenfive; for the word duty, in the English language, I think, is commonly applied only to what the ancients called honeftum. CICERO, and PANETIUS before him, treating of offices, firft point out those that are grounded upon the boneftum, and next those that are grounded upon the utile. The most ancient philosophical fyftem concerning the principles of action in the human mind, and, I think, the most agreeable to nature, is that which we find in fome fragments of the ancient Pythagoreans, and which is adopted by PLATO, and explained in fome of his dialogues. According to this fyftem, there is a leading principle in the foul, foul, which, like the fupreme power in a commonwealth, has CHAP. V. authority and right to govern. This leading principle they called reafon. It is that which diftinguishes men that are adult from brutes, idiots and infants. The inferior principles, which are under the authority of the leading principle, are our paffions and appetites, which we have in common with the brutes. 66 CICERO adopts this system, and expreffes it well in few words. Duplex enim eft vis animorum atque naturæ. Una pars in appetitu pofita eft, quæ hominem huc et illuc rapit, quæ eft g græce, altera in ratione, quæ docet, et explanat quid faci"endum fugiendumve fit. Ita fit ut ratio præfit appetitus obtemperet." This divifion of our active principles can hardly indeed be accounted a discovery of philofophy, because it has been common to the unlearned in all ages of the world, and feems to be dictated by the common fenfe of mankind. What I would now observe concerning this common divifion of our active powers, is, that the leading principle, which is called reafon, comprehends both a regard to what is right and honourable, and a regard to our happiness upon the whole. Although these be really two diftinct principles of action, it is very natural to comprehend them under one name, because both are leading principles, both fuppofe the use of reason, and, when rightly understood, both lead to the fame course of life. They are like two fountains whofe ftreams unite and run in the fame channel. When a man, on one occafion, confults his real happiness in things not inconfiftent with his duty, though in opposition to the folicitation of appetite or paffion; and when, on another occafion, without any selfish confideration, he does what is right CHAP. V. and honourable, because it is fo; in both these cafes, he acts reasonably; every man approves of his conduct, and calls it reasonable, or according to reason. So that, when we speak of reason as a principle of action in man, it includes a regard both to the boneftum and to the utile. Both are combined under one name; and accordingly the dictates of both, in the Latin tongue, were combined under the name officium, and in the Greek under xaxov. If we examine the abftract notion of duty, or moral obligation, it appears to be neither any real quality of the action confidered by itself, nor of the agent confidered without refpect to the action, but a certain relation between the one and the other. When we fay a man ought to do fuch a thing, the ought, which expreffes the moral obligation, has a respect, on the one hand, to the person who ought, and, on the other, to the action which he ought to do. Those two correlates are effential to every moral obligation; take away either, and it has no exiftence. So that, if we feek the place of moral obligation among the categories, it belongs to the category of relation. There are many relations of things, of which we have the moft diftinct conception, without being able to define them logically. Equality and proportion are relations between quantities, which every man understands, but no man can define. Moral obligation is a relation of its own kind, which every man understands, but is perhaps too fimple to admit of logical definition. Like all other relations, it may be changed or annihilated by a change in any of the two related things, I mean the agent or the action. Perhaps Perhaps it may not be improper to point out briefly the cir- CHAP. V. cumftances, both in the action and in the agent, which are neceflary to constitute moral obligation. The univerfal agreement of men in these, fhews that they have one and the fame notion of it. With regard to the action, it must be a voluntary action, or preftation of the perfon obliged, and not of another. There can be no moral obligation upon a man to be six feet high. Nor can I be under a moral obligation that another person fhould do fuch a thing. His actions must be imputed to himself, and mine only to me, either for praise or blame. I need hardly mention, that a perfon can be under a moral obligation, only to things within the sphere of his natural power. As to the party obliged, it is evident, there can be no moral obligation upon an inanimate thing. To speak of moral obligation upon a stone or a tree is ridiculous, because it contradicts every man's notion of moral obligation. The person obliged must have understanding and will, and fome degree of active power. He must not only have the natural faculty of understanding, but the means of knowing his obligation. An invincible ignorance of this destroys all moral obligation. The opinion of the agent in doing the action gives it its moral denomination. If he does a materially good action, without any belief of its being good, but from fome other principle, it is no good action in him. And if he does it with the belief of its being ill, it is ill in him. Thus, if a man fhould give to his neighbour a potion which CHAP. V. he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves falutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poifoner, and not a benefactor, Thefe, qualifications of the action and of the agent, in moral obligation, are felf-evident; and the agreement of all men in them shows, that all men have the fame notion and a distinct notion of moral obligation. WE Of the Senfe of Duty. E are next to confider, how we learn to judge and determine, that this is right, and that is wrong. The abstract notion of moral good and ill would be of no use to direct our life, if we had not the power of applying it to particular actions, and determining what is morally good, and what is morally ill. Some Philofophers, with whom I agree, afcribe this to an original power or faculty in man, which they call the moral fenfe, the moral faculty, confcience. Others think, that our moral fentiments may be accounted for without fuppofing any original fenfe or faculty appropriated to that purpose, and go into very different fyftems to account for them. I am not, at prefent, to take any notice of those systems, because the opinion first mentioned feems to me to be the truth, to wit, That, by an original power of the mind, when we come to years of understanding and reflection, we not only have the notions |