our part well, and to do what is right, without the leaft concern CHAP. III. about things not in our power, which we ought, with perfect acquiefcence, to leave to the care of him who governs the world.

This noble and elevated conception of human wisdom and duty was taught by SOCRATES, free from the extravagancies which the Stoics afterwards joined with it. We fee it in the Alcibiades of PLATO; from which JUVENAL hath taken it in his tenth fatire, and adorned it with the graces of poetry.

Omnibus in terris quæ funt a gadibus ufque
Auroram et Gangen, pauci dignofcere poffunt
Vera bona, atque illis multum diversa, remotâ
Erroris nebulâ. Quid enim ratione timemus?
Aut cupimus? Quid tam dextera pede concupis ut te
Conatus non poeniteat, votique peracti?

Nil ergo optabunt homines? Si concilium vis,
Permittes ipfis expendere numinibus, quid
Conveniat nobis, rebufque fit utile noftris.
Nam pro jucundis aptiffima quæque dabunt Dii.
Charior eft illis homo quam fibi. Nos animorum
Impulfu, et cæca magnaque cupidine ducti,
Conjugium petimus, partumque uxoris; at illis
Notum qui pueri, qualifque futura fit uxor.
Fortem pofce animum, et mortis terrore carentem,
Qui fpatium vitæ extremum inter munera ponat
Naturæ ; qui ferre queat quofcunque labores,
Nefciat irafci, cupiat nihil, et potiores
HERCULIS ærumnas credat, fævofque labores
Et venere, et cœnis, et plumis, SARDANAPALI.
Monftro quid ipfe tibi poffis dare. Semita certe
Tranquillæ per virtutem patet unica vitæ.
Nullum numen abeft fi fit prudentia; fed te
Nos facimus fortuna Deam, coloque locamus.

CHAP. III.

Even HORACE, in his ferious moments, falls into this system.

Nil admirari, prope res eft una Numici,

Solaque quæ poffit facere et fervare beatum.

We cannot but admire the Stoical fyftem of morals, even when we think that, in fome points, it went beyond the pitch of human nature. The virtue, the temperance, the fortitude and magnanimity of fome who fincerely embraced it, amidst all the flattery of fovereign power and the luxury of a court, will be everlasting monuments to the honour of that fyftem, and to the honour of human nature.

That a due regard to what is beft for us upon the whole, in an enlightened mind, leads to the practice of every virtue, may be argued from confidering what we think beft for those for whom we have the strongest affection, and whofe good we tender as our own. In judging for ourselves, our paffions and appetites are apt to bias our judgment; but when we judge for others, this bias is removed, and we judge impartially.

What is it then that a wife man would wish as the greatest good to a brother, a fon, or a friend?

Is it that he may spend his life in a conftant round of the pleasures of fenfe, and fare fumptuously every day?

No, furely; we wish him to be a man of real virtue and worth. We may wish for him an honourable ftation in life; but only with this condition, that he acquit himself honourably in it, and acquire just reputation, by being useful to his country and to mankind. We would a thousand times rather with him honourably to undergo the labours of HERCULES, than to diffolve in pleasure with SARDANAPALUS.

Such

Such would be the with of every man of understanding for CHAP. III. the friend whom he loves as his own foul. Such things, therefore, he judges to be beft for him upon the whole; and if he judges otherwife for himself, it is only because his judgment is perverted by animal paffions and defires.

The fum of what has been faid in these three chapters amounts to this:

There is a principle of action in men that are adult and of a found mind, which, in all ages, has been called reafon, and fet in oppofition to the animal principles which we call the paffions. The ultimate object of this principle is what we judge to be good upon the whole. This is not the object of any of our animal principles, they being all directed to particular objects, without any comparison with others, or any confideration of their being good or ill upon the whole.

What is good upon the whole cannot even be conceived without the exercise of reason, and therefore cannot be an object to beings that have not fome degree of reafon.

As foon as we have the conception of this object, we are led, by our conftitution, to defire and pursue it. It justly claims a preference to all objects of pursuit that can come in competition with it. In preferring it to any gratification that opposes it, or in submitting to any pain or mortification which it requires, we act according to reafon; and every fuch action is accompanied with felf-approbation and the approbation of mankind. The contrary actions are accompanied with fhame and felf-condemnation in the agent, and with contempt in the spectator, as foolish and unreasonable.

The right application of this principle to our conduct requires an extensive prospect of human life, and a correct judg

CHAP. III ment and estimate of its goods and evils, with respect to their intrinfic worth and dignity, their conftancy and duration, and their attainableness. He must be a wife man indeed, if any fuch man there be, who can perceive, in every inftance, or even in every important inftance, what is beft for him upon the whole, if he have no other rule to direct his conduct.

However, according to the beft judgment which wife men have been able to form, this principle leads to the practice of every virtue. It leads directly to the virtues of prudence, temperance and fortitude. And, when we confider ourselves as focial creatures, whose happiness or mifery is very much connected with that of our fellow-men; when we confider, that there are many benevolent affections planted in our conftitution, whofe exertions make a capital part of our good and enjoyment; from these confiderations, this principle leads us also, though more indirectly, to the practice of juftice, humanity, and all the focial virtues.

It is true, that a regard to our own good cannot, of itself, produce any benevolent affection. But, if fuch affections be a part of our conftitution, and if the exercise of them make a capital part of our happiness, a regard to our own good ought to lead us to cultivate and exercise them, as every benevolent affection makes the good of others to be our own.

CHAP.

CHA P. IV.

Defects of this Principle.

AVING explained the nature of this principle of action,

HA

and fhewn in general the tenor of conduct to which it leads, I fhall conclude what relates to it, by pointing out fome of its defects, if it be fuppofed, as it has been by fome Philofophers, to be the only regulating principle of human conduct.

Upon that fuppofition, it would neither be a fufficiently plain rule of conduct, nor would it raise the human character to that degree of perfection of which it is capable, nor would it yield fo much real happiness as when it is joined with another rational principle of action, to wit, a difinterested regard to duty.

First, I apprehend the greater part of mankind can never attain fuch extenfive views of human life, and fo correct a judgment of good and ill, as the right application of this principle requires.

The authority of the poet before quoted is of weight in this point. "Pauci dignofcere poffunt vera bona, remotâ erroris ne"bulâ." The ignorance of the bulk of mankind concurs with the strength of their passions to lead them into error in this most important point.

Every man, in his calm moments, wishes to know what is best for him on the whole, and to do it. But the difficulty of difcovering it clearly, amidst such variety of opinions and the importunity of present defires, tempt men to give over the fearch, and to yield to the present inclination.

Though