CHAP. II. his away when All our power is, without doubt, derived from the Author of our being, and, as he gave gave it freely, he may take it he will. No man can be certain of the continuance of any of powers of body or mind for a moment; and, therefore, in every promise, there is a condition understood, to wit, if we live, if we retain that health of body and foundness of mind which is necessary to the performance, and if nothing happen, in the providence of GOD, which puts it out of our power. The rudeft favages are taught by nature to admit these conditions in all promises, whether they be expreffed or not; and no man is charged with breach of promife, when he fails through the failure of thefe conditions. It is evident, therefore, that, without the belief of fome active power, no honeft man would make a promise, no wise man would trust to a promife; and it is no less evident, that the belief of active power, in ourselves or in others, implies an idea or notion of active power. The fame reasoning may be applied to every instance wherein we give counsel to others, wherein we perfuade or command. As long, therefore, as mankind are beings who can deliberate and refolve and will, as long as they can give counsel, and exhort, and command, they must believe the existence of active power in themselves, and in others, and therefore must have a notion or idea of active power. It might farther be observed, that power is the proper and immediate object of ambition, one of the most universal paffions of the human mind, and that which makes the greatest figure in the history of all ages. Whether Mr HUME, in defence of his fyftem, would maintain that there is no fuch paffion in mankind as ambition, or that ambition is not a vehement defire of power, or that men may have a vehement defire of power, without having any idea of power, I will not pretend to divine. I cannot help repeating my apology for insisting so long in the CHAP. II. refutation of so great an absurdity. It is a capital doctrine in a late celebrated system of human nature, that we have no idea of power, not even in the Deity; that we are not able to difcover a single instance of it, either in body or spirit, either in fuperior or inferior natures; and that we deceive ourselves when we imagine that we are poffeffed of any idea of this kind. To fupport this important doctrine, and the out-works that are raised in its defence, a great part of the first volume of the Treatife of Human Nature is employed. That fyftem abounds with conclufions the most abfurd that ever were advanced by any Philofopher, deduced with great acuteness and ingenuity from principles commonly received by Philofophers. To reject fuch conclufions as unworthy of a hearing, would be disrespectful to the ingenious author; and to refute them is difficult, and appears ridiculous. It is difficult, because we can hardly find principles to reason from, more evident than those we wish to prove; and it appears ridiculous, because, as this author juftly observes, next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to prove it. Proteftants complain, with justice, of the hardship put upon them by Roman Catholics, in requiring them to prove that bread and wine is not flesh and blood. They have, however, submitted to this hardship for the fake of truth. I think it is no less hard to be put to prove that men have an idea of power. What convinces myself that I have an idea of power is, that I am confcious that I know what I mean by that word, and, while I have this consciousness, I difdain equally to hear arguments for or against my having fuch an idea. But if we would convince thofe, who, being led away by prejudice, or by autho CHAP. II. rity, deny that they have any fuch idea, we must condefcend to ufe fuch arguments as the subject will afford, and fuch as we should use with a man who should deny that mankind have any idea of magnitude or of equality. The arguments I have adduced are taken from these five topics: 1. That there are many things that we can affirm or deny concerning power, with understanding. 2. That there are, in all languages, words fignifying, not only power, but fignifying many other things that imply power, fuch as, action and passion, cause and effect, energy, operation, and others. 3. That in the structure of all languages, there is an active and paffive form in verbs and participles, and a different conftruction adapted to these forms, of which diversity no account can be given, but that it has been intended to distinguish action from paffion. 4. That there are many operations of the human mind familiar to every man come to the use of reason, and neceffary in the ordinary conduct of life, which imply a conviction of fome degree of power in ourselves and in others. 5. That the defire of power is one of the strongest paffions of human nature. TH CHA P. III. Of Mr Locke's Account of our Idea of Power. HIS author, having refuted the Cartefian doctrine of innate ideas, took up, perhaps too rafhly, an opinion that all our fimple ideas are got, either by sensation or by reflection; that is, by our external fenfes, or by consciousness of the operations of our own minds. Through the whole of his Effay, he fhews a fatherly affection to this opinion, and often strains very hard to reduce our fimple ideas to one of those sources, or both. Of this, several inftances instances might be given, in his account of our idea of fub- CHAP. III. ftance, of duration, of perfonal identity. Omitting these, as foreign to the prefent fubject, I fhall only take notice of the account he gives of our idea of power. The fum of it is, That obferving, by our fenfes, various. changes in objects, we collect a poffibility in one object to be changed, and in another a poffibility of making that change, and fo come by that idea which we call power.. Thus we fay the fire has a power to melt gold, and gold has power to be melted; the first he calls active, the second paffive power. He thinks, however, that we have the moft diftinct notion of active power, by attending to the power which we ourselves exert, in giving motion to our bodies when at reft, or in directing our thoughts to this or the other object as we will. And this way of forming the idea of power he attributes to reflection, as he refers the former to fenfation. On this account of the origin of our idea of power, I would beg leave to make two remarks, with the respect that is most justly due to so great a Philosopher, and so good a man. 1. Whereas he diftinguishes power into active and passive, I conceive paffive power is no power at all. He means by it, the poffibility of being changed. To call this power, feems to be a mifapplication of the word. I do not remember to have met with the phrase passive power in any other good author. Mr LOCKE feems to have been unlucky in inventing it; and it deferves not to be retained in our language. Perhaps he was unwarily led into it, as an oppofite to active power. But I conceive we call certain powers active, to diftin CHAP. III. guish them from other powers that are called fpeculative. As all mankind distinguish action from speculation, it is very proper to distinguish the powers by which those different operations are performed, into active and speculative. Mr LOCKE indeed acknowledges that active power is more properly called power; but I fee no propriety at all in paffive power; it is a powerlefs power, and a contradiction in terms. 2. I would observe, that Mr LOCKE feems to have impofed upon himself, in attempting to reconcile this account of the idea of power to his favourite doctrine, That all our fimple ideas are ideas of fenfation, or of reflection. There are two steps, according to his account, which the mind takes, in forming this idea of power; first, It observes changes in things; and, fecondly, From these changes, it infers a cause of them, and a power to produce them. If both these fteps are operations of the external fenfes, or of consciousness, then the idea of power may be called an idea of fenfation, or of reflection. But, if either of those steps requires the co-operation of other powers of the mind, it will follow, that the idea of power cannot be got by fenfation, nor by reflection, nor by both together. Let us, therefore, confider each of these steps by itself. First, We observe various changes in things. And Mr LOCKE takes it for granted, that changes in external things are obferved by our fenfes, and that changes in our thoughts are observed by consciousness. I grant that it may be faid, that changes in things are obferved by our fenfes, when we do not mean to exclude every other faculty from a share in this operation. And it would be ridiculous to cenfure the phrase, when it is so used in popular discourse. But |