CHAP. II. on the whole, and to avoid what is ill upon the whole, is a rational principle of action, grounded upon our constitution as reasonable creatures.

It appears that it is not without just cause, that this principle of action has in all ages been called reafon, in oppofition to our animal principles, which in common language are called by the general name of the paffions.

The first not only operates in a calm and cool manner, like reason, but implies real judgment in all its operations. The fecond, to wit, the paffions, are blind defires of some particular object, without any judgment or confideration, whether it be good for us upon the whole, or ill.

It appears alfo, that the fundamental maxim of prudence, and of all good morals, That the paffions ought, in all cafes, to be under the dominion of reafon, is not only felf-evident, when rightly understood, but is expreffed according to the common use and propriety of language.

The contrary maxim maintained by Mr HUME, can only be defended by a gross and palpable abuse of words. For, in order to defend it, he must include under the paffions, that very principle which has always, in all languages, been called reafon, and never was, in any language, called a paffion. And from the meaning of the word reason he muft exclude the most important part of it, by which we are able to difcern and to pursue what appears to be good upon the whole. And thus, including the most important part of reafon under paffion, and making the least important part of reason to be the whole, he defends his favourite paradox, That reason is, and ought to be, the servant of the par

fions.

To judge of what is true or falfe in fpeculative points, is the

office

office of speculative reason; and to judge of what is good or ill CHAP. IL for us upon the whole, is the office of practical reafon. Of true and falfe there are no degrees; but of good and ill there are many degrees, and many kinds; and men are very apt to form erroneous opinions concerning them; mifled by their passions, by the authority of the multitude, and by other caufes.

Wise men, in all ages, have reckoned it a chief point of wifdom, to make a right estimate of the goods and evils of life. They have laboured to discover the errors of the multitude on this important point, and to warn others against them.

The ancient moralifts, though divided into fects, all agreed in this, That opinion has a mighty influence upon what we commonly account the goods and ills of life, to alleviate or to aggravate them.

The Stoics carried this fo far, as to conclude that they all depend on opinion. Πάντα Ὑπόληψις was a favourite maxim with them.

We fee, indeed, that the fame ftation or condition of life, which makes one man happy, makes another miserable, and to a third is perfectly indifferent. We fee men miserable through life, from vain fears, and anxious defires, grounded folely upon wrong opinions. We fee men wear themselves out with toilfome days, and fleepless nights, in pursuit of fome object which they never attain; or which, when attained, gives little fatisfaction, perhaps real difguft.

The evils of life, which every man muft feel, have a very different effect upon different men. What finks one into despair and abfolute misery, rouses the virtue and magnanimity of another, who bears it as the lot of humanity, and as the discipline

of

CHAP. II. of a wife and merciful father in heaven. He rifes fuperior to adverfity, and is made wifer and better by it, and confequently happier.

It is therefore of the last importance, in the conduct of life, to have just opinions with respect to good and evil; and furely it is the province of reafon to correct wrong opinions, and to lead us into those that are juft and true.

It is true indeed, that men's passions and appetites, too often, draw them to act contrary to their cool judgment and opinion of what is beft for them. Video meliora proboque, deteriora fequor, is the cafe in every wilful deviation from our true interest and our duty.

When this is the cafe, the man is felf-condemned, he fees that he acted the part of a brute, when he ought to have acted the part of a man. He is convinced that reafon ought to have reftrained his paffion, and not to have given the rein to it.

When he feels the bad effects of his conduct, he imputes them to himself, and would be ftung with remorfe for his folly, though he had no account to make to a fuperior being. He has finned against himself, and brought upon his own head the punishment which his folly deserved.

From this we may fee, that this rational principle of a regard to our good upon the whole, gives us the conception of a right and a wrong in human conduct, at least of a wife and a foolish It produces a kind of felf-approbation, when the paffions and appetites are kept in their due fubjection to it; and a kind of remorfe and compunction, when it yields to them.

In these refpects, this principle is fo fimilar to the moral prin

ciple,

ciple, or confcience, and fo interwoven with it, that both are commonly comprehended under the name of reason. This fimilarity led many of the ancient Philofophers, and fome among the moderns, to refolve confcience, or a fenfe of duty, entirely into a regard to what is good for us upon the whole.

That they are diftinct principles of action, though both lead to the fame conduct in life, I fhall have occafion to fhew, when I come to treat of conscience.

CHAP. III.

IT

CHA P. III.

The Tendency of this Principle.

T has been the opinion of the wifeft men, in all ages, that this principle, of a regard to our good upon the whole, in a man duly enlightened, leads to the practice of every virtue.

This was acknowledged, even by EPICURUS; and the best moralists among the ancients derived all the virtues from this principle. For, among them, the whole of morals was reduced to this question, What is the greatest good? Or what course of conduct is best for us upon the whole?

In order to refolve this question, they divided goods into three claffes, the goods of the body; the goods of fortune, or external goods, and the goods of the mind; meaning, by the laft, wisdom and virtue.

Comparing thefe different claffes of goods, they fhewed, with convincing evidence, that the goods of, the mind are, in many respects, fuperior to those of the body and of fortune, not only as they have more dignity, are more durable, and less expofed

to

CHAP. III. to the ftrokes of fortune, but chiefly as they are the only goods in our power, and which depend wholly on our conduct.

EPICURUS himfelf maintained, that the wife man may be happy in the tranquillity of his mind, even when racked with pain, and struggling with adversity.

They obferved very justly, that the goods of fortune, and even those of the body, depend much on opinion; and that, when our opinion of them is duly corrected by reafon, we shall find them of small value in themselves.

How can he be happy who places his happiness in things which it is not in his power to attain, or in things from which, when attained, a fit of fickness, or a ftroke of fortune, may tear him afunder.

The value we put upon things, and our uneafiness in the want of them, depend upon the ftrength of our defires; correct the defire, and the ureafinefs ceafes.

The fear of the evils of body and of fortune, is often a greater evil than the things we fear. As the wife man moderates his defires by temperance, fo, to real or imaginary dangers, he opposes the fhield of fortitude and magnanimity, which raifes him above himself, and makes him happy and triumphant in thofe moments wherein others are most miserable.

These oracles of reafon led the Stoics fo faras to maintain, That all defires and fears, with regard to things not in our power, ought to be totally eradicated; that virtue is the only good; that what we call the goods of the body and of fortune, are really things indifferent, which may, according to circumstances, prove good or ill, and therefore have no intrinfic goodnefs in themselves; that our fole business ought to be, to act

our