CHAP.VIII. between an army properly trained, and a militia haftily drawn out of the multitude? What fhould hinder us from thinking, that, for every purpose of civil government, there may be a like difference between a civil fociety properly trained to virtue, good habits and right fentiments, and thofe civil focieties which we now behold? But I fear I fhall be thought to digress from my fubject into Utopian fpeculation.

To make an end of what I have to fay upon the animal principles of action, we may take a complex view of their effect in life, by fuppofing a being actuated by principles of no higher order, to have no confcience or sense of duty, only let us allow him that fuperiority of understanding, and that power of selfgovernment which man actually has. Let us fpeculate a little upon this imaginary being, and confider what conduct and tenor of action might be expected from him.

It is evident he would be a very different animal from a brute, and perhaps not very different, in appearance, from what a great part of mankind is.

He would be capable of confidering the diftant consequences of his actions, and of reftraining or indulging his appetites, defires and affections, from the confideration of diftant good or evil.

He would be capable of chufing fome main end of his life, and planning such a rule of conduct as appeared moft fubfervient to it. Of this we have reason to think no brute is capable.

We can perhaps conceive fuch a balance of the animal principles of action, as, with very little felf-government, might make a man to be a good member of fociety, a good companion, and to have many amiable qualities.

The

The balance of our animal principles, I think, conftitutes CHAP.VIII. what we call a man's natural temper; which may be good or bad, without regard to his virtue.

A man in whom the benevolent affections, the defire of esteem and good humour are naturally prevalent, who is of a calm and difpaffionate nature, who has the good fortune to live with good men, and associate with good companions, may behave properly with little effort.

His natural temper leads him, in most cases, to do what virtue requires. And if he happens not to be exposed to those trying fituations, in which virtue croffes the natural bent of his temper, he has no great temptation to act amifs.

But perhaps a happy natural temper, joined with fuch a happy fituation, is more ideal than real, though no doubt fome men make nearer approaches to it than others.

The temper and the fituation of men is commonly fuch, that the animal principles alone, without felf-government, would never produce any regular and confiftent train of conduct.

One principle croffes another. Without self-government, that which is strongest at the time will prevail. And that which is weakest at one time may, from paflion, from a change of difpofition or of fortune, become strongest at another time.

Every natural appetite, defire and affection, has its own prefent gratification only in view. A man, therefore, who has no other leader than these, would be like a ship in the ocean without hands, which cannot be said to be destined to any port. He would have no character at all, but be benevolent or fpiteful, pleasant or morose, honeft or dishonest, as the prefent wind of passion or tide of humour moved him.

CHAP.VIII.

Every man who pursues an end, be it good or bad, must be active when he is difpofed to be indolent; he must rein every passion and appetite that would lead him out of his road.

Mortification and self-denial are found not in the path of virtue only, they are common to every road that leads to an end, be it ambition, or avarice, or even pleasure itself. Every man who maintains an uniform and confiftent character, muft fweat and toil, and often struggle with his present inclination.

Yet those who steadily purfue fome end in life, though they must often restrain their strongest defires, and practise much felf-denial, have, upon the whole, more enjoyment than those who have no end at all, but to gratify the prefent prevailing inclination.

A dog that is made for the chafe, cannot enjoy the happiness of a dog without that exercise. Keep him within doors, feed him with the moft delicious fare, give him all the pleasures his nature is capable of, he foon becomes a dull, torpid, unhappy animal. No enjoyment can fupply the want of that employment which nature has made his chief good. Let him hunt, and neither pain nor hunger nor fatigue seem to be evils. Deprived of this exercife, he can relifh nothing. Life itfelf becomes burdenfome.

It is no difparagement to the human kind to fay, that man, as well as the dog, is made for hunting, and cannot be happy but in fome vigorous purfuit. He has indeed nobler game to pursue than the dog, but he must have fome purfuit, otherwise life stagnates, all the faculties are benumbed, the spirits flag, and his existence becomes an unfupportable burden.

Even the mere foxhunter, who has no higher purfuit than his dogs, has more enjoyment than he who has no pursuit at all.

He

He has an end in view, and this invigorates his fpirits, makes CHAP.VIII. him defpife pleasure, and bear cold, hunger and fatigue, as if

they were no evils.

Manet fub Jove frigido

Venator, teneræ conjugis immemor,

Seu vifa eft catulis cerva fidelibus

Seu rupit teretes marfus aper plagas.

ME

There are Rational Principles of Action in Man.

ECHANICAL principles of action produce their effect without any will or intention on our part. We may, by a voluntary effort, hinder the effect; but if it be not hindered by will and effort, it is produced without them.

Animal principles of action require intention and will in their operation, but not judgment. They are, by ancient moralifts, very properly called caca cupidines, blind defires.

Having treated of these two claffes, I proceed to the third, the rational principles of action in man; which have that name, because they can have no existence in beings not endowed with reason, and, in all their exertions, require, not only intention and will, but judgment or reafon.

That

CHAP. I.

That talent which we call reafon, by which men that are adult and of a found mind, are diftinguished from brutes, idiots, and infants, has, in all ages, among the learned and unlearned, been conceived to have two offices, to regulate our belief, and to regulate our actions and conduct.

Whatever we believe, we think agreeable to reafon, and, on that account, yield our affent to it. Whatever we disbelieve, we think contrary to reason, and, on that account, diffent from it. Reason therefore is allowed to be the principle by which our belief and opinions ought to be regulated.

But reafon has been no less universally conceived to be a principle, by which our actions ought to be regulated.

To act reasonably, is a phrafe no less common in all languages, than to judge reasonably. We immediately approve of a man's conduct, when it appears that he had good reason for what he did. And every action we difapprove, we think unreasonable, or contrary to reafon.

A way of speaking fo univerfal among men, common to the learned and the unlearned in all nations, and in all languages, must have a meaning. To fuppofe it to be words without meaning, is to treat, with undue contempt, the common sense of mankind.

Suppofing this phrase to have a meaning, we may confider in what way reason may ferve to regulate human conduct, fo that some actions of men are to be denominated reasonable, and others unreasonable.

I take it for granted, that there can be no exercise of reason without judgment, nor, on the other hand, any judgment of things, abstract and general, without fome degree of reason.