must be admitted; but I think the conclufion not justly drawn CHAP. II. from it, for the following reafons :

1. It seems contrary to reafon, to attribute to chance or accident, what is fubject to rules, even though there may be exceptions to the rule. The exceptions may, in fuch a cafe, be attributed to accident, but the rule cannot. There is perhaps hardly any thing in language fo general, as not to admit of exceptions. It cannot be denied to be a general rule, that verbs and participles have an active and a paffive voice; and as this is a general rule, not in one language only, but in all the languages we are acquainted with, it fhews evidently that men, in the earliest stages, and in all periods of fociety, have distinguished action from paffion.

2. It is to be obferved, that the forms of language are often applied to purposes different from those for which they were originally intended. The varieties of a language, even the most perfect, can never be made equal to all the variety of human conceptions. The forms and modifications of language must be confined within certain limits, that they may not exceed the capacity of human memory. Therefore, in all languages, there must be a kind of frugality ufed, to make one form of expreffion serve many different purposes, like Sir Hudibras' dagger, which, though made to ftab or break a head, wa. put to many other ufes. Many examples might be produced of this frugality in language. Thus the Latins and Greeks had five or fix cafes of nouns, to exprefs the various relations that one thing could bear to another. The genitive cafe must have been at first intended to exprefs fome one capital relation, such as that of poffeffion or of property; but it would be very difficult to enumerate all the relations which, in the progrefs of language, it was used to exprefs. The fame obfervation may be applied to other cafes of nouns.

The

CHAP. II.

The flighteft fimilitude or analogy is thought fufficient to juftify the extension of a form of speech beyond its proper meaning, whenever the language does not afford a more proper form. In the moods of verbs, a few of those which occur most frequently are distinguished by different forms, and these are made to fupply all the forms that are wanting. The fame obfervation may be applied to what is called the voices of verbs. An active and a paffive are the capital ones; fome languages have more, but no language fo many as to answer to all the variations of human thought. We cannot always coin new ones, and therefore must use fome one or other of those that are to be found in the language, though at first intended for another purpose.

3. A third obfervation in answer to the objection is, That we can point out a cause of the frequent misapplication of active verbs, to things which have no proper activity: A cause which extends to the greater part of such misapplications, and which confirms the account I have given of the proper intention of active and paffive verbs.

As there is no principle, that appears to be more universally acknowledged by mankind, from the first dawn of reason, than, that every change we observe in nature must have a caufe; fo this is no fooner perceived, than there arises in the human mind, a strong defire to know the causes of thofe changes that fall within our obfervation. Felix qui potuit rerum cognofcere caufas, is the voice of nature in all men. Nor is there any thing that more early diftinguishes the rational from the brute creation, than this avidity to know the causes of things, of which I fee no fign in bruteanimals.

It must surely be admitted, that in those periods wherein languages are formed, men are but poorly furnished for carrying on this investigation with fuccefs. We fee, that the experience of thousands of years is neceffary to bring men into the right track

in this investigation, if indeed they can yet be faid to be brought CHAP. II. into it. What innumerable errors rude ages muft fall into, with regard to causes, from impatience to judge, and inability to judge right, we may conjecture from reason, and may fee from experience; from which I think, it is evident, that fuppofing active verbs to have been originally intended to express what is properly called action, and their nominatives to exprefs the agent; yet, in the rude and barbarous state wherein languages are formed, there must be innumerable misapplications of fuch verbs and nominatives, and many things spoken of as active, which have no real activity.

To this we may add, that it is a general prejudice of our early years, and of rude nations, when we perceive any thing to be changed, and do not perceive any other thing which we can believe to be the cause of that change, to impute it to the thing itself, and conceive it to be active and animated, fo far as to have the power of producing that change in itself. Hence, to a child, or to a favage, all nature seems to be animated; the fea, the earth, the air, the fun, moon, and stars, rivers, fountains and groves, are conceived to be active and animated beings. As this is a fentiment natural to man in his rude state, it has, on that account, even in polished nations, the verifimilitude that is required in poetical fiction and fable, and makes personification one of the most agreeable figures in poetry and eloquence.

The origin of this prejudice probably is, that we judge of other things by ourselves, and therefore are difpofed to afcribe to them that life and activity which we know to be in ourselves.

A little girl afcribes to her doll, the paffions and sentiments she feels in herself. Even brutes feem to have fomething of this nature. A young cat, when the fees any brisk motion in a feather or a straw, is prompted, by natural instinct, to hunt it as fhe would hunt a mouse.

CHAP. II.

Whatever be the origin of this prejudice in mankind, it has a powerful influence upon language, and leads men, in the ftructure of language, to ascribe action to many things that are merely paffive; because, when fuch forms of speech were invented, those things were really believed to be active. Thus we say, the wind blows, the fea rages, the fun rifes and fets, bodies gravitate and

move.

When experience discovers that these things are altogether inactive, it is easy to correct our opinion about them; but it is not fo eafy to alter the established forms of language. The most perfect and the most polished languages are like old furniture, which is never perfectly fuited to the present taste, but retains. fomething of the fashion of the times when it was made..

Thus, though all men of knowledge believe, that the fucceffion of day and night is owing to the rotation of the earth round its axis, and not to any diurnal motion of the heavens; yet we find ourselves under a neceffity of speaking in the old style, of the fun's rifing and going down, and coming to the meridian.. And this ftyle is used, not only in converfing with the vulgar, but when men of knowledge converfe with one another. And if we fhould fuppofe the vulgar to be at last so far enlightened, as to have the fame belief with the learned, of the cause of day and night, the fame ftyle would ftill be ufed.

From this inftance we may learn, that the language of mankind may furnish good evidence of opinions which have been early and univerfally entertained, and that the forms contrived for expreffing such opinions, may remain in use after the opinions which gave rife to them have been greatly changed.

Active verbs appear plainly to have been first contrived to exprefs action. They are ftill in general applied to this purpose. And though we find many inftances of the application of active

verbs

verbs to things which we now believe not to be active, this CHAP. II. ought to be ascribed to mens having once had the belief that thofe things are active, and perhaps, in fome cafes, to this, that forms of expreffion are commonly extended, in courfe of time, beyond their original intention, either from analogy, or because more proper forms for the purpose are not found in language.

Even the misapplication of this notion of action and active power shews that there is fuch a notion in the human mind, and shews the neceffity there is in philofophy of distinguishing the proper application of these words, from the vague and improper application of them, founded on common language, or on popular prejudice.

Another argument to fhew that all men have a notion or idea of active power is, that there are many operations of mind common to all men who have reason, and neceffary in the ordinary conduct of life, which imply a belief of active power in our

selves and in others.

All our volitions and efforts to act, all our deliberations, our purposes and promises, imply a belief of active power in our selves; our counsels, exhortations and commands, imply a belief of active power in those to whom they are addreffed.

If a man should make an effort to fly to the moon; if he should even deliberate about it, or refolve to do it, we fhould conclude him to be lunatic; and even lunacy would not account for his conduct, unless it made him believe the thing to be in his power.

If a man promises to pay me a fum of money to-morrow, without believing that it will then be in his power, he is not an honeft man; and, if I did not believe that it will then be in his power, I should have no dependence on his promise.