THE BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE OF

LORDS.

As one of the chief privileges of an Englishman is said to be that of grumbling and airing a grievance, I venture to exercise my national rights on behalf of a class who, though small in number, may perhaps claim the same consideration shown to many others of an equally deserving character, and who, I make bold to think, are somewhat hardly dealt with; and these are the junior members of that august body, the House of Lords, which has at various times excited the admiration and ridicule of this free and enlightened country.

When the British public unfolds its daily newspaper, and turns with respectful admiration to the report of the doings of the Imperial Parliament the night before, it generally is informed that while the Speaker of the House of Commons took the chair 'shortly before four o'clock,' and continued in that exalted, but it is to be feared somewhat tedious, position until probably about two the next morning, their lordships,' strange to relate, having begun by installing the Lord Chancellor on his woolsack at five o'clock, adjourned at 5.20, or it may be 5.25 in busy times, having actually sat fully a quarter of an hour, or even twenty minutes! Thank God, we have a House of Lords,' will no doubt be the ejaculation of the pious at this announcement.

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But the intelligent householder, if he turns to another column of his cheap daily press,' may be often somewhat surprised to see a considerable amount of complaint expressed at the way in which Parliament is overworked, that there is really no time for the consideration of many important measures year by year, and that the progress of useful legislation is seriously impeded; and the question naturally arises: Why is all the work laid exclusively on one House, while the other House never seems to do anything?' And again: 'What is the use of a House which practically but seldom sits, in which very few of its members ever attend, or, if they do attend, do anything?'

To answer these inquiries, we must glance for a moment at the method of conducting what business there is in the Upper House. The sittings for public business may be divided into three classes:—

1. Sittings when there is no business.

2. Sittings for business of moderate importance.

3. Sittings for business of extreme importance.

Now the first of these speaks for itself. All that need be mentioned is that a very large majority of the sittings fall under this head, and thus tend to facilitate description.

The last description of business is necessarily undertaken by the chiefs on each side of the House. Debates on such subjects as the Eastern Question, the Berlin Treaty, &c., are necessarily confined in very great measure to scientific experts-such as the Ministry of the day who are behind the scenes, and their chief opponents who were lately in office themselves-and do not afford easy material for outsiders or junior members. It is perhaps on the whole a good thing that private members of the House of Lords do not interfere in these very important questions, as it tends to save time; and in fact, when the leading men have spoken out without the fear of constituents before their eyes, there is really very little more to be said that will be for the public benefit. But surely this is no reason why junior members (and when I use this expression I do not necessarily mean those who are young in years, but those who are not in the Government or on the front Opposition benches) should be almost entirely excluded, and that in a somewhat arbitrary manner, from taking part in any public business whatever.

If we turn to the second or intermediate class of business mentioned above, we shall see what opportunities are here afforded for outside members to play a useful part. This class would include the discussion of such measures as Army Reform, Local Government, the higher branches of railway business, and similar questions affecting home government, &c., of great importance in themselves, but which might easily and usefully be discussed by independent as well as official peers, and would moreover give the former excellent opportunities of training themselves for useful public men. But it so happens in this case that the time is too short, the duration of the sitting being regulated absolutely by the witching hour of dinner, so that, when the chief men have said their say, the House begins gradually but surely to thin; and if an unfortunate outsider gets up to make any remarks, he enjoys the double advantage of speaking to an empty House and upon an empty stomach.

But this is not all. It seems to be the invariable practice of the Government to put every possible spoke in the wheel of a young ambitious member. I do not hesitate to say that if a young man gets up in the House to speak, he is deliberately discouraged and given plainly to understand that he is a meddlesome intruder and had better not take such a liberty again; and no Government has exercised this constitutional rule to a greater extent than the present one.

This feeling was pretty conclusively shown not long since. A

motion was brought forward during last Session by a peer on the Conservative benches that the House should sit at four o'clock instead of five, so as to give more time for the discussion before dinner of business such as we are now considering; and this naturally led to the consideration of the opportunities afforded to junior members of the House for taking a part in public affairs, which was indeed admittedly the whole point of the debate. It was shown to demonstration that the opportunities afforded were almost nil, and that, on the other hand, every discouragement was given to these men. The Government 'exerted their matchless powers of ridicule' on the subject, and it was said that in society we might frequently see young peers late for dinner, and that therefore they might and did take their part in public business (loud cheers). The Liberals then got up one after the other, headed by their leader, and almost unanimously supported the motion (proposed by a Conservative). You are quite right,' said they; the way in which young members are treated is notorious. Not only is there no encouragement given to them, but, even if they do get up, their interference is hailed as an unwarrantable intrusion.' So strong was the feeling that if the matter had been pressed to a division, which unfortunately it was not, the Government would have been notoriously and deservedly beaten.

Contrast this practice with that which obtains in the House of Commons. There a new member is always given a fair chance to start with, and facilities are afforded him on his entrance into public life, on whichever side of the House he may sit. When he rises to speak for the first time, he is invariably given a fair and patient hearing. Of course, if he neglects his opportunities and does not come up to the proper standard, that is his own affair; but he is at all events given a fair start and encouragement. There is indeed a much stronger incentive for a young man to come forward in the House of Commons from the fact of his being sent up to Parliament by his constituents, who will probably, to a certain extent, expect him to do something; and in the case of any strong and important constituency this pressure will be always more or less forcibly applied. True, this does not apply to the other House. There the chief incentive will be a man's own aspirations, which, if they be of any higher nature than those of a groom or keeper, will probably lead him to wish to act up in some degree to the position in which he is placed. And here it is, I think, worthy of note that the two positions are in a very important degree essentially dissimilar. It may be said (and with some degree of fairness) of a member of the House of Commons who does not fulfil his duties: If you are unwilling or incapable of performing these duties, why did you offer yourself for election? Your entry into Parliament is, subject to the approval of your electors, entirely a matter of free choice with yourself. If you meant to do nothing, you should not have come forward; in any case,

if you cannot make yourself in any degree useful, and are thereby keeping out a better man, you can, and should, resign your seat.'.

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Now in the Lords this argument cannot apply. There, except in the case of newly created or Scotch and Irish representative peers, who are in a different position, a member's seat not only does not depend on his own choice or that of any elective body, but he has no voice in the matter. Directly his father (or family predecessor) dies, he becomes ipso facto, whether he likes it or not, a member of the House of Lords, and this position he cannot resign under any circumstances whatever. True he may never take his seat,' or attend the House, or even call himself by his proper title-in short, he may ignore his position, but he cannot alter it, or the civil disabilities which it entails by way of barring him from almost any civil employment. This, it seems to me, is a great hardship in the case of those men who really wish to make themselves useful in the world, and who are unable to extricate themselves from their somewhat false position. And it is not only a great hardship in many individual cases, but it is very bad policy. In these days of trial and inquiry we ought not to lose sight of the fact that individuals and institutions are mostly judged of, not by their intrinsic, but by their logical merit. An institution or a custom may have the plea of immemorial usage to speak for it; it may work very well now; it may do an immense deal of practical good every day; nay, its removal may obviously be productive of much serious evil. But if it cannot be supported by strict logical argument, if its advantages cannot be shown in plain black and white, if they do not lie obviously on the surface so as to commend themselves to the superficial admiration of the ignorant mob, that institution or that custom is certainly doomed. Now the great complaint of the day is, as above mentioned, the undue stress of work laid on the shoulders of Parliament, who cannot keep pace with it; and here we have one House working day after day and night after night, to the detriment of its own health and vigour, and still getting into arrears, while the other House does literally next to no work at all, and its members consequently scarcely ever attend, with the exception of those who are officially obliged to do so.

It is not my purpose to examine all the old threadbare arguments for and against a House of Lords. It may or may not be a vitally important part of our constitution. If it is the former, the sooner its advantages and practical working capabilities are made more obvious, the more lasting is its continuance likely to be. At present its position is a curious one. As a debating club, or rather a court of inquiry, it is admirable; as a Chamber, it is next door to a nonentity; as a public office, worthless.

What must strike every observer is that its strength is so much wasted. Its members are almost all of them men of honour, high feeling, and in a responsible position of life. They have, I suppose,

universally received a high and liberal education, and there are many and many of them who, if they were allowed to do so, and were to receive the smallest encouragement, would gladly come forward and take a useful share of public business, and train into good public servants, instead of being driven by the present system, too often it is to be feared, into habits of idleness.

'The independent peers will not attend,' say their detractors. The answer is conclusive. They do not attend because there is nothing for them to do, and they are not allowed to do anything.

That this complaint is no mere chimera is, I think, sufficiently shown by the fact of it having been a subject of actual debate, and also of more than one question addressed to the Government by the Opposition. I am perfectly aware that there have been, and are, exceptional cases of young independent peers rising to eminence in the House, but in almost every such case they have been aided by their great personal wealth and consequent influence on the constituencies, which has rendered them very undesirable persons for any government to treat with disrespect. Of course those peers who have already sat and made a reputation in the House of Commons will, no doubt, always continue their influence in the Lords; but these cases obviously do not fall within the limits of the present argument. They have been given fair play on entering Parliament, and have made brilliant use of their talents, and when they retire from the former scene of their labours their works follow them. It is a significant fact, that almost all the present ministry in the Lords, with the exception of the late Colonial Secretary, have previously sat and made their mark in the other House. There are again a few instances of men who have entered Parliament for the first time in the Upper House, and by dint of extraordinary talent and readiness have taken the House by storm, and established a position which they owe neither to personal influence nor favouritism. Such men will always rise in whatever society they may be placed; but at the same time there are many and many men who may not be of transcendent genius, or possess that rare faculty of being able to make a brilliant impression the first time they come forward, but who nevertheless have in them the making of good useful public men by means of judicious training and encouragement.

Is there, then, no remedy for all this? I am inclined to think the remedy lies in the hands of the Government, and might be applied with very little difficulty.

I would make two suggestions:

1. That more bills should originate in the House of Lords than at present.

It is sometimes said that the House of Commons would be jealous of this, and would exert pressure against such a plan. I cannot see on what grounds. Money bills could not of course originate else