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their intentions with regard to the land. A similar opinion was again expressed in 1856, and the governor said it was clear that the natives were hostile to a system of popular government in which they had no share.

They had but too much reason for this feeling; and, if time and space permitted, it would be easy to show how much injustice to the natives was done by a Government so constituted, and subject to no effective control by the Crown. Without, however, going into details, it is sufficient to say that this injustice produced deep discontent in the minds of the natives; but still they were not the first to have recourse to arms. After long disputes, especially on the subject of land, war was begun by the British artillery firing upon a pah which the natives were peaceably occupying, on land of which they claimed (as it ultimately turned out upon good grounds) to be the legitimate owners, and to which they asserted their right only by refusing to remove from it. The war, thus begun, continued, with some temporary interruptions, for about nine years; it was carried on as savagely as such wars always are, caused terrible sufferings to both parties, and led in the end almost to the destruction of the Maories, a small remnant only being left of what thirty years ago was such an interesting race. The war had hardly begun before it was found how practically impossible it is, when real danger arises, to act upon the rule that it is the business of colonists to protect themselves. When British subjects with their wives and families have been barbarously murdered, and their fellow-colonists are in extreme danger from halfreclaimed savages, no matter what provocation these may have received, no minister in this country can refuse to send Her Majesty's forces to the assistance of those whose lives and properties are in peril. Accordingly, when the war began in New Zealand, additional troops and a naval force were sent there, and at one time not less than 10,000 British soldiers were employed in the colony. It is true that, owing to the division of authority and mismanagement, this large force failed to accomplish all that was expected from it; and, if my memory does not deceive me, the whole, or the greater part, of it was withdrawn before the war was brought to a final close, which was accomplished at last by the colonists with little or no assistance. On this ground the advocates of the policy of leaving the colonists to themselves are accustomed to cite what occurred in New Zealand as a proof of its being right-forgetting that but for the adoption of this policy there would have been no war at all, and also that, though they were strong enough to finish the war after the number of their enemies and their resources had been reduced in the struggle to a small fraction of what they had been, there is little reason to believe that in 1861 the comparatively small number of settlers then in the colony could have held their ground against the Maories, whose strength was still unbroken.

Notwithstanding the unhappy results in New Zealand of the policy I have been considering, it was determined a few years ago to adopt the same policy in South Africa. The object of doing so was apparently to afford plausible grounds for keeping the army at a lower establishment of numbers than had formerly been usual. It was assumed that, in comparing the amount of force which the nation at different periods might rely upon as available for any sudden emergency, we ought to look only to the number of men at home. If, therefore, the force stationed in the colonies could be so reduced that with a smaller number of men on the establishment we could still have as many as usual at home, it was contended that the country would be as ready as formerly to meet any danger that might arise, and that the estimates might be safely cut down. I am not aware that there was any strong reason for desiring thus to diminish the cost of the army at that time. The nation was rich and prosperous, and the people more lightly taxed in proportion to their means than any other people in the world. Except, therefore, for the purpose of gratifying the expectations the public had been taught to entertain, that each successive Budget would bring with it some diminution of taxation, I do not see that there was any occasion for trying to keep down the cost of the army to the lowest possible point. But parsimony (I deny its having been economy) was then in full favour with the Government and with Parliament. A reduction of the force at the Cape was therefore resolved upon; and in order that the full responsibility for maintaining the peace of the colony with this diminished force might be thrown on the colonists, they were pressed to alter their existing constitution by adopting the system of party government. This proposal did not meet with a favourable reception in the colony. The governor, Sir P. Wodehouse, in some very able despatches, pointed out what appeared to me conclusive objections to the scheme, and it was in the first instance rejected by the Cape Parliament. But a new governor succeeded Sir P. Wodehouse, and a new Parliament was elected, which, by no very gentle use of the power and the influence of the Government, was with some difficulty induced to pass the measure recommended to it.

It is only fair to the white inhabitants of the Cape to remark that, although I must admit my information on the subject to be very imperfect, there is, so far as I am aware, little if any cause for imputing blame to them for the manner in which they have exercised the uncontrolled power given to them over their coloured fellowsubjects. But we are still in early days of the new system of government, and it is difficult to believe that eventually the usual consequences will not follow from the possession of a practical monopoly of political power by a minority of the population. If this danger is averted, a not less serious one may arise: the ignorant and

semi-barbarous coloured population may learn to avail themselves of the franchise to which they are legally entitled (though I believe that as yet it is not largely used by them), and may make themselves masters of the Parliament and the Government. For the present, however, it is satisfactory to have no reason for supposing that the authority which the Crown has surrendered to the representatives of the inhabitants of the Cape has been abused. In other respects the change of system does not appear to have answered so well.

Though the reduction of the British force in South Africa was not carried, I believe, by any means so far as was originally intended, the war with the Kafirs, which has lately occurred, affords ground for doubting whether even any pecuniary advantage has been obtained by this measure. The presence of a larger British garrison in Africa before that war began would most probably have prevented it from breaking out; the Kafirs, like other savages, are easily encouraged to resist an authority which does not appear to have the support of an adequate military force, but may generally be kept in obedience by a much smaller number of troops than is required to subdue a rebellion which has once begun. I can hardly doubt that the reduction of the number of British troops in Africa must have had much to do in causing the recent Kafir war with its heavy expense. The saving, therefore, effected by bringing home part of our troops has turned out in the end a very costly one. This is the more true when we consider that the saving in the first instance was more nominal than real. The nation must have somewhere a considerable reserve of troops ready at short notice to be sent to any place where they may be wanted. In ordinary times there is no need for these troops in England, and there is no station where a part of them might be kept with greater advantage than South Africa. It is a healthy station-one where the maintenance of troops is not costly; and in these days of steam and of telegraphs, though we have been strangely remiss in extending telegraphic communication to the Cape, the services of troops quartered there can be made promptly available either in Europe or in India. In the Sepoy war two or three regiments sent from the Cape to the assistance of Lord Canning contributed much towards bringing our Indian Empire safely through that great danger. In 1867 and on one or two subsequent occasions, when the intended withdrawal of troops from Africa was discussed in the House of Lords, I pressed these considerations on the attention of the Government, but without

success.

The change in the system of government at the Cape has had the further bad effect of rendering it impossible to secure the adoption of a steady and consistent policy towards the coloured tribes not only throughout the British dominions in Africa, but beyond our frontier. So long as the governor of the Cape, whose authority extended over the whole of the British dominions, was responsible to the Crown for

the executive and administrative measures of his government, and was assisted in the performance of his duties by public servants whose duty it was to carry his orders into effect, and who held office practically during good behaviour, there was sufficient security that all the measures of the Government in every part of the territory from Natal to the Cape would be directed to the same object and guided by the same views. But when the Government ceased to have the real direction of the policy of the government of the Cape, and it fell into the hands of ministers whose advice he was bound to follow, but whose authority was confined to the Cape Colony properly so called, there ceased to be any means of insuring unity of purpose and co-operation among the authorities of different parts of the territory.

This evil was felt to be so serious, that two years ago Lord Carnarvon, who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies, carried a bill through Parliament for facilitating a confederation of the South African States, including the Dutch republics and the territory subject to British authority. But that Act is only to come into operation by the consent of the various parties concerned, which has not hitherto been obtained, and does not seem likely to be so; and even if it were, it is still less probable that an efficient authority for the government of this vast territory could be constructed out of the jarring and discordant elements from which it would have to be drawn. The Assembly, which would exercise authority in the confederation contemplated by the Act, will represent not only the men of superior intelligence, to be found in the chief seats of industry and trade, but also the Boers who, with their fathers, have been accustomed for time out of mind to oppress and plunder the native races; these uneducated natives themselves; and the miscellaneous European population of the diamond fields. It seems to me utterly impossible that an authority, resting upon representation, can be formed from such materials as these from which we could look for such a firm, just, and steady administration as is indispensable for the welfare of both the white and coloured races, and the gradual civilisation of the latter. Such an administration might, I believe, have been best secured by maintaining the former executive authority of the Crown. The Cape Colony, properly so called, with its larger proportion of civilised inhabitants, might with advantage have continued to enjoy representative institutions according to the system which, till within a short time, was the only one known in the British colonies by which real executive and administrative authority was exercised by the governor, and the Legislature took charge only of matters of legislation and finance. The extension of the colony beyond its original boundaries ought, I think, to have been avoided, and the territory beyond these boundaries in British Kafraria, Griqualand, and Natal should have been separately organised under officers subordinate to the governor of the

Cape. This was the former practice as to Natal; and the governor of the Cape, without interfering habitually in the details of its administration, exercised even in that distant settlement all the authority that was necessary to insure a uniformity of policy towards the natives throughout the British territory, and to provide for its different divisions affording to each other mutual assistance and support. This system of government was not as well organised as would have been desirable; but before responsible' government was forced on the Cape, I do not believe that there would have been any insuperable difficulty in arranging with its Parliament the improvements that were required. What was perhaps most wanted was that a uniform rate of customs duties should be established throughout British South Africa, with provisions for fairly apportioning the revenue derived from them among the several divisions of the territory, and placing a reasonable percentage of the receipts at the disposal of the governor, to be applied for purposes connected with the improvement of the natives. As they contribute by no means a small amount to this revenue, such an arrangement would have been only fair towards them.

Whenever the war with the Zulus is over, it will be a question deserving of serious consideration whether even now the reorganisation of the government of the British territories in South Africa upon the principle I have indicated ought not to be attempted. Of course, after having been once granted, what is regarded as a boon in the privilege of self-government cannot be withdrawn from the Cape colonists without their own consent. But it seems to me by no means impossible that they might be brought to see that some such modification of their present system of government as I have alluded to would be for their real interest, especially with a view to the present excitement among the coloured races within and without the Cape frontier, and to the very serious consequences that might arise if these classes were to gain an ascendency in the Assembly. No doubt, in order to induce the colonists to agree to the change I have suggested, an assurance of protection from the uncivilised tribes would be required; and to give such an assurance would be very contrary to the views of colonial policy which have of late prevailed. But I believe it would, nevertheless, be wise to give such an assurance, and that the responsibility we should incur would be less onerous than that which now rests upon us. We find that though, by professing to leave the colonists to manage their own affairs, we lose the power of so directing their policy as to avert war, still, when war comes, we cannot leave the Queen's subjects without the protection that is necessary for their safety, and we have to spend more money in giving them this protection, when the time of danger comes, than would have been necessary to maintain a control by which peace might have been preserved. I am also convinced that if the Imperial VOL. V.-No. 26.

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