the right divine of kings, and for about twenty years from 1689 the nation had comparative rest; but successive difficulties were all along to be apprehended, as the Tories stuck to the right divine dogma, whilst the Whigs with equal zeal adhered to the new doctrine of the will of the nation.

At the death of Anne, Bolingbroke and the Tories wished to see her succeeded by her brother, although a Roman Catholic, rather than by a Protestant German Prince who could not speak a word of English. In this they failed.

6

The Whigs and the mass of the people wished to see the Hanover succession secured as arranged by the Act of Settlement, by which it was provided that the Crown after the demise of William the Third and Queen Anne without issue was limited to Sophia Electress of Hanover, granddaughter of James the First, and her heirs being Protestants.'

The people at York on the accession of George cried Liberty, prosperity, and no Pretender,' and as Lytton Bulwer has written, 'Walpole's only excuse for violating the constitution by the Septennial Act and suppressing opinion by corrupting its organs, was to secure the Hanoverian succession.'

The power of the people over Parliament at this time was very slight; indeed, was pretty much to be found, not in giving their voice as voters at an election, but merely in shouting in the streets; and as this extension of the duration of Parliament was made to appear as carrying out their views in securing the Hanoverian succession, they made no complaint. Whilst the aristocracy, by whose ascendency the Septennial Act was mainly brought about, were perfectly satisfied by this Act, the ruling families of England were in effect enthroned, acting at once on behalf of the Crown and of the people, sometimes exalting the one, sometimes the other, but always retaining ruling positions for themselves.

By the Septennial Act the power of the people over the House of Commons was seriously diminished, as Junius in the Dedication of his celebrated Letters' says

With regard to any influence of the constituents over the conduct of the representative, there is little difference between a seat in Parliament for seven years, and a seat for life. Although the last session of a Septennial Parliament is usually employed in courting the favour of the people, consider that at this rate your representatives have six years for offence and but one for atonement.

The Septennial Act latterly has been vigorously maintained both by Whigs and Tories, under the guise of convenience and saving of turmoil and expense; both sides alike avoid the question of shortening the duration of Parliaments.

The language of Junius in the Dedication of his 'Letters' is so clear on this subject that I venture to quote it in full :

If you reflect that in the changes of administration which have marked and disgraced the present reign-George the Third-although your warmest patriots have in their turn been invested with the lawful and unlawful authority of the Crown, and other reliefs and improvements have been held forth to the people, yet that no man in office has ever promoted or encouraged a Bill for shortening the duration of Parliaments, but that, whoever was Minister, the opposition to this measure ever since the Septennial Act passed has been constant and uniform on the part of Government, you cannot but conclude without the possibility of doubt that long Parliaments are the foundation of the undue influence of the Crown.

This influence answers every purpose of arbitrary power, with an expense and oppression to the people which would be unnecessary in an arbitrary government.

The best of our Ministers find it the easiest and most compendious mode of conducting the King's affairs, and all Ministers have a general interest in adhering to a system, which of itself is sufficient to support them in office without any assistance from personal virtue, popularity, labour, or expense.

These truths are unquestionable. If they make no impression, it is because they are too vulgar and notorious.

These words penned in 1796 are every one applicable to our own day, for human nature is the same. But they are intensified by the position of our times; quickened communication and vastly increased intelligence have made seven years of our time longer than a score of years in the days of Junius.

It is worthy of attention here that, by changes in the law, Ministers may remain even longer in office now than in the days of Junius.

Formerly, the duration of Parliaments was frequently lessened by the demise of the Crown; and in 1839, forty years ago, Macaulay said, 'Whenever any shortening of Parliaments takes place, we ought to alter that rule which requires that Parliament shall be dissolved as often as the demise of the Crown takes place.'

He did not argue that such a change should be made as long as the seven years' system continued, for to do so would be indirectly to add to the average length of Parliaments. But this has been done by the Reform Act of 1867, which provides that the Parliament in being at the demise of the Crown shall continue as long as it would otherwise, unless dissolved by the Crown.

During this century it has been the practice to dissolve Parliament within a month of the demise of the Crown: had the provision made under the Act of 1867 been in existence, it would have added considerably to the length of several Parliaments; for at the death of George the Third, Parliament had only been one year, six months, and twenty-five days in existence when dissolved; and at the death. of George the Fourth, three years, eight months, and ten days; and of William the Fourth, two years and five months.

The tendency of Parliaments now will, undoubtedly, be to live out the full terms more completely, and there are indications that each

swing of the political pendulum will be longer than before. This change, made in 1867, although excellent in itself, has undoubtedly added a percentage to the duration of Parliaments beyond the original Septennial Act.

Frequent appeals to the people were almost unknown during the last century, and within the walls of the House of Commons itself political life seems at one time almost to have expired; during the twenty-one years that Walpole remained at the head of affairs, his administration is almost without a history, in the third year of his ministry there was but one division, and year after year there was no division at all.

The Tory Members were so few they hardly cared to attend. From the passing of the Septennial Act in 1716 until 1801-the first Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland under the Union-there were thirteen Parliaments; eight of which continued over six years, three over five and a half, one nearly five, whilst one lasted only three years and five months; the shortening of two of these Parliaments being occasioned by the death of two Sovereigns. Since the Union it has been generally the practice not to keep Parliament more than six years; indeed, in the ten Parliaments which sat from 1796, to the Reformed Parliament of 1833, there is but one instance of a Parliament going beyond six years, and that was the first of George the Fourth, which continued. for six years, one month, and nine days; and only three went beyond five years: under three and a half years being the average

of the ten.

Since the first reformed Parliament of 1833, until the Parliament of 1868, the first which was elected under the Reform Act of 1867, there have been nine Parliaments, two of which continued for about six years; the one a month under, the other a month over six years; the rest varying from two to nearly five years: the average of the nine being three years and nine months. Since the Reform Act of 1867, we have had two Parliaments, Mr. Gladstone's of 1868, which lasted for five years and two months, and the present Parliament, which, having been elected in 1874, has already existed for five sessions, and may, as the law now stands, continue until February

1881.

During the last century, several attempts were made to obtain a return to triennial, or to the even more ancient system of annual Parliaments. The most important of these attempts was in 1734, when on the 13th of March, Mr. Bromley, the son of Queen Anne's Tory Secretary of State, moved the repeal of the Septennial Act. This motion led to a debate which was productive of at least two great Parliamentary speeches: the one by Wyndham the Tory chief, who supported the motion in a very remarkable speech which has been considered as one of the most powerful specimens of the

Parliamentary eloquence of that day; the other by Walpole, who, opposing the motion, insisted that there were still Jacobitism and disaffection in the nation, and that frequent elections would be dangerous to the liberty of the country.

Nevertheless, some Whigs, who had long scrupled about voting for the repeal of a Bill which they themselves had once thought necessary for the security of the Protestant succession, voted with the Tories, who in vain insisted that the Septennial Act was an encroachment on the rights of the people, for the motion was lost by a majority of 63, 247 voting against and 184 for it.

In 1745 the Tories brought forth a motion for annual Parliaments, in order, as they hoped, to shake the Hanoverian succession.

In 1792 the Whig leaders insisted that in order to prevent the practice of keeping one and the same Parliament on foot till the majority was corrupted by offices, gifts, and pensions, the ancient legal course of annually chosen Parliaments should immediately be restored.'

During the present century the question has not been prominent. There was a short debate in 1833, and again in 1834, when a motion for the Repeal of the Septennial Act came to a division, 185 voting for, and 235 against its repeal. Then there was an important debate in May, 1837, when 87 voted for the repeal of the Act, and 96 against. The narrow majority by which this motion was lost had, perhaps, the useful effect of causing attention for a time to be drawn to the question; and at the Edinburgh election in 1839 we find Mr. Macaulay speaking at some length upon the subject, and urging powerful reasons in favour of shortening Parliament to five years. He said:

The objections to long Parliaments are perfectly obvious. The truth is, that in very long Parliaments you have no representation at all. The mind of the people goes on changing, and the Parliament remaining unchanged ceases to reflect the opinion of the constituent bodies. In the old times before the Revolution, a Parliament might sit during the life of the monarch. The Parliament called by Charles the Second continued to sit long after two-thirds of those who had heartily welcomed him back from Holland as heartily wished him in Holland again. Since the Revolution we have not felt that evil to the same extent. But it must be admitted that the term of seven years is too long. Whatever may be the legal term, it ought to be for a year longer than that for which Parliament ought ordinarily to sit, for there must be a general election at the end of the legal term, let the state of the country be what it may: there may be riot, there may be revolution, there may be famine in the country; and yet, if the Minister wait to the end of the legal term, the writs must go out. A wise Minister will, therefore, always dissolve Parliament a year before the legal time, if the country be then in a quiet state. My own inclination would be to fix the legal term at five years, and thus to have a Parliament practically every four years.

For some time the subject of the duration of Parliament was virtually out of sight, but in 1843 Mr. Sharman Crawford raised

the question, and again in 1849 Mr. Tennyson D'Eyncourt reintroduced his bill for shortening the duration of Parliaments. This measure did not specify any particular period or term. On the 22nd of May of that year he obtained leave to introduce the bill, 46 voting in favour of it and 41 against. He does not appear to have proceeded with the measure, nor was anything heard of the question until incidentally, on Lord John Russell introducing his Reform Bill on the 9th of February, 1852, Mr. Bright drew attention to the silence of the noble lord about shortening the duration of Parliament. The noble lord had said nothing about the Septennial Act. Mr. Bright said he believed it would be better for members if they were more responsible to their constituents at the beginning of a Parliament. He found them suffering from an intense feeling of responsibility just before a dissolution. He should like that the feeling of responsibility should be spread over the whole period of Parliament. He believed that it would add very much to the conscientiousness with which members would perform their duty to that House. It would render it difficult for Government to call a party meeting in Downing Street to frighten them with a dissolution, a course pursued by Government from both sides greatly to the injury of the House.'

Again in 1858 there was a motion made upon the subject, but it led to no important discussion. It is not difficult, however, to see why this question has been less debated in modern times than some others connected with Parliamentary reform. Ever since the American war and the French Revolution until the Reform Act of 1867, the extension of the suffrage and the re-distribution of seats were too prominent to admit of or make the duration of Parliaments an important question. The American war opened the eyes of English statesmen to the necessity of Parliamentary reform, and Mr. Pitt in 1781-82 and 1785 propounded different plans, and nearer the end of the century the question received a fresh impetus by the French Revolution.

From that time till 1867 the questions of the qualification of voters and the adjustment of seats have been hotly discussed; and next to these the manner of voting, namely, whether it should be open or by ballot, was regarded as the most important.

In the face of such questions, in the face of securing a vote at all, in the face of the inequalities and corruptions which had so long defaced our electoral system, it is clear that the question of shortening the Septennial period was of but secondary importance; but with these other questions settled, and by the light of new experience, especially the experience of sessions just closed, when it is admitted that the constitution was strained in a somewhat alarming manner, now is a most appropriate time for fairly and thoughtfully considering the question; for surely every thinking man will admit that he