power to centre in the few to the exclusion of the many: leave power unwatched for even a short time in the hands of the unscrupulous, and you will quickly see encroachments upon the liberties of the people, and there is nothing which should be resisted with a more determined resolution than such encroachments. Different Prime Ministers have different notions as to the power of the Crown and the rights of the people. For instance, the present Prime Minister has notions of the prerogatives of the Crown and the rights of the people which, in my opinion, the mass of my fellowcountrymen do not in the least degree share. Enormous obligations have recently been incurred in the name of the British people, entailing, perhaps, heavy future taxation, and, it may be, even forced military service, yet for two years more the hands of the people are tied and their voice is powerless; binding obligations are being entered into in relation to matters which, when the people had a voice five years ago, had not then even loomed in the distance. It is true that indignation meetings may be held, and protests against the action of a Government may be solemnly entered into, but there is no constitutional means by which it is possible for the nation formally to declare its mind at such a crisis, except a general election; and if these were a little more frequent than they now are, the effect on Ministers and Parliament would be extremely wholesome. Indeed, were I to use no other argument, but point to the experience of the country throughout the whole year, 1878, it would be sufficiently alarming to cause a desire on the part of all thinking men for some shortening of the time during which power was to remain uncontrolled in the hands of any Ministry. In the great debate which took place at the end of last session on the Eastern Question, the leaders of the Opposition fearlessly and without hesitation pointed out the grave dangers to which this uncontrolled power of the Government might lead the country. Mr. Gladstone said: "We are perplexed with the apprehension that," as long as these proceedings continue to be sustained by a majority in this House, and as long as the country has had no opportunity of passing its final and conclusive judgment, they will be repeated and renewed from time to time as may seem good to the Ministry in power.' Mr. Lowe declared that it is perfectly manifest, if this state of things may be supposed to be permanent, the liberties of the country are not worth a day's purchase.' Then Mr. Forster said: "What I maintain is, that the action of the Government is practically revolutionary.' And again he urged: 'It is pitiable, it is almost absurd, to talk about the great council of the realm if a perfectly new policy is to be undertaken, and perfectly new responsibilities are to be incurred, without our ever being consulted.' And the leader of the Opposition, the Marquis of Hartington, in winding up the debate, was very clear in his expression of opinion that there has been a straining of the prerogative in this matter; and I venture to say that in time to come it will be more difficult than it has hitherto been to maintain that practice of the prerogative of the Crown.' If such a state of things is allowed to go on after this Parliament is dissolved, it will be our own fault. The nation will look to the next House of Commons to devise some safeguards against the perilous position so clearly and ably pointed out by the leaders of the Liberal party. The consideration of this question naturally divides itself into two aspects--the one historical, the other practical. In looking at the historical aspects of the subject, it is needless for my purpose to go back with any minuteness to an earlier period than to the Revolution. It is, however, worth observing that since the year 1509, when it is generally supposed the duration of Parliaments was extended beyond one year, there have been, including the present Parliament, eightysix in all. Only four of these existed beyond seven years; besides these, but ten have had a sexennial duration; of the rest, only ten have lasted above five years, five between four and five years, and six above three and less than four; of the remaining number only eleven existed above two years, and no less than thirty-eight for a shorter period: so that the average since the reign of Henry the Seventh does not exceed three years, even including the Long Parliament in the reign of Charles the First, and the still longer one of Charles the Second, which existed nearly seventeen years. Let us now pass on to the historical aspects of the question since the Revolution; for although it is true there was the ephemeral Triennial Act of 1641, it is only of importance that we should look at the history and working of the Triennial Act of 1694, which was the law of the land for twenty years, and the Septennial Act of 1716, which still exists. As Lord Russell observes: The Revolution of 1688 which appeared merely to transfer the sovereignty over England from James to William and Mary, in actual fact transferred the sovereignty from the King to the House of Commons;' for by the Bill of Rights the sole power to tax the nation was vested in the House of Commons, and its annual meeting guaranteed by two provisions-the one that an Annual Act, the Mutiny Act, was necessary for keeping on foot a defined number of troops; the other, the Appropriation Act, which is also an Act annually repeated, and by a clause of which the Lords of the Treasury are forbidden from appropriating any moneys in the Exchequer for any other purpose than that voted by Parliament. With these guarantees for its annual assembling, the House of Commons became the supreme power in the State. No Ministry had in the modern sense of the term yet existed. Hitherto each great officer of State had been independent of his fellow-officers; each was the King's servant,' and responsible to the King alone, for the discharge of his special duties. It was common for the King to dismiss individual Ministers without any communication whatever with the rest. The new King was advised to recognise practically the new power of the Commons by choosing the Ministers of the Crown exclusively from among the party which was strongest in the Lower House; Thus replacing independent Ministers by a Ministry drawn from the party who reflected most strongly the will of the majority of the people and who, representing the same opinions, were bound together in common action by a sense of responsibility and loyalty to their party, became at once the Ministers of the Crown' and an executive Committee of the House of Commons. And so solved in the simplest manner the problem which had so long vexed both King and Commons.'2 And, as if to give completeness and harmony to this arrangement, from this time it first became general that the King should on the opening of Parliament read the programme of the party in power in the form of a royal speech; henceforth also small factions were drawn together into either of the two great parties which supported or opposed the Ministers of the Crown. If at a general election there was a change of parties, then it was of course the duty of the King to draw his Ministers from the victors. As Bulwer, in England and the English, says: The King enjoys the prerogative of seeing two parties fight in the lists and of crowning the victor.' In order that the people might have regular and frequent opportunities of reconsidering their choice of rulers another measure was needed, and in December 1689, but ten months after Parliament had presented the Bill of Rights to William and Mary, a Bill for Triennial Parliaments was introduced, and, although lost through the prorogation of Parliament, was passed by both Houses early in 1693. To this Bill, carried in the House of Commons by 200 to 161, the King nevertheless refused his assent. There was reason, perhaps, for the delay in passing the Triennial Bill from 1689 to 1694, for It was thought by William and many besides that some middle course should have been chosen between leaving the dissolution of Parliament open indefinitely and making it imperative after so short an interval as three years. 3 The House of Commons, however, clung to a measure of such importance; and at the end of 1694 The Triennial Bill' became law, as An Act for the frequent meeting and calling of Parliaments.' The preamble of the Act runs thus: Whereas by the Ancient Laws and Statutes of this Kingdom frequent Parliaments ought to be held, and whereas frequent and new Parliaments tend very much to the 2 Green's Short History of the English People, p. 682. 3 Vaughan's Revolutions in English History, vol. iii. p. 569. happy union and good agreement of the King and people &c.' and the main provisions were: That from henceforth a Parliament shall be holden once in three years at the least,' and 'That from henceforth no Parliament whatever that shall at any time hereafter be called, assembled, or held, shall have any continuance longer than for three years only at the furthest, to be accounted from the day on which by the writs of summons the said Parliament shall be appointed to meet.' And the then Parliament was not to continue beyond the 1st of November, 1696. This Act continued in force during the nine Parliaments elected in the reigns of William and of Anne, the exact duration of each being as follows: With the death of Anne Triennial Parliaments in England also expired. Although there are many reasons why in our time so short a period would in my opinion be unwise, yet no one can say that England had ever stood higher than during the reign of Queen Anne ; 'no doubt progress became material rather than political, but the material progress of the country was such as England had never before seen; 94 nor can it be said to have been unproductive of active and powerful statesmen belonging to both parties in the State, when we see two such eminent Tories as Harley, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and St. John, Secretary of State, and Robert Walpole chosen as Secretary of War under the purely Whig Government of 1708. Let us now look at the origin and history of the Septennial Act. Queen Anne died on the 31st of July, 1714; the Elector of Hanover was on the 1st of August proclaimed King as George the First of England. A general election, however, did not take place, as formerly, immediately on the demise of the Crown; but in accordance with the law passed in the reign of William the Third, which postponed the dissolution until within six months after the accession of the new Sovereign, the election took place on the 15th of January, 1715, and the new Parliament met on the 15th of the following March. This Parliament, having been elected under the Triennial Act, should have continued at the furthest only until the beginning of 1718; but the Whigs, who were in great strength (the Tories, although they crowded the House at the accession of Anne, after the arrival of George the First, owing to their Jacobite leanings, became almost powerless in English politics-indeed it is asserted that the Tory members of the House of Commons hardly numbered fifty!), ventured upon the bold course of extending the period by four years, without any consultation with the nation. No doubt in 1715 the country was in a state of great disaffection, and the Government, fearing that to encounter a general election would be to place the Hanoverian succession in peril, as well as perhaps to risk their own places, made this partly the foundation or excuse for introducing the new measure and passing it, with much haste, through both Houses; and it became law in the month of May 1716. The title of the Act runs thus: An Act for enlarging the time of continuance of Parliament, appointed by an Act made in the reign of King William and Queen Mary intituled an Act for the frequent meeting and calling of Parliaments,' and the preamble states that Whereas it has been found by experience that the said clause (limiting to three years) hath proved very grievous and burthensome, by occasioning much greater and more continued expenses in order to elections of members to serve in Parliament, and more violent and lasting heats and animosities among the subjects of the realm than were ever known before the said clause was; and the said provision, if it should continue, may probably at this juncture, when a Popish faction are designing and endeavouring to renew the rebellion within this kingdom and an invasion from abroad, be destructive to the peace and security of the Government. The provision which follows is- Be it enacted that this present Parliament and all Parliaments that shall at any time hereafter be called, assembled, or held, shall and may respectively have continuance for seven years and no longer, to be accounted from the day on which by writ of summons this present Parliament hath been, or any future Parliament shall be, appointed to meet, unless this present, or any such Parliament hereafter to be summoned, shall be sooner dissolved by His Majesty, his heirs, or successors. Many consider that the Parliament which passed this Act, being elected like its predecessors for a period of only three years, by this extension of its own existence as well as the existence of all future Parliaments, violated the law and the Constitution. The question of the succession was the question of the day. With the expulsion of the Stuarts the long struggle between the King and the people ended. The substitution of princes who received their title to the throne through the will of the nation extinguished all absurd dogmas as to |